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ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION 
DEGREE AND PATTERNS OF FORMAL NGO PARTICIPATION WITHIN THE 
UNITED NATIONS ECONOMIC AND SOCIAL COMMITTEE (ECOSOC): AN 
APPRAISAL OF NGO CONSULTATIVE STATUS RELATIVE TO POLITICAL 
PLURALISM 
by 
Barry D. Mowell 
Florida International University, 2017 
Miami, Florida 
Professor Markus Thiel, Major Professor 
 The United Nations (UN) has invested increasing levels of effort in recent 
decades to cultivate a more effective, diverse and democratic institutional culture via the 
inclusion of and interaction among international civil society organizations (CSOs) and 
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) to supplement the traditional role of states as the 
primary transnational actors.  The principle vehicle for the UN-civil society dynamic is 
the consultative status (CS) program within the Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), wherein a diverse range of nearly 5,000 transnational organizations 
ostensibly participate.  
 This research examined patterns of participation and the nature/level of 
CSO/NGO involvement within the UN, with particular focus upon ECOSOC.  In 
examining participation patterns, the research identified patterns related to 
geographical/proportional representation among developed and developing regions and 
world regions in general and also as related to policy/issue areas represented.  In terms of 
 vii 
 
involvement, the research sought to assess the types and degree of contributions being 
made by CSOs/NGOs in association with the UN.  To address both areas, the research 
employed a two-prong methodology including (1) a detailed analysis of the UN’s online 
integrated Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) database and (2) a comprehensive survey 
questionnaire mailed to a randomly-selected sample of 10% of all organizations holding 
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC. 
 The findings challenge the assumption that UN association with international civil 
society has realized pluralist ideals in that substantial variations were found to exist in the 
representation of policy/issue areas, with some areas far better represented than others.  
Perhaps more importantly, the research revealed that only a minority of organizations in 
the ECOSOC-CS program appear to be actively/regularly engaged with the UN, with a 
large minority of CS-accredited organizations engaged only periodically or to a more 
limited extent, and a substantial minority not participating/interacting in any way.  Rather 
than exemplifying pluralism within the constructivist tradition, findings imply support for 
liberal institutionalist theories in that decades-long expansion of IGO influence has 
facilitated a corollary expectation of expanding international civil society and an 
associated expectation of linkages between transnational governance and democratic 
institutions on the one hand and transnational civil society on the other as a standardized 
norm.   
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I. CHAPTER ONE: 
INTRODUCTION TO CIVIL SOCIETY AND PLURALISM WITHIN UN-ECOSOC 
 
General Statement of Problem Area & Research Purpose 
 A diverse range of civil society organizations has increasingly been involved with 
the United Nations.  This includes record numbers of civil society organizations (CSOs) 
also known as non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which hold formal consultative 
status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the main organ for UN-
civil society interaction.  A primary goal of the UN has been to cultivate a more effective, 
diverse and democratic institutional culture via the active inclusion of and interaction 
among international organizations and civil society to augment the traditional role of 
states as the primary transnational actors within the organization.  This study seeks to 
determine the patterns of participation and effectiveness of civil society organizations 
within the UN, with a particular focus on CSO/NGO participation within ECOSOC.  As 
the number and diversity of organizations holding ECOSOC consultative status has 
increased, have the patterns of their involvement and influence changed?   
 
Significance of Study 
 This study is significant for three reasons.  Firstly, the UN practice of cultivating 
formal association with reputable international civil society organizations has expanded 
significantly in recent years and has been described as the most dynamic area of growth 
and change within the UN framework (Alger 2002).  In 1946 when the practice was 
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initiated, only 41 CSOs/NGOs held formal consultative status with the UN, but as of 
2016 the status was afforded to nearly 5,000 organizations of various types, representing 
a wide range of issues across the globe (United Nations 2016, 2).  However, it is unclear 
what patterns of participation exist among the diverse range of CSOs/NGOs which have 
formal status with the UN.  For example, what, if any, geographical patterns of 
participation exist? Early in its history of direct association with CSOs/NGOs the UN 
cultivated relationships with western organizations almost exclusively---largely reflecting 
a dearth of such organizations based in the developing world.  In recent decades, a 
multitude of CSOs/NGOs have emerged in the developing world, many of which have 
pursued ties with the UN and may have eroded the western-centric dominance of the 
organizations within ECOSOC.  However, other geographical patterns may be found to 
exist such as disproportionate representation of some world regions relative to others---
e.g. European and/or western CSOs/NGOs are more predominant than those 
headquartered in Africa.  Also, topical patterns of participation may also exist via some 
issues and interest areas being proportionally better represented than others.  This could 
be evidenced through the nature of the CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status as most 
are issue-specific in their focus and also by analyzing the participation of CSOs/NGOs in 
topic-specific initiatives.  For example, human rights as an issue appears to be well 
represented within the UN-ECOSOC civil society framework, much more so than many 
other policy/issue areas.  Analysis of geographical, topical and other patterns of 
participation among CSOs/NGOs is important in cultivating a general understanding of 
the inter-organizational dynamic.  Importantly, most previous attempts to study such 
issues have focused upon one or very limited numbers of such organizations or have been 
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specific to a particular issue area such as human rights or development rather than 
seeking to understand overall patterns of civil society participation within an IGO 
(Tallberg et al 2013). 
 Secondly, the number of CSOs/NGOs with formal standing at the UN has grown 
exponentially, potentially allowing non-state actors an unprecedented level of access and 
input.  Proponents of the trend see it as a catalyst for global justice and democracy in 
which more populations and issues are afforded a voice and in which civil society 
expertise on specific issues may contribute, but it is also viewed as a means for the UN to 
research and implement many multilateral initiatives such as the Sustainable (formerly 
“Millennium”) Development Goals, (Grady 2005; Pubantz 2005).  Large-scale 
participation of civil society organizations within IGOs particularly in policy formulation 
roles also potentially enhances the legitimacy of the IGO (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010).  
Yet, a preliminary assessment of CSO/NGO participation in UN conferences suggests 
minimal actual participation by most of the organizations which have attained formal 
consultative status.  A large number, possibly the majority, of CSOs/NGOs which have 
obtained formal status within the UN may never have engaged in any meaningful way 
with the organization, which would presumably diminish the claims related to a 
dramatically expanded role of civil society and democratic pluralism within the UN 
(Mowell 2015).  To understand the effectiveness of civil society organizations within the 
UN framework, it is necessary to determine their degree of participation within the UN 
and also to understand the factors which encourage participation and barriers which may 
prevent participation.   
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 Thirdly, analysis of patterns and the degree of participation may serve as a 
foundation for further research related to CSOs/NGOs and civil society at the United 
Nations such as understanding the political, fiscal or other reasons for CSO/NGO 
participation or the lack thereof.  For example, should the study reveal that a key 
impediment to participation with ECOSOC is that many organizations do not fully 
understand the consultative status process (i.e., CSOs/NGOs do not know how to 
participate), future analyses could explore ways to better introduce the organizations to 
the UN bureaucracy and streamline their matriculation into the consultative status 
program.  More profoundly, if many CSOs/NGOs fundamentally lack the organizational 
or fiscal ability or sincere commitment to engage with the UN via the program perhaps 
the consultative status program or its admission criteria for CSOs/NGOs should be 
scrutinized for viability. 
 
Origins of Research 
 I served as the United Nations representative for two organizations holding 
consultative status with ECOSOC and was variously accredited to UN headquarters in 
New York, Geneva and Vienna.  Additionally, I advised multiple CSOs/NGOs 
concerning consultative status and the application process and had an opportunity to 
communicate with the leadership of those organizations about possibilities of making 
contributions to the UN’s work.  While the experiences were not uniform, in many cases 
the CSOs/NGOs appeared less interested in actual collaboration and networking than in 
the (real or perceived) prestige and credibility such an association could potentially bring.  
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Some of the organizations seemed keenly interested in how UN-affiliated legitimacy 
could factor into publicity in general and donor/fundraising appeal specifically.   
 As this pattern repeated---though not universally---among different CSOs/NGOs 
with which I had involvement, I became curious as to the degree of participation of such 
organizations which held consultative status.  I began to question whether I had 
experienced something unique or whether lack of genuine commitment to participate was 
common among CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC.  As a part of a 
Florida International University graduate seminar on International Organizations, I 
undertook a preliminary examination of the UN iCSO database which seemed to indicate 
that lack of meaningful participation on the part of CSOs/NGOs with consultative status 
was commonplace.  My initial assumption that my perceptions/experiences were likely 
atypical and that most accredited CSOs/NGOs were active participants began to change 
as I examined the database.   
 It turned out that many such organizations had not participated in any UN 
conference or other function in years---if ever---and it seemed that it was commonplace 
for CSOs/NGOs to lose their accreditation status due to inactivity.  They may have 
officially designated UN representatives and submitted one or more required quadrennial 
reports, but neither of the latter denotes substantive participation or contribution.  The 
preliminary analysis of the iCSO database did not reveal the full extent of participation 
rates or what accounted for them, but it became increasingly apparent that CSO/NGO 
unwillingness or inability to participate in UN forums may be a common phenomenon.  
Not only could I find nothing in the literature that specifically addressed lack of 
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participation among CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with ECOSOC, the UN and 
the majority of the literature tended to exalt the association as an example of 
strengthening of pluralistic and democratic traditions within transnational institutions, a 
view which contrasted sharply with my own experiences and preliminary foray into UN 
data.  This research is the culmination of questions raised by the aforementioned problem 
and seeks to clarify the nature and extent of CSO/NGO affiliations with UN-ECOSOC 
and explore barriers to and catalysts for such interaction. 
 
Key Terminologies and Concepts 
 A wide variety of terms and acronyms are used in this research.  Many of the 
terms are perceived and used in a discordant manner by different scholars within the 
literature.  For example, while some may regard civil society organizations, 
nongovernmental organizations, nonprofit organizations, and voluntary organizations as 
essentially synonymous, others may perceive one or all of the latter terms as distinct in 
some subtle regard and not use the terms interchangeably.  Clarification of many of these 
often overlapping or conflicting terminologies as found in the literature and key concepts 
underlying the terminology is necessary to frame further discussion.    
 The concepts of civil society and civil society organizations (CSOs) are core 
components of this study.  Linz and Stepan (1996, 116) offer a frequently cited 
description of civil society as being comprised of groups which freely self-organized 
independently of government influence which seek to “articulate values, create 
associations and solidarities, and advance their interests.”  Waisman (2006) defined civil 
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society in similar light stating that it is “a slice of society, whose core is the web of 
voluntary associations that articulate interests and values, and their system of interaction, 
as long as these units are not under the control of the state” (Uhlin 2009, 272-73).  In the 
broadest of senses, CSOs are all voluntarily organized associations independent of direct 
government and/or market control.  In a tripartite division of societal activity, the realm 
of civil society is everything not found in the domains of government or 
business/commercial activity, wherein organizations pursue collectively goals (Thiel 
2014).   Early concepts of civil society regarded it as the mediating institutions that 
bridged the gap between the individual and the state (Himmelfarb 2000, 95).  Reflecting 
such a three-part division, the term third-sector organization (TSO) has been used in the 
literature to refer to civil society/CSOs.  Some scholars have a broad and inclusive view 
of civil society as being comprised of widely diverse professional and labor associations, 
religious organizations and perhaps most famously via his example of bowling leagues 
and their decline as symptoms of broader waning of American civil society, Putnam 
(2001) also includes recreational-related organizations.   
 Many regard civil society as having a potentially clear and vital role in that the 
latter and the private sector can be relied upon to more efficiently supplement or replace 
roles traditionally carried out by sovereign governments ranging from the provision of 
social and charitable services to even helping resolve complex international issues 
including even peaceful resolution of military conflicts (Haufler 2008).  Perceptions of 
what constitutes civil society may also be influenced by political perspectives.  
Addressing the latter phenomenon in the United States Eberly (2000) states: 
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  For conservatives it (civil society) embodies a vision for a larger role for 
 community-based charities, especially faith-based ones, which can be substituted 
 for flawed government programs.  Libertarians have recently embraced the term 
 civil society…as a synonym for privatization, implying that the term’s major 
 attraction may be its usefulness in expanding the marketplace and limiting the 
 state.  Alternatively, many liberals see civil society as a means to deepen 
 community participation in public projects, thereby improving both the 
 performance of government and the public’s acceptance of it. 
 Universal agreement does not exist concerning the parameters of what does and 
does not constitute civil society and also, what specifically is and is not a CSO.  Many 
regard civil society as those organizations which are “striving to improve society” and to 
effect political and/or economic change via public activism (Edwards 2009, 2).  Some 
scholars (e.g. Diamond 1994) eschew the inclusion of apolitical or informal organizations 
such as recreational associations as constituting civil society via the perception that such 
groups are more inwardly focused, private and yield less social or civic capital.  Yet, 
commonly such organizations have a multifaceted character wherein a bowling league, 
religious group or book club can also have more direct and formal roles within the civic 
sphere via conducting voter registration drives, collecting donations for charitable or 
activism-related endeavors, or initiating programs working with youth or otherwise 
supporting civic good.   
 Questions can also potentially be raised as to the classification of labor groups or 
professional associations as civil society or CSOs.  By virtue of their connection to 
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business and commerce-related issues would labor unions such as the Teamsters or 
professional associations such as the American Medical Association be best classified as 
manifestations of the civic sphere or the business sphere?  Addressing questions 
surrounding how to classify political parties given their potential connection with or 
control of government, Edwards (2009, 28) contends that “political parties are in civil 
society when they are out of office and out of civil society when they are in.”  Since the 
entire membership of the American Judges Association and the vast majority of members 
of the National Education Association or the National Air Traffic Controllers Association 
are employed by government entities, can they be regarded as “civil” society and 
divorced from the realm of government or alternatively from the realm of business as 
they are all concerned with the economic interests of their respective professions?  While 
the classification of certain organizations including labor unions, professional 
associations and political parties remains a subjective and contested issue, examples exist 
of all of the latter types of organization being granted formal consultative status with the 
UN within the rubric of its international civil society outreach.  
 The terms civil society and CSO may not be completely interchangeable in the 
minds of many in that the former is a broader, more general and inclusive reference than 
the latter which refers to a more formally organized constituency which also has more 
defined agendas.  While different interpretations of the term exist, most broadly the term 
civil society could be perceived to be comprised of most or even the entirety of a 
population and the totality of diverse views and interests it contains.  Expansive models 
of associational life would include most non-state or non-market free associations within 
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a population as constituting civil society (Edwards 2009, 29).  In contrast a CSO is a 
formally organized segment of the population coordinated behind the goal of promoting 
an agenda on behalf of a defined constituency.  Registered voters or politically-active 
persons in the United States exemplify civil society, but neither could be regarded as a 
CSO, whereas the League of Women Voters is both an element of civil society and a 
CSO.   
 Some question also exists as to the “voluntary” character of certain civil society 
outlets in the Tocquevillian sense of totally free, libertine association.  Uhlin (2009) notes 
that structural factors and various sources of societal pressure could make it difficult for 
many people to not join organizations such as party-related youth or civic groups in 
communist or authoritarian states, or religious-related organizations in deeply religious 
societies.  Thus in some cases, what is perceived to be a voluntary association may be 
obligatory to at least some degree culturally or politically or at minimum subjecting 
individuals to direct or indirect pressure to participate.  Many organizations are heavily 
funded via governmental or corporate sources raising questions as to autonomy as well.  
Also, larger CSOs generally have a paid professional staff to carry out core components 
of their mission.  Due to such considerations, the terms private voluntary organizations 
or voluntary organizations (PVOs/VOs), sometimes proposed as a synonym for 
CSOs/civil society, have not become standard nomenclature within the literature, though 
some organizations including the US Agency for International Development (USAID) 
continue to utilize the terminology.  The latter, which provided $2.8 billion in funding to 
support such organizations in 2013, defines PVOs as “tax-exempt nonprofits that 
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leverage their expertise and private funding to address development challenges abroad” 
(USAID 2016). 
 Nonprofit organizations or NPOs, sometimes also described as not-for-profit 
organizations, are those non-governmental entities “organized for purposes other than 
generating profit and in which no part of the organization's income is distributed to its 
members, directors, or officers” (Cornell University 2016).  NPOs are closely associated 
with the concept of charitable organizations, but distinguishable via their altruistic, non-
commercial operational parameters, where at least theoretically some charitable 
organizations could be for-profit enterprises.  Though the term NPO is not widely used in 
the contemporary literature of international relations it is often viewed as equivalent to or 
overlapping with the more commonly-referenced concepts of CSO or NGO entities as 
evidenced in the World Bank’s attempt to define civil society: 
  The World Bank has adopted a definition of civil society developed by a 
 number of leading research centers: “the term civil society to refer to the wide 
 array of non-governmental and not-for-profit organizations that have a presence in 
 public life, expressing the interests and values of their members or others, based 
 on ethical, cultural, political, scientific, religious or philanthropic considerations. 
 Civil Society Organizations (CSOs) therefore refer to a wide of array of 
 organizations: community groups, non-governmental organizations (NGOs), 
 labor unions, indigenous groups, charitable organizations, faith-based 
 organizations,  professional associations, and foundations” (World Bank 2013).      
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 The term nongovernmental organization or NGO came into usage within the UN 
via the organization’s original charter in 1945 due to the need for the UN to formally 
differentiate between participation rights for state or IGO actors as opposed to what were 
often described at the time as transnational private organizations---i.e. international 
CSOs as opposed to specialized intergovernmental agencies (Willetts 1996).  The League 
of Nations had previously referred to such groups merely as private organizations, while 
many such organizations themselves in the early 20th century self-described as 
international institutes, international unions, or international organizations.  By the 
1970s, the term nongovernmental organization or acronym NGO had emerged as 
common public usage via the popularization of UN institutional jargon (Willetts 2011).  
Presently, the term NGO is the preferred term within UN-ECOSOC whereas other UN 
bodies continue to use the term CSO.   
 The World Bank (2002, 1) offers the following definition for NGOs: “private 
organizations that pursue activities to relieve the suffering, promote the interests of the 
poor, protect the environment, provide basic social services, or undertake community 
development.”  Today the term/concept of NGOs is more widely referenced in the 
literature than certain comparable alternatives such as CSO or (P)VO, in part because of 
the perception that NGO may be a more delimited concept than many alternatives and 
also because NGOs are regarded by many as being the best-organized elements of civil 
society and accordingly having a greater chance of exerting influence upon state and 
transnational actors than less structured civil society entities (Riddell-Dixon 2008).  
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 Willetts (1996) argues that there is essentially no practical difference between an 
NGO and a (P)VO, but the term NGO may imply neutral connotations and applicability 
to a broader segment of political actors, whereas (P)VO suggests moral approval of 
perhaps a more limited range of civil society.  NGOs are also occasionally compared to 
social movement organizations (SMOs).  While proponents of SMOs may often regard 
their enterprise as being somehow more progressive or dynamic than NGOs, this is not a 
correct perception as NGOs for the most part are components and direct manifestations of 
social movements.  For example NGOs such as the National Center for Missing and 
Exploited Children or A Child is Missing, Inc. could not have emerged as easily or 
flourished financially or otherwise without underlying social movements galvanizing 
public attention and advocating for the safety of children from abuse, abduction and other 
forms of victimization. 
 The United Nations classifies a highly diverse range of private entities as NGOs 
and in fact has only very general criteria for the designation: the organization must be (1) 
independent from government control, (2) not-for-profit, (3) non-criminal, and (4) not 
seek to challenge the government of a state either as a political party or by a narrow focus 
upon a human rights issue (Willetts 1996).  Beyond the latter basic criteria, the nature and 
organization of NGOs varies widely.  Interestingly, in terms of levels of operation, many 
UN-recognized NGOs are community-based organizations (CBOs) which operate on a 
local or regional level within a single country, and many others are national in scope, 
operating only within a single country.  Local or national-level NGOs may still covet an 
association with the UN as a vehicle for networking and exchanging ideas with other 
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organizations, providing feedback to the international community concerning their areas 
of expertise or to pursue the possibility of international support for their operational 
goals.  There is also a diverse range of NGOs according to policy focus areas and 
diversity of UN terminologies and classifications related to the latter such as 
environmental NGOs (ENGOs), market advocacy NGOs (MANGOs), and technical 
assistance NGOs (TANGOs).  
 In terms of functionality, NGOs are classified by many IOs including the World 
Bank into two basic categories, those with an operational focus and those with an 
advocacy focus.  NGOs with an operational focus usually pursue positive change directly 
through projects such as the delivery of public welfare or other services, emergency 
relief, or environmental causes, usually on a local, regional or otherwise smaller scale 
(Willetts 2012).  Examples of operational-oriented NGOs include the American Red 
Cross, Catholic Charities, and Food for the Poor.  Advocacy-oriented NGOs strive to 
accomplish larger-scale change via influencing political systems on behalf of their 
specific causes such as human rights, animal rights, environmental policy, or other issues 
(Willetts 2012).  Examples of NGOs principally focused upon advocacy include Amnesty 
International, Human Rights Watch, the National Rifle Association, and the US Institute 
for Peace.  It is also possible for an NGO to assume characteristics of both operations and 
advocacy with the World Wildlife Fund being a possible example.  
 It is worthy of mention that the term NGO has been subject to ongoing debate as 
to the verbiage and the underlying meaning(s) it conveys.  Critics of the term note that it 
is a negative (“non”) description, seeking to address what it is not, rather than what it 
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is/does.  For example, the term pressure groups has been suggested by some as a possible 
alternative in that the latter term more descriptively conveys what the organizations seek 
to achieve, apply pressure within a civic or political sphere to obtain desired outcomes 
(Willetts 1982).  The existing acronym NGO has also been subject to attempts at 
reinterpretation in more positive light, including “Necessary-to-Governance 
Organizations” (Gotz 2008, 245; Jonsson 2010, 34).  The latter term and concept raises 
another key issue as to how divorced such organizations actually are from government 
when NGOs often carry out government-related projects such as the provision of public 
services and are frequently dependent upon government funding, issues which will be 
explored more fully elsewhere in this research.  
 The line between civil society or NGOs as opposed to government or business is 
not always distinct.  Many NGOs derive significant portions---in many cases the vast 
majority---of their funding from government and/or business sources.  Concomitantly, in 
the case of many such organizations skepticism exists as to the degree of organizational 
independence in the face of financial dependency.   In some cases governments or their 
functionaries have actually created and at least to some degree managed NGOs, which 
are termed government-operated NGOs (GONGOs) and may in reality be “non”-
governmental or “civil” society organizations only in name (Hemment 2012).  A lesser 
gradation of the latter may be quasi-autonomous NGOs (QUANGOs), which receive 
most or even all of their funding from governments and may pursue specific projects at 
the behest of government, but are not founded or directly managed by government---a 
model common in many countries such as Britain which has some 1,200 such 
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organizations (The Guardian 2012).  In contrast, social movement organizations (SMOs) 
or grassroots support organizations (GSOs) better exemplify the concept of “civil” 
society in that they originate from widespread support within the population, presumably 
represent agendas derived from the citizenry and are bottom-up rather than hierarchical in 
origin and in terms of their locus of control and agenda-setting.  
 Other terms of significance to the research include those related to the 
international scope of civil society and NGOs.  Of an estimated 10 million NGOs 
presently operating in the world today, the vast majority operate within a single country 
and often only within a geographically limited local area.  The majority of such 
organizations are also relatively small, with 72% of NGOs in the United States having 
annual revenue of less than half a million dollars for example (NCCS 2007).   
Approximately 40,000 NGOs are believed to be international in scope in that they operate 
in multiple countries (NGO.IN 2016).  Within the literature, such entities which operate 
across international borders are variously referred to as international nongovernmental 
organizations (INGOs) or transnational nongovernmental organizations (TNGOs).  
More broadly, international organizations or IOs are any governmental, business, or civil 
society organizations/NGOs operating in multiple countries—e.g. the United States Trade 
Representative, multinational corporations (MNCs) such as Exxon Mobil, and Amnesty 
International respectively.  Intergovernmental organizations or IGOs are formal 
associations among state actors or their organs, with the United Nations, Arab League, 
European Union, and Organization of American States serving as examples. 
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 For the sake of consistency and clarity and for the purposes of this research, the 
concepts of CSOs (though not necessarily civil society, which is arguably broader in 
scope) and NGOs are for the most part regarded as synonymous and interchangeable.  
The vast majority and possibly all CSOs could conceivable also be regarded as NGOs in 
the broadest of senses/uses of the term NGO and the terms are largely used 
interchangeably, including among most UN venues.  In this study, preference is given to 
the term NGO, as is also the standard practice within the United Nations Economic and 
Social Council, the principle focus of this research. 
 
Theoretical Framework: A Summary Overview 
 Dahl (1961) famously characterized the political process as an arena in which 
there is a diversity of actors/groups competing for and sharing power and attention.  
While different interpretations exist, at its most basic the concept of political pluralism 
contends that a truly democratic system must have more than one locus of power.  The 
classical model of political pluralism as espoused by Dahl and Lipset (1981) essentially 
holds that decision-making and politics are primarily the domain of government but civil 
society and other non-governmental entities can exercise influence over the process 
(Hauss 2011).  In terms of a national polity, power and the opportunity for input should 
not be vested solely in one party, demographic cohort, sub-region or other group but 
rather distributed equitably among as many segments as possible.  Research conducted in 
the US has shown that political structures that are more pluralist may contribute to 
broader participation in policy issue-areas which affect the populace (Okoth 2013).   
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In recent decades, the concept of pluralism has received attention as related to the 
distribution of power and influence within the transnational institutions including the UN 
(e.g., as a catalyst for global democratization: DeMars 2005, Risse-Kappen ed. 1995, 
Willetts 1996; for the diversification of moral authority: Boli and Thomas eds. 1999, 
Gotz 2008, etc.).  Historically, the UN has functioned as an association among states with 
national governments holding a monopoly on influence.  For the first decades of its 
existence UN agenda-setting and the actions (e.g. relief, monitoring) undertaken 
internationally were carried out largely by state actors.  The explosion in the number of 
international civil society organizations afforded the UN not just practical opportunities 
to diversify the implementation of its initiatives at the ground level via non-state, civil 
society organizations, but also to diversify the chorus of voices participating in the UN 
process and partly decentralize the focus away from state actors.  Whereas national 
governments presumably represent the interests of their citizens, they may frequently 
reflect the political agendas of the elites or the regime in power.  Civil society 
organizations such as NGOs have been perceived as having a more “bottom-up”, 
grassroots dynamic in which the views of the citizenry, often including marginalized 
segments of a society, may be better represented.  Accordingly, increased direct UN 
involvement with NGOs would serve as a step in the direction of democratic pluralism 
and facilitate more interaction with non-state actors internationally.  Also, the greater the 
diversity among NGOs in terms of regional/geographical representation and issue areas 
represented, the greater the contribution to pluralism.  For the purposes of this research, 
political pluralism is defined as sharing of influence among and active engagement of a 
diverse group of stakeholders within a political dynamic. Relative to the relationship 
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between NGOs and UN-ECOSOC, an exploration of political pluralism entails 
assessments of the degree and nature of actual NGO engagement (i.e. is NGO influence 
actual/potential or largely symbolic?) and the degree of proportional and equitable NGO 
representation by country/region and by policy focus area. 
The concept of pluralism as espoused in Kantian classical liberalism and liberal 
institutionalism contends that ideally democratic systems have decentralized power 
structures and significant influence and participation from diverse sources, rather than a 
limited segment of a polity.  The latter has been described as the most compelling 
argument on behalf of UN involvement with civil society organizations in that it 
facilitates a multi-actor framework and contributes additional voices, perspectives and 
expertise to international forums/regimes which have traditionally been the almost 
exclusive domain of states (Mingst and Muldoon 2015; Whaites 1996; Willetts 2006).  
Succinctly, if vibrant civil society participation helps to foster democratic processes, 
increased roles of civil society within IOs will help facilitate democratic processes within 
the IO.  Within the pluralist tradition of constructivism, NGOs are regarded as the 
principle organizing element and the voice of transnational civil society, and as 
representing the interests of people and grassroots movements, separate from and 
diffusing the power of states (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 11).  Beginning in the 1990s, 
NGOs and civil society organizations in general were regarded as primary catalysts for 
the emerging pattern of bottom-up international democratization.  Burgeoning global 
civil society including thousands of newly UN-affiliated NGOs sought increasingly 
proactive roles in contributing to global problem solving and transnational governance, 
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potentially competing with the influence of states within international regimes and 
functioning as agents of change upon states and transnational institutions via grassroots 
influence (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 10-13).  The process of policy formulation also 
benefits from pluralism as stakeholders may potentially consult international/domestic 
policymakers during the formulation process, thus developing more effective and/or 
democratic policy (Bunea and Thompson 2015; Tallberg 2012).  Additionally, pluralism 
holds that the actions of IOs/IGOs and states may become increasingly subject to the 
oversight of transnational civil society organizations and that such an outcome reflects 
democratic institutional trends (Keohane 1998). 
 Pluralism also entails considerations related to cultural diversity within egalitarian 
democratic institutions in that it advocates that all groups can maintain their distinctive 
identity and be afforded opportunities to participate and have their voices heard without 
being relegated to the margins (Abu-Laban 2008, 2).  It can be regarded as an ethic of 
respect that places value on and prioritizes human diversity (Global Centre for Pluralism 
2012).  The United Nations advocates diversity in representation, and the expanding role 
of increasingly diverse (geographical, policy issue areas represented, etc.) ranges of 
NGOs within ECOSOC and other organizations reflects institutionalized commitment to 
pluralism.  The UN has assumed a direct role in attempting to facilitate such pluralism 
within the consultative status framework via encouraging NGOs representing the 
historically marginalized (e.g., the global south, human/indigenous rights-related 
organizations) and providing funding to allow NGOs from developing nations to 
participate in UN forums.  However, significant question exists as to whether such efforts 
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favoring plurality have yielded genuine improvements in the diversity of representation/ 
participation or whether they are largely symbolic (Kymlicka 2007, 3-25). 
 The theoretical perspective underpinning the proposed study is a critical appraisal 
of pluralist assumptions relative to the expanding role of CSOs/NGOs within the United 
Nations and the associated perceptions of the decentralization of power away from states, 
the diversification of perspectives geographically and culturally, and the strengthened 
role of civil society within the UN.  The international community has become 
characterized in recent decades by decreasing dominance of state actors and 
concomitantly increasing involvement of non-state actors including NGOs (McKeon 
2009, pg. 6; Pubantz 2005).  The most significant non-state actors within the UN 
framework and global civil society in general are NGOs which continue to grow in 
number and influence within the UN and international arena (Bennessaieh 2011, pg. 72; 
Smith 2006, pg. 109; Hill 2008, pg. 129; Reimann 2006, pg. 45-67).  Due to the latter 
trend and the understanding that NGOs make key contributions to civil society and 
democratic institutions, advocates of democratic pluralism within the UN regard the 
expansion of NGO influence within the organization as an appropriate means of 
diversifying input and for further democratizing global governance.  Article 71 of the UN 
Charter (Appendix B) authorizes the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC) to 
form formal consultative arrangements with NGOs.  UN conferences intentionally place 
state parties adjacent to NGOs in parallel conferences in order to impart a perception of 
pluralism and democracy (Anderson 2012, pg. 235).  In 1996, NGOs with a national or 
regional scope were for the first time considered for formal accreditation with the UN, 
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with the goal of democratizing access---particularly for NGOs in developing nations 
(McKeon 2009, pg. 124). 
 However many scholars question the degree to which the expanded role of NGOs 
within the UN actually exemplifies democratic pluralism.  Critics note that the increased 
profile of NGOs may be more perceptual or symbolic than substantive with regard to the 
balance of power and influence which overwhelmingly remains with state actors within 
international governance.  Also, NGO representation at the UN may be more symbolic 
than substantive in terms of degree of active engagement of NGOs within the UN 
dynamic, as the theoretical number and diversity of NGOs in theoretical affiliation with 
the UN is not meaningful without active engagement.   
 Kotzian (2015) contends that civil society can theoretically strengthen democratic 
institutions within IOs/IGOs (1) via transmitting information between agents of 
international governance and the public and (2) by helping to hold organizations such as 
the UN accountable, but NGOs within the UN-ECOSOC framework appear to often fall 
short of one or both of the latter goals (particularly the second) in practice.   McKeon 
(2009) and Omelicheva (2009) argue that while the UN has become increasingly 
inclusive of civil society, for various reasons such as limited channels of participation 
(not all UN organs permit extensive NGO participation and those that do usually regulate 
levels of participation via the NGOs affiliation status) and, logistical obstacles (NGO 
financial/personnel resources may impede participation) it has largely failed with regard 
to full incorporation of civil society into the global political process---i.e., formally 
affiliated NGOs often provide minimal if any input, and have little-no oversight role.  
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Carpenter (2010, pg. 216-217), Anderson (2012, pg. 222) and Willetts (2000, pg. 196) 
note that access to the UN is not available to all NGOs equally and that barriers such as 
the cost of attending UN conferences serve as significant impediments for many NGOs to 
participate.  Hemment (2012) has suggested that a large portion of the NGOs created 
during the post-Cold War civil society expansion are “Potemkin NGOs”, either state 
funded/directed organs or that otherwise exist as civil society organizations more in 
name/theory than practice---i.e. devoid of ground-up, popular, grassroots support or 
active membership.   
 Many studies have addressed the expanding number and roles of NGOs globally 
in recent decades but few theories have been posited to address the actual behaviors of 
NGOs within the international arena such as patterns of participation regionally, topically 
or the degree to which they are actually engaged with the UN (Barnett and Finnemore 
2006, 177-178).  Many of the attempts to address the latter have been critical including 
Bloem, Attia and Dam (2008) who cite the challenges inherent to coordinating large 
numbers of NGOs and the associated issue of quantity versus quality of input.  Carpenter 
(2010) also notes the politicization of the NGO screening committee/process and the 
otherwise un-level playing field financially or politically among NGOs that may seek 
association with the UN---e.g. an NGO with a harshly critical position against one or 
more national governments is more likely to be denied status.  Cooley (2010) and 
Edwards (2009) note that many NGOs are so dependent upon state or corporate funding 
that many are arguably organs of states and state policies/agendas rather than independent 
entities.  Thiel (2017) notes that to date, CSOs have been largely marginal players within 
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IOs including the EU with regard to agenda-setting and policy-development.  The latter 
examples of political idiosyncrasies presumably call into question the UN-NGO program 
as a vehicle for democratic pluralism within the organization and also the legitimacy and 
independence of many NGOs and the nature and value of their contributions to the UN.    
 
Research Parameters 
 This study proposes that the expansion of the number and role of NGOs in 
consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC) does not necessarily equate to meaningful 
collaboration between the UN and civil society, and accordingly the ideals of democratic 
pluralism are not being fully realized via this dynamic.  Specifically, a large percentage---
possibly the majority---of NGOs which have attained formal consultative status with UN-
ECOSOC do not appear to participate in UN functions (e.g. conference attendance, 
presentation of or assistance with research) or otherwise make any observable 
contribution to representing civil society at the UN.  This study further proposes that 
analysis of patterns of NGO participation with UN-ECOSOC will reveal gaps with regard 
to geographical representation as well as gaps in issue areas both of which also 
undermine the tenets of democratic pluralism via claims of expanded NGO participation 
at the UN.  Most empirical studies of NGOs at the UN have focused upon a limited 
number of organizations within a single issue area (Clark et al, 1998).  A strength of this 
study is that its breadth of scope in seeking to analyze patterns of participation of all 
NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC will reveal macro-scale patterns 
within the institutional dynamic.  
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Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses 
Questions: 
#1a: What are the patterns of participation of NGOs in the UN-ECOSOC consultative 
status programs in terms of country and regional representation and are countries and 
world regions proportionally represented? 
1b: What are the patterns of participation and proportional representation in terms of 
policy issue focus areas (e.g. human rights, environment, relief, etc.)? 
1c: What types and degrees of participation exist among NGOs which hold consultative 
status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council? 
#2: Why do some NGOs in consultative status utilize the status to participate in UN 
functions, but others do not? 
#3: Why do many NGOs holding consultative status fail to participate in any meaningful 
way in UN-ECOSOC functions? 
Guiding Hypotheses: 
1: Imbalances exist in patterns of participation of NGOs in consultative status with the 
UN Economic and Social Council with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g. 
NGOs of developed states are proportionally better represented than those of developing 
states) and regarding the policy issues with which the NGOs are concerned. 
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2: A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of 
understanding of the process through which NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC 
can participate make some NGOs more active than others. 
3: Given such constraints, most NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not 
participate in any meaningful way in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive 
contribution (providing input at conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN 
goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society.  
 
Research Design, Methodology and Instrumentation 
 The study will utilize a qualitative methodology in analyzing patterns of 
participation (institutional input) of NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC 
and in survey case studies of NGOs.  Data obtained from the extensive UN integrated 
Civil Society Organizations (iCSO) online database will be analyzed for macro-scale 
patterns of CSO/NGO participation within UN-ECOSOC.  Organizations with 
consultative status will be analyzed according to 1) region and country, 2) year and 
classification of UN status (general, special, and roster), 3) organizational type, 4) field 
and geographical scope of activity, and 5) degree of participation in UN meetings or 
other venues.  Qualitative analysis of these data via a simple descriptive approach should 
be sufficient to operationalize the first guiding hypothesis and in part (i.e., some of the 
evidence supporting widespread lack of participation in the UN-NGO program) 
operationalize the third guiding hypothesis.  These data will also help identify NGOs and 
their contact information to be selected for the empirical case study.   
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 Individual survey case studies utilized CSOs/NGOs which identified English as at 
least one of several languages spoken in order to minimize logistical obstacles inherent to 
attempting to survey or otherwise obtain information from international organizations---
which should also increase survey participation rates among organizations selected for 
inclusion in the study.  Utilizing random sampling, 10% percent of NGOs which have (1) 
obtained consultative status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council, (2) 
identified English language proficiency in their UN database profile, and (3) have a 
valid/complete email address listed in their contact information were selected for a survey 
(see Appendix A).  The latter information used in sample selection is obtained from the 
publicly-available online UN iCSO database. 
 The random selection of CSOs/NGOs for inclusion in the case studies occurred 
according to the following procedures.  Utilizing the publicly-accessible UN iCSO online 
database, an alphabetized list of all English-speaking organizations in consultative status 
with ECOSOC was generated.  Of 4,601 NGOs with consultative status at the time the 
sample pool was selected, 4,383 (95.3%) were identified as speaking English as one of 
several languages.  In alphabetical order, each CSO/NGO was numbered consecutively.  
The online resource www.stattrek.com was utilized to generate 439 random, non-
duplicated numbers which served as the basis for sample selection in the research.    
Questionnaires containing primarily fixed choice (i.e. number line) items and a 
small number of open-ended items will be distributed by email to selected NGOs with the 
goal of understanding why the organizations have or have not participated in the UN 
consultative status program in which they were accepted.  Follow up by phone and/or 
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email with some participants will permit elaboration/clarification of survey responses if 
necessary.  Survey/interview data will be analyzed in an interpretive-qualitative manner 
so as to address the second and third guiding hypothesis.  Information derived from both 
the UN iCSO database and surveys/interviews will be analyzed via content analysis and 
descriptive reporting.  In an effort to increase response rates and also to aid in the candor 
of information furnished, anonymity will be provided in that the names of the 
CSOs/NGOs, persons affiliated with them or any other identifying characteristics will be 
withheld by the researcher from the study or any publications derived from the study.  
Following the initial email informing randomly selected participants of the study 
and requesting that they complete and submit the survey, several follow-up/reminder 
emails were sent approximately every 10 days to 2 weeks.  Such follow-up intervals are 
traditionally deemed appropriate by survey researchers as shorter intervals risk being 
perceived as irritating, and longer intervals don’t convey importance, allow more 
potential participants to forget about the study/request and risks needlessly prolonging the 
time needed for data collection (Burton 2000; Edwards 1997; Mangione 1995).  All 
follow-up contacts contained the original survey and consent form as an attached Word 
document for the convenience of potential respondents who may have deleted or 
misplaced the original email, a practice commonly recommended by survey researchers 
(e.g., Dillman et al 2009; Thach 1995).  Each follow-up contained a slightly different 
message emphasizing a different reason to participate or other piece of information, as 
research has shown that the latter approach, rather than a repetition of the identical 
message, could be more effective in eliciting responses (Cialdini 1984; Dillman et al 
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2009; Hildreth et al 2006).  The first reminder was sent November 10-12, 2016 and 
succinctly stressed the importance of the study, its brief nature, and my availability to 
promptly answer any questions concerning the study via email.  A second reminder was 
emailed November 22-23 which mentioned each of the latter again and also emphasized 
my willingness to send the survey in other languages as well and notice that the deadline 
for submission had been extended through December 2.  The third and final follow-up 
was sent on December 2 indicating that the deadline had passed but that late submissions 
would still be accepted if submitted promptly. 
Literature related to survey research suggests that subsequent contacts/reminders 
regarding surveys yield progressively diminishing returns with regard to response rate 
and this was generally my experience in this study (Dialsingh 2008; Gideon 2012).  
Many survey researchers note that response rates for subsequent follow-ups can yield as 
little as half the prior return rate, meaning that once three follow-up reminders have been 
sent the likelihood of any significant number of responses from further follow-ups would 
likely be close to zero and thus not justifiable (Gideon 2012; Mangione 1995).  In the 
period following the initial email contacts with potential respondents---and prior to any 
follow-up reminders being sent, a total of 22 surveys were submitted.  Subsequently, 21 
more were submitted after the first follow-up email, 16 after the second, and 3 after the 
third for a total of 62 survey responses, yielding a response rate of 14.1%.  The majority 
of surveys were submitted via email attachments, but 5 were submitted by mail, and 1 by 
fax.  All of the latter options were made available to participants for their 
convenience/preference and with the goal of maximizing rate of response. 
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High response rates for academic research of this type can be difficult to achieve.  
Survey research literature note the existence of long-term trends in declining response 
rates to all types of surveys, possibly the result of increased volumes of spam over time 
(Panel on a Research Agenda for the Future of Social Sciences Data Collection 2013; 
Gorard 2003).  In addition to multiple follow-up emails and allowing multiple modes of 
submission at participants’ discretion (email, mail or fax), several other steps were 
undertaken in an effort to increase the questionnaire response rate.  Prior to distribution 
and following several rounds of editing, the number of questions included in the survey 
was reduced by nearly one-half from the original version and additionally several items 
that were originally more open-ended were converted to fixed-choice items in an effort to 
make the survey less daunting and time-consuming to potential respondents.  Assurances 
of anonymity and an extension of the original submission deadline are both 
recommended strategies for increasing response rates in the literature concerning survey 
research and both approaches were employed in this study (Ballantyne 2005; Dommeyer 
et al 2002).    
Response rates can vary substantially depending upon the type of survey being 
conducted.  Internal surveys such as those undertaken by employers with their workers, 
universities with their students, or businesses with their clients or suppliers tend to have 
higher response rates than external surveys in which the researcher is seeking to obtain 
input from a target audience with which no existing connection or exists.  For example, 
Nulty (2008) found an average online response rate to 9 different internal higher 
education surveys in which institutions sought input from their enrolled students to be 
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33%.  Formal surveys such as those using questionnaires and requiring signed consent 
forms generally yield lower response rates than informal studies such as more casual 
market research surveys (OECD 2001).  The response rate for surveys targeted to specific 
individuals is often considerably higher than surveys undertaken for organizations, and 
whereas offering incentives may boost response rates when surveying individuals, 
incentives have not been demonstrated to increase response rates from organizations 
surveyed (Baruch 2008).  Surveys undertaken face-to-face (which is of course not 
practical for many studies including this research) have been shown to produce 
substantially higher rates of response than indirect methods such as mail or email, and 
paper-based surveys are often touted as yielding better results than online or email 
surveys (Burton 2000; Nulty 2008).   
In nearly every respect, the nature of this survey research aligned with those 
studies traditionally characterized by lower response rates: external, formal---and 
requiring consent documentation, indirect rather than face-to-face, email rather than 
paper, and targeting organizations rather than individuals.  Given the latter parameters, a 
realistic minimum goal for a survey response rate with a study of this type may 
commonly be set at approximately 10% (OECD 2001; Panel on a Research Agenda for 
the Future of Social Sciences Data Collection 2013).  It should also be noted that a 
growing consensus in the literature stresses that higher response rates do not necessarily 
guarantee data quality and conversely lower rates do not necessarily mean that data 
obtained is in any way weak or biased (e.g. Groves 2006; Massey and Tourangeau 2013; 
Peytchev 2013).    
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In hindsight, it is possible that at least a slightly higher response rate could have 
been achieved via use of a web-based survey, as many participants seemed to lack the 
basic technical skills to scan documents or even open the questionnaire as a Word file.  
Among those with basic computer proficiencies, a fully-online survey may have elicited 
more response through convenience as a potentially quicker and easier way to participate.  
However, the design and implementation of a functional web-based survey platform was 
beyond my technical capabilities and such a format would still not absolve participants 
from reading and following short, basic instructions related to completing and submitting 
the survey.  Also, the formal procedural requirement of a signed consent form may have 
proven difficult to adequately address via an online survey as those with limited 
computer skills would likely not be able to attach an electronic signature and those only 
willing to provide feedback via a website for questionnaire items, may have been less 
likely to print, sign, and scan or otherwise submit the consent form (which if 
completed/submitted separately from the online questionnaire could also become difficult 
to pair with the correct survey), meaning many questionnaires may have been unusable 
without accompanying consent documentation.     
 
Limitations 
 The first guiding hypothesis in its entirety and a portion of the third (participation 
in UN meetings) are addressed via analysis of data for all NGOs in consultative status 
and accordingly the study findings are generalizable.  However, given the relatively large 
number of NGOs, the percent needed for statistical significance, the focus upon only 
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English-speaking NGOs, and the possibility of obtaining a small sample size (i.e. those 
NGOs which have failed to participate in a prestigious UN program may not be inclined 
to complete/submit a detailed questionnaire---either via the time commitment involved 
and/or the reality/perception of self-reporting inadequate participation), a case study 
approach is undertaken, the results of which are not necessarily generalizable to all NGOs 
in consultative status with ECOSOC.  Also regarding the second and third guiding 
hypotheses, NGO participation may be curtailed by external factors beyond the 
control/influence of the organizations such as the level of accreditation granted by the 
UN (general, special, roster) which in effect restricts the type and extent of participation. 
 
Summary  
To the researcher’s knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of 
macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part 
of all NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.  It may also be among the 
first such studies which seeks to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement or 
the lack thereof on the part of NGOs in consultative status.  Lastly, the study will seek to 
appraise the findings within the theoretical framework of political pluralism in assessing 
the place and contributions of NGOs within the UN dynamic as either meaningful or as 
more symbolic. 
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II. CHAPTER TWO:  
THEORIZING ON THE ROLE AND CONTRIBUTIONS OF CSOs/NGOs WITHIN 
THE UNITED NATIONS AND TRANSNATIONAL GOVERNANCE 
 
Introduction 
 Speaking at the World Economic Forum in 1999, then UN Secretary Kofi Annan 
famously suggested that a tripartite model of cooperation between the UN (and other 
IGOs), civil society organizations such as NGOs and labor unions, and business was 
needed to sufficiently address many pressing and complex international issues such as 
environmental protection and human rights (Ottaway 2001).   Externally, CSOs/NGOs 
can serve useful purposes for transnational institutions as monitors of international law 
and norms in areas such as human rights or environmental standards, as facilitators of 
beneficial socio-economic programs, or as disseminators of aid among other roles.   
Internally, although such organizations have little official authority at the UN or most 
other IGOs, through their advocacy roles they can nonetheless allow additional voices to 
be heard and exert influence and in recent years CSOs/NGOs have successfully promoted 
new environmental agreements, helped to strengthen human rights, and helped achieve 
arms control measures among other achievements (Paul 2000). 
 The UN is the primary forum for policy formulation and rule-making in the fields 
in which most INGOs function and accordingly it stands to reason that CSOs/NGOs with 
an international scope would seek to cultivate relationships with the UN and its bodies 
(Paul 2000).  By gaining knowledge of procedures and language used at the UN and other 
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IGOs, elements of civil society including CSOs/NGOs may learn how to effectively use 
international instruments associated with democratic traditions such as compliance 
reporting to advance domestic or transnational agendas in various policy areas including 
human or environmental rights (Riddell-Dixon 2008).  Within democratic institutions 
whether at the sub-state, state or transnational level, CSOs/NGOs can potentially foster 
and reinforce democratic ideals and practices via aggregation and representation of 
stakeholder interests and also via mitigating government power---i.e. civil society is 
beneficial for democracy (Uhlin 2009).  In short, stronger bonds between institutions of 
governance and institutions related to civil society can in turn strengthen democratic 
traditions. 
 By the late 20
th
 century, NGOs were widely regarded as the most important 
element of civil society, facilitating public services and heavily contributing to the 
democratization trends sweeping much of the world, but in recent years the perception 
concerning CSOs/NGOs internationally has begun to shift toward criticism, with 
increasing calls that they may not be as effective as touted, many of them have little-no 
relationship to any real public, and via competing with and potentially undermining state 
actors they are undermining national sovereignty and democracy rather than reinforcing it 
(Jordan and Tuijl 2006).  This chapter examines existing literature to address the 
theoretical underpinnings of the UN’s association with CSOs/NGOs, its evolution and 
nature, and the potential shortcomings in the association. 
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CSOs/NGOs within IR Theory  
 Within IR theory, the role of civil society as an agent of influence and change 
within the international system has historically either been dismissed or downplayed.  As 
recently as the 1980s, CSOs/NGOs were omitted from theory formulations in IR, likely 
as a reflection of state-centric theorizing and a dearth of information/understanding 
concerning the organizations (Mingst and Muldoon 2015, 67).  The latter state of affairs 
has begun to change in recent decades as many international relations scholars have 
increasingly moved toward the study of non-state actors including civil society (Barnett 
and Sikkink 2008).  Increasingly, academicians, as well as states and IOs are moving 
away from the long-prevailing view of CSOs/NGOs as negligible actors on the global 
stage (Liebert and Trenz 2013; Scholte 2011; Steffek and Hahn 2010).   
 The theoretical frameworks that do regard NGOs and civil society as having 
relevance do not agree as to the nature or source of their influence.  To gain insight into 
variations in how CSOs/NGOs are perceived within the international framework, it is 
necessary to briefly address often conflicting views concerning the latter within each of 
several principle theoretical schools within IR: realism, Marxism, the English School, 
(neo) liberal institutionalism, behaviorist approaches such as structural sociological 
theories, and constructivism/pluralism.  Particular attention is paid to pluralism, normally 
considered a strand of constructivism, as it is arguably the IR theory which gives the most 
consideration to the role of NGOs and civil society within the international system (Thiel 
2010, 7117). 
 37 
 
 Preoccupied with power and states as the almost exclusive purveyors of power 
within the international system, realists (e.g. Walt) discount the importance of all non-
state actors including CSOs/NGOs.  Realists discount the autonomous agency of NGOs 
as only realized if allowed by states which weigh such decisions upon their own vested 
national interests, meaning the impact of CSOs/NGOs or IOs in general is limited to their 
role as instruments/surrogates of states’ interests (Andersen 2015, 45-46).  Classical 
realist perspectives ignore the expanding influence of CSOs/NGOs and other elements of 
civil society in recent decades, yet within the UN structure, the vast majority of real 
influence remains with member states and states have used their preeminence to 
successfully limit the expansion of CSO/NGO influence into key areas such as the 
General Assembly and Security Council. 
 If classical realism presents an oversimplified model of an international system 
characterized by competition for power so does its chief theoretical opponent Marxism, 
but with different agents vying for their own interests.  Marxist theory regards class 
conflict as the catalyst for competition and in turn as the primary vehicle for an 
anarchical world system.  Yet it conceives of transnational capitalist elites as maintaining 
power within societies via maintaining control of the state and its organs of power 
(Willetts 2011, 115).  As in all major theories within international relations, different 
internal strands exist, but Marxist theory like realism discounts the importance of 
CSOs/NGOs or civil society, or views them as the extended arm of the state or possibly 
corporate shills, rather than an impartial non-governmental .  The agendas of 
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CSOs/NGOs would not be viewed as distinct from the political or economic 
environments which gave birth to or finance such organizations. 
 In some respects, the English School within IR theory mirrors realism in that the 
former also sees an established society of states as the primary purveyor of structure 
within the international system.  However, the English School also sees at least the 
potential for a broader, more diverse international society which at least potentially 
transcends and competes with state actors.  Hedley Bull (1977) viewed the emergence of 
a more pluralistic international system with some degree of trepidation in that by 
challenging the primacy of state actors and their sovereignty, new voices on the world 
stage competing with states for influence may serve to undermine an already anarchical 
international order (Bellamy and McDonald 2004).  Such views are consistent with the 
actions of many UN member states which have historically sought to prevent the 
potential erosion of sovereignty or international influence by non-state actors. 
 Many aspects of neorealist and neoliberal theories are comparable including their 
shared attitudes favoring free-market globalization as beneficial to the state, leading some 
theorists to place both within the rubric of neo-utilitarianism (Willetts 2011, 116).  
Neorealist and neoliberal theorists also have similar perspectives concerning the place of 
CSOs/NGOs within the international dynamic.  Both remain state-centered, as they 
regard national governments as the principle actor on the international stage, though both 
neorealists and neoliberals regard the state as less monopolistic in influence than do 
classical realists.  Both also allow for non-state actors including CSOs/NGOs to wield at 
least some state-delimited influence within the international system.  Neoliberal theorists 
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regard IOs as mediums through which states may coordinate their interests, and 
CSOs/NGOs as equivalent to interest groups, whose voices may be louder than ever, but 
are still not central to norm-setting or functionality in the international arena (Andersen 
2015, 46).   
 Liberal institutionalism, one of several variants within the liberal school, contends 
that the spread of international institutions helps foster peace and cooperation.  The latter 
goals being achieved via dissemination of democratic ideals, increased economic 
interdependence, and increased levels of intergovernmental collaboration---and they 
regard all of the latter as largely the products of state actions (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 
10).  In other words, liberal institutionalists regard NGOs and international civil society 
as a byproduct derived from larger international trends such as increasing levels of 
economic and political interdependence, rather than as a catalyst for bringing such 
transitions about.  The latter theory would regard the expansion of the ECOSOC 
consultative status program not as a catalyst for change or as a phenomenon of the CSO’s 
doing but rather as a manifestation of institutional/societal expectation that transnational 
civil society should be given more voice. 
 Analysis of the distribution of power and influence within a system and 
understanding the nature of the power dynamic may entail behaviorist models and 
approaches such as observing decision-making processes and competition among 
competing agendas.  Some such models are actor-centric such as rational-choice 
institutionalism which entail some real or perceived benefit to be derived by transnational 
actors or power-oriented institutionalism which regards transnational CSOs/NGOs as a 
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reflection of the power and influence of states (Tallberg et al 2013).  In contrast, 
structural theories of sociological institutionalism stress that many elements of 
transnational institutions are embedded in sociocultural norms (Giddens 1986; Hall and 
Taylor 1996).  The latter theories strive to explain the nature of changing institutional 
practices by assessing the sociocultural legitimacy of the actors as opposed to rationalist 
means-end calculation (Thiel 2017, 35).  For example, CSOs/NGOs may be regarded as 
the vehicle via which disenfranchised populations may be included in the decision-
making process by IGOs or other institutions which value diversity and wish to become 
more inclusive in elevating their status (Benhabib 2009).         
 Behaviorist concepts are commonly seen as having common ground with 
pluralism.  Within the scope of international politics, the concept of pluralism can refer to 
a range of things, though some core ideas lie at the heart of the concept.  In the broadest 
of senses, constructivism in general denotes pluralism in that constructivism takes into 
account a diverse, pluralistic range of considerations in examining how a complex social 
dynamic impacts international politics.  The emergence of constructivism began in 
response to rationalist theories, including neorealism and neoliberalism, which perceive 
actors and their motives as materialists which pursue resources or other forms of power.   
Rationalists assume that the international system is driven by states which are rational 
actors striving to maximize their own material advantages and that their actions can be 
understood entirely by the conduct of individual actors (states), without regard to the 
complex, diverse and frequently changing socio-cultural systems within which the 
interactions occur (Ruggie 1998, 9).   
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 When constructivism emerged as a school of thought in the 1980s it facilitated a 
larger focus on non-state actors, and it remains the sole mainstream IR theory which 
emphasizes a significant role for CSOs/NGOs within the international political dynamic 
(Andersen 2015, 46-47).  Presently, most IR theorists regard constructivism as a 
descendent of the idealist perspective in that it stresses the roles of ideas, values, and 
discourses in shaping the political realm---taking a wider and more multifaceted view 
than many previous theories which merely viewed the IR arena as a competition among 
states to attain their vested interests (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 10-11).  Unlike 
conventional liberalism, constructivist thought deconstructs---rather than assuming as a 
given---and effectively discounts the traditional views related to anarchy, power, and 
state actors, all of which are regarded as products of many societal variables.  The entire 
international dynamic and the variables which influence it are social constructs that 
frequently change and evolve (Wendt 1992, 422-424).  Accordingly, NGOs and other 
manifestations of civil society as reflections of the complex societal dynamic should have 
some significance within the international system.  Addressing how CSOs/NGOs factor 
into the more nuanced and multifaceted theoretical framework of constructivism 
Andersen (2015, 46-47) states: 
  Constructivism puts emphasis on the dynamics behind the spread of norms 
 and ideas in the international system, and NGOs play a central role in this…as 
 they embody values and act independently of governments.  They function as 
 norm entrepreneurs/transmitters within what many see as an emerging global civil 
 society.  Constructivism calls attention to the frequent interactions  between 
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 NGOs and states…(but) the goal is not to replace the state-centrism of early 
 theorizing. 
 Within constructivism there are variations concerning the nature of CSOs/NGOs 
within the international framework, essentially a dichotomy between the globalist and 
pluralist camps.  More narrowly, the plural(ist) school of liberal constructivism contends 
that the social and ideational considerations flow from the bottom up, as opposed to the 
globalist school within constructivism which sees norms and ideas as being more 
hierarchical in nature and trickling down from states, IGOs and other macro-scale actors 
(DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015, 11).  This distinction is important in attempting to define the 
role of NGOs, as pluralists see such manifestations of civil society as significant agents 
of international influence.  Exploring this, DeMars and Dijkzeul (2015, 11-12) state: 
  In the pluralist school of idealist constructivism, NGOs are understood as 
 the articulate and organized element of transnational civil society, acting largely 
 independent of government.  Pluralists portray NGOs as servants of the poor in 
 grassroots development, or prophetic voices of the voiceless lobbying 
 governments and the UN, or transnational pilgrims in an emancipatory passage 
 from oppressive rule to self-regulating community.  Pluralism reiterates, in 
 abstract theoretical terms, the representative claims articulated by the NGOs 
 themselves. 
 In contrast with the pluralist framework, within the globalist school of idealist 
constructivism, international norms are “implemented” or “enforced” through the actions 
of CSOs/NGOs collecting information and reporting on the norm compliance of states, 
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IGOs, MNCs and other actors, a model that many observers argue is evident in how 
CSOs/NGOs function within the framework of the UN and other IGOs (DeMars and 
Dijkzeul 2015; Clark 2001; Martens 2000; Weiss and Gordenker 1996).  Whereas realists 
discount the influence of civil society and other non-state actors outright, liberal 
institutionalists merely perceive CSO/NGO growth largely as a bi-product of increased 
influence of international institutions and globalization rather than a significant source of 
influence upon the international dynamic (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015).  Such conflicting 
views concerning the place of NGOs within the framework of IR theory is presented in 
Table 2.1.     
 
Table 2.1: Perception of CSOs/NGOs in IR Theory  
 
IR Theory  Perception of CSOs/NGOs 
Realism  CSOs/NGOs are insignificant compared to states. 
Liberal   CSOs/NGOs are largely symptoms of spreading international 
Institutionalism institutions, but do not comprise an important element of them or 
   significantly influence them. 
Global   CSO/NGO power/influence flows primarily from  
Constructivism international norms downward to states. 
Plural   CSO/NGO power/influence flows in a single direction from  
Constructivism societies upward to states 
      (adapted from DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015) 
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Evolution and Growth of the CSO/NGO Phenomenon 
 While the concept of CSOs/NGOs and the perception of the latter as one element 
of democratic society slowly emerged and expanded in the 19
th
 century, the most 
substantial growth in the total number and transnational nature of civil society has 
occurred since the mid-twentieth century.  The postcolonial era in the decades following 
WWII was an important time for the growth of NGOs and civil society globally, as in the 
preceding colonial period, governments customarily did not encourage the growth of such 
groups, seeing them as threats to the power structure (Kwesiga and Namisi 2006).  In the 
decades following decolonization, CSOs/NGOs acquired an increasingly prominent role 
in developing countries in the provision of services and distribution of aid, as evidenced 
in the tenfold increase in developmental aid dispersed by international organizations 
between 1970-1985 (Jokic 2013).  During the latter years of the Cold War in the 1980s 
and early 1990s, a substantial expansion in the number and influence of CSOs/NGOs 
occurred internationally and this upsurge, particularly in groups related to human and 
political rights or free market economic reform are often credited with playing a role in 
the decline in authoritarianism and movement toward democracy characteristic of the era.  
Increasing numbers of CSOs/NGOs with international focus were founded in many areas 
in an effort to meet community needs or promote interests, with one estimate claiming 
that some 25,000 organizations could reasonably be classified as INGOs (those with 
affiliates/programs in multiple countries) by the year 2000, up from less than 400 a 
century earlier and 6,000 in 1990 (Paul 2000; Jokic 2013).  As of 2016, the Union of 
International Associations’ Yearbook of International Organizations lists over 38,000 
active and some 30,000 dormant CSOs/NGOs that operated in 2 or more countries and 
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obtained financial support from more than one state, their definitional criteria for being 
an INGO (UIA 2016).   
 The type and degree of CSO/NGO involvement with the UN has evolved over 
time, with the principle venue of interaction being the UN Economic and Social Council 
(ECOSOC), a body established in 1946.  Hundreds of organizations were in attendance at 
the conference establishing the UN at the end of WWII, setting a precedent for 
continuing cooperation and by 1950 formal consultative arrangements with CSOs/NGOs 
and a framework of rules regulating the affiliations were established (Willetts 1996).  
Article 71 of the UN Charter (see Appendix B) is the primary vehicle for UN-civil 
society relations and serves as the basis of the formal consultative status program.  It 
states that ECOSOC “may make suitable arrangements for consultation with non-
governmental organizations which are concerned with matters within its competence.   
Such arrangements may be made with international organizations and, where appropriate, 
with national organizations after consultation with the Member of the United Nations 
concerned.” 
 A highly diverse and ever-expanding range of CSOs/NGOs and policy areas 
including those with a transnational, state-specific and even sub-state focus are 
represented within the UN-ECOSOC consultative status program, reflecting a high 
degree of flexibility on the part of the NGO Committee regarding matriculation into the 
program.  In fact, one source of criticism has been a lack of consistent admission 
standards in that many CSOs/NGOs with an obscure focus or whose mission is otherwise 
very tangentially related to the work of the UN.  Examples of the latter include the 
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International Federation of International Furniture Removers and the European Cyclists’ 
Federation both of which currently hold Roster consultative status (which is the level of 
accreditation usually---though not always---held by organizations with a highly 
narrow/specialized focus) and the International Federation of Psoriasis Associations 
which holds Special consultative status, normally reserved for organizations with a 
broader scope of mission relative to UN activities.   Many examples exist of CSOs/NGOs 
with similarly narrow focus, with at best indirect relevance to the UN’s work, being 
awarded consultative status while others with a comparable or even far more relevant and 
appropriate scope and mission are denied.  Despite such controversies and the occasional 
attempt on the part of state actors or other entities to limit the number of organizations 
involved with the UN, Willetts (1996, 43) explains that the consultative status program 
and the number of organizations involved in it has expanded rapidly in recent years for a 
combination of reasons: 
  First, international NGOs that already existed when the UN was formed, 
 or that were established in the early years, often only had branches in 
 Western countries and have subsequently expanded to become truly global, 
 gained more resources and increased legitimacy.  Second, groups that 
 previously saw no reason to work with the UN, or were suspicious that their 
 independence might be compromised, have seen how the system works and 
 decided that they could benefit from consultative status.  Third, many new NGOs 
 are being formed, as new areas of economic activity develop or new issues move 
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 into the global agenda.  Fourth, as existing groups gain greater resources, 
 experiences and skills, they may expand their scope of activities. 
 
ECOSOC’s Formal Relations with CSOs/NGOs 
 ECOSOC formally accredits NGOs according to three gradations of influence 
which determine degree of access and input: general consultative status, special 
consultative status, and roster consultative status.  The type of accreditation determines 
the right and ability to circulate documents, access to informal preparatory meetings, 
observation of various proceedings, and the opportunity to speak at certain functions (UN 
1999).  General status is afforded to the relatively small number of organizations that are 
global in scope, directly involved with most areas of ECOSOC activities and are 
perceived to be capable of making “substantive and sustained” contributions.  As of 
August 10, 2016, of 4,707 CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status only 147 or 3.1% held 
this level of accreditation.  General status allows organizations to submit written 
statements of up to 2,000 words to ECOSOC bodies on subjects in which the 
organization has specialized knowledge.  Many of the organizations which hold General 
status are among the world’s best known and most respected CSOs/NGOs including 
Greenpeace, Oxfam International, Rotary International, Save the Children, and World 
Vision International for example. 
 Organizations with special status are those with operations in multiple countries, 
expertise in a less diverse range of issues with which ECOSOC is concerned, but are 
potentially capable of making contributions in several such areas.  Special status 
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classification affords less influence than general status and CSOs/NGOs holding this 
accreditation level may not propose items for the provisional agenda of ECOSOC or one 
of its bodies but these NGOs are allowed to submit written statements of up to 500 words 
(Cassese 1979).  As noted in Table 3.1, Special status is by far the most common 
accreditation level among organizations in consultation with ECOSOC, with 3,574 
organizations or 75.9% holding the latter designation.  Organizations holding General or 
Special status are required by ECOSOC to submit a brief report every four years in which 
organizations succinctly (maximum total of 700 words for all responses combined) 
address each of eight items: (1) an introduction to the organization; (2) the CSO’s/NGO’s 
aims and purposes; (3) any changes occurring during the period that significantly 
impacted the CSO’s/NGO’s mission; (4) an overview of the organization’s contributions 
to the work of the UN; (5) an overview of the CSO’s/NGO’s participation in UN 
meetings; (6) examples of the CSO’s/NGO’s cooperation with UN bodies; (7) initiatives 
taken by the CSO/NGO in support of Sustainable (formerly ‘Millennium’) Development 
Goals; (8) any additional relevant information the organization wishes to share with the 
United Nations Committee on NGOs which reviews the quadrennial reports.  Failure to 
submit the quadrennial report may result in loss of ECOSOC consultative status and 
failure to remain active or provide adequate information in the report may result in the 
downgrade of an organization’s status, information which at least as yet is not publicly 
disclosed by the UN. 
 Roster status is for those organizations that are often less transnational in scope, 
usually focused on a more narrow issue area and can make an occasional useful 
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contribution in their area(s) of expertise.  Organizations with Roster status may only 
submit written statements if specifically invited to do so by the UN and the 
CSO’s/NGO’s representatives may only attend public meetings directly relevant to their 
field of specialization.  Roster status is the second most common type of ECOSOC 
consultative status with some 986 (20.9%) organizations holding this level of affiliation.  
Just as CSOs/NGOs can be downgraded from inactivity or lose consultative status 
entirely, they may also petition to upgrade their status to gain greater access within 
ECOSOC and each year numerous organizations apply to transition from Roster to 
Special (most commonly) or Special to General status.   
 An assumption underlying this study is that the degree of participation of 
CSOs/NGOs will to at least some degree be impacted by the level of consultative status 
they hold, i.e. presumably a higher percentage of those holding General status will be 
active participants as opposed to those with Special status due to both the breadth of 
operational scope and the increased opportunity to participate.  Likewise, it may be that 
the smallest participation rates will be among CSOs/NGOs holding Roster Status as theirs 
is the narrowest scope of operations and the most restrictive type of ECOSOC status 
wherein for example submission of written statements is not a right or a matter of routine.  
However, such assumptions cannot be taken for granted.  Also, the potential influence of 
organizations holding Special or Roster status should not be entirely discounted, certainly 
when weight of their numbers and proportional representation is taken into consideration.  
While organizations with General status presumably have a greater degree of opportunity 
to participate within the ECOSOC system, they constitute scarcely more than 3% of 
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organizations holding consultative status at present (see Table 3.1).  In contrast, those 
organizations with Special status comprise nearly 76% and those with Roster status 21%, 
meaning even with lower proportional rates of participation, CSOs/NGOs holding a 
lower tier accreditation status within ECOSOC could nonetheless be better represented in 
conferences than those with General status and could potentially be making meaningful 
contributions.    
 While ECOSOC remains the primary venue for UN-civil society interaction, other 
outlets also exist for formal interaction with other UN bodies.  CSOs/NGOs may be 
granted formal association with the UN Department of Public Information (DPI) which 
facilitates access, but not participation in UN meetings.  The number of organizations 
with a DPI affiliation has increased markedly over time, from 200 in 1968 to over 1,300 
in 2016 (Global Policy Forum 1999; DPI 2016).  Informal dialog also occasionally exists 
between the NGO Working Group of the UN Security Council with accredited NGOs 
(UN 1999).  Limited formalized NGO participation arrangements also exist with certain 
other UN bodies and affiliated organizations including the International Labor 
Organization; UN Conference on Trade and Development; UN Development Program; 
UN International Children’s Fund; World Health Organization; UNAIDS; UN High 
Commission for Refugees; UN Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization; Food 
and Agricultural Organization of the UN; and the World Intellectual Property 
Organization (UN-CONGO 2006).  With regard to such bodies, the UN may provide one-
time, temporary accreditation for a specific meeting or other function which does not 
equate to a permanent affiliation or consultative status.   
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 The United Nations is not the only prominent IGO to establish formal 
relationships with civil society organizations.  For example, the World Bank has for 
many years prioritized associations with CSOs/NGOs, facilitated partnership 
opportunities, disseminated CSO/NGO-related information, and hosted seminars and 
discussion groups on the roles of CSOs/NGOs in international governance (Ottaway 
2001).   CSOs/NGOs played important roles in the establishment of the International 
Criminal Court (ICC) as well as in many of its functions including providing information 
for investigations and trials (Hill 2008).  Both the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and 
World Trade Organization (WTO) have long maintained association with CSOs/NGOs 
having expertise in economic/trade-related matters and both have held public 
consultations and policy forums with CSOs/NGOs, and have often solicited their 
feedback concerning IMF and WTO policies (IMF 2016; Vifell 2010; WTO 2016).  
Some 1,300 international CSOs/NGOs were present for the WTOs infamous Seattle 
conference in 1999 (Seters 2008).  Most major regional IGOs such as the African Union, 
Arab League, Commonwealth of Nations, European Union, and Organization of 
American States have established formal programs that facilitate varied degrees of 
cooperation and communication with CSOs/NGOs and most provide at least some form 
of funding for such organizations in order to assist in performing certain functions such 
as education or emergency relief.  Some significant IGOs also have established an official 
associative status for cultivating more formal standing relationships with CSOs/NGOs.  
Prominent examples include the Council of Europe which implemented such a program 
in 1993 and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), which via 
its “researcher in residence” program grants archival access to representatives of 
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approved organizations.  Institutional culture in general, guidelines for CSO/NGO 
participation, and opportunities for meaningful input can pose intervening obstacles for 
those organizations which seek to cultivate relationships with the UN or other IGOs, and 
one potential catalyst for overcoming such barriers and furthering policy agendas can be 
constructive interaction (e.g. information sharing) and coalition-building among 
CSOs/NGOs.   
 
CSO/NGO Collaborations and Coalition-Building 
 Often civil society organizations are most effective when they engage in 
collaborate efforts via formal coalitions with each other and with other entities such as 
business, labor or governmental actors (Paul 2000).  Collaborative efforts between 
multiple CSOs/NGOs working in conjunction, particularly when there is also support 
from state actors, have been cited in various studies as facilitating change with regard to 
numerous international policy initiatives.  Examples include the international movement 
which led to the 2008 global treaty banning cluster munitions (Bolton and Nash 2010), 
advocacy coalitions which have helped bring about action and accountability in health 
initiatives for women and children in many world regions (WHO 2012), and the 
successful efforts of CSOs/NGOs working with labor unions to ban sandblasting 
processes in jeans manufacturing in Europe that were potentially harmful to workers’ 
health (Kryst 2012).  CSOs/NGO coalitions working in collaborative effort behind a 
common goal increasingly rival or even exceed the influence of state actors as evidenced 
in relief efforts for Typhoon Haiyan wherein civil society fundraising coalitions outpaced 
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the contributions of national governments in many wealthy industrialized countries (GHA 
2014). 
 The phenomenon of INGO coalition-building has emerged over time.  Coalition 
building and collaborative efforts among civil society organizations is certainly not a new 
phenomenon as evidenced by the founding of such organizations as the World Alliance 
of Young Men’s Christian Associations in 1855, the International Veterinary Congress in 
1863, the International Federation of Metal Workers Organizations in 1893 or perhaps 
more famously the International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies in 
1919 (Ritchie 1995).  However, the scope and frequency of international cooperation 
among CSOs/NGOs and between the latter and other elements of civil society, business 
and government has expanded in recent decades.   
 Organizations with common interests and policy goals may find their level of 
influence and the likelihood of success in influencing policy is greater if they undertake a 
combined effort or at least present the public image of a united front.  For example, in the 
area of development CSO/NGO coalitions have been formulated behind the idea that 
policy reforms are critical for increasing visibility and public access to the decision-
making process and for promoting alternative strategies (Udall 1998).  Variations exist 
concerning the exact organization and structure of CSO/NGO coalitions, and they make 
take the form of---ranging from most-to-least formally organized: umbrella organizations, 
networks, or caucuses (Willetts 1996).  Entities such as the International Union for the 
Conservation of Nature, which counts over 1,000 individual CSOs/NGOs as members, 
are referred to as umbrella organizations in order to denote the presence within one broad 
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framework of a variety of different organizations in formal, long-term association that 
nonetheless maintain distinct identities and governance.  Issue-based CSO/NGO 
networks such as the prototype International Baby Foods Action Network, made up of 
nearly 300 autonomous groups in 168 countries, are less formal in their organizational 
structure than umbrella organizations and may be organized behind the goal of 
exchanging information, mobilizing supporters, or coordinating combined efforts (Ibid).  
The least formally integrated variant among transnational CSO/NGO partnerships is a 
caucus, wherein a group of organizations unite on a more short-term basis essentially as 
lobbyists at a particular international event such as a UN conference in an effort to 
achieve specific objectives at the event, after which the association will customarily 
dissolve (Ibid).  An example of the latter is the Youth Caucus at the 2016 UN DPI/NGO 
Conference in Korea.    
 Balanced, egalitarian and harmonious partnerships within coalitions can be 
difficult to establish and maintain given sometimes significant differences in agendas, 
culture, influence, political and ideological background, and power that can exist and 
serve as centrifugal forces between different organizations (Brown and Fox 1998).  The 
latter problems become compounded as the size, diversity and range of issues with which 
an CSO/NGO coalition may be dealing expand.  As the result of such complexities, such 
coalitions can be fluid in terms of their dynamic and composition and they commonly 
dissolve, with many never intended to be more than a temporary alliance for a common 
cause.     
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Concepts of Pluralism and Democratization 
 Within the context of analyzing democracy, the concept of pluralism is associated 
with a school of thought in liberal political science that focused upon multiple sources of 
political power/input and that regarded democracy as the internal regulation of society via 
competition among various groups over power and social privileges (Dahl 1956). 
Attempts to characterize pluralism usually share the core view that what is desirable and 
egalitarian about democratic systems is that their functioning cannot be reduced to any 
single hierarchy or idea (Karppinen 2013).  The epistemological foundation of pluralism 
within democratic institutions is the concept that diversity in all its forms is a social and 
political good that safeguards against the dominance of one particular agenda (Smith 
2006, 21–22).  Karppinen (2013, 30) states that “premised on the impossibility of 
unambiguously establishing truth, right or good, especially in social and political affairs, 
pluralism has been widely celebrated as the cornerstone of the liberal conception of 
democracy.”  Pluralism within transnational civil society is also often regarded as a 
potentially important vehicle for the transmission of global norms, including those related 
to democracy and human rights (Edwards 2009). 
 Within pluralist concepts, a distinction exists between liberal pluralists who tend 
to stress rights-oriented issues such as protection and inclusion of minorities and 
participatory or deliberative democracy pluralists who emphasize public empowerment 
through voting and other participative processes (Cohen and Arato 1997).  Pluralism’s 
importance to democracy may be viewed in slightly different terms by the two camps.  
For liberal pluralists the “marketplace of ideas and individual choice” is sacrosanct, 
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whereas for deliberative democrats pluralism is a catalyst for improving the “epistemic 
quality of public deliberation and discursive reconciliation of disagreement” (Karppinen 
2013, 29).  Galston (2002, 3) notes that liberal pluralists support the minimum conditions 
for maintenance of public order such as rule of law and authorities that can enforce it.  As 
he elaborates on some of the core tenants of liberal pluralism, it’s relevance to the UN 
dynamic is clear…  
  Liberal pluralists…also endorse “minimal universalism”, the moral and 
 practical necessity of organizing public life so as to ward off, to the greatest 
 extent possible, the great evils of the human condition such as tyranny, genocide, 
 cruelty and humiliation, mass starvation and deadly epidemics.  This overlaps 
 with contemporary movements for universal human rights and provision of basic 
 needs.    
 Political pluralism can be interpreted to mean different things in different 
contexts.  Some conceptions of pluralism on a global scale regard it essentially as an 
egalitarian collaboration for mutual interest, such as---for the purposes of this research---
diversifying voices which can be heard at the UN in pursuit of increased opportunity for 
input and oversight within international governance.  Exploring the latter perspective, 
Verweij (2011, 201) states that “pluralism postulates that the world system is not made 
up of dependencies between unequal parties, but rather of voluntarily created 
interdependencies that are to the benefit of most actors involved.”  As he further 
elaborates, his vision of global pluralism as a cooperative framework evokes parallels to 
the fundamental principles of neorealism: 
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  The enormous growth of transnational trade, services, investment, travel, 
 and education increasingly ties together the fortunes and interests of non-state, but 
 also of governmental actors.  In the forever changing and partially interwoven 
 ‘cobwebs’ of economic, financial, and social relations that are thus created, 
 political power is increasingly diffused among a multitude of state and non-state 
 actors (Verweij 2011, 201-202).   
 
 One of the core concepts important to pluralism and its relationship to democratic 
institutions is the issue of power, specifically how power is distributed and shared.  The 
objective of egalitarian balance within democratic institutions is achieved via power and 
influence being distributed among widely diverse and often competing interest groups 
(Held 2006).  Such a balance will not necessarily reflect perfect equilibrium or pluralism 
in its ideal form, as certain elements within a polyarchical dynamic may often wield more 
power and influence than others.  In fact, it may be naïve to dismiss the existence of elites 
within a political dynamic in favor of a purist vision of pluralism in that within even the 
most democratic societies or institutions some elements (e.g. people, interest groups) will 
always exert more influence and control than others (Lindblom 2002; Schattschneider 
1975).  The latter reality does not necessarily preclude the existence of pluralism as a 
phenomenon, but instead potentially reframes the nature of pluralism (“elite pluralism”) 
within democratic systems as a process wherein diverse elements are given voice and 
opportunity to pursue equilibrium---even if perfect equilibrium within a power dynamic 
is not achieved (Blokland 2016).   
 58 
 
 Considerable differences of opinion exist as to the nature of power and how it is 
distributed.  While a constructivist perspective may regard power and its distribution 
among various elements competing for it as being a more fluid process, the structuralist 
perspective may contend that power distributions are resilient and long-term or 
permanent in nature, possessing a tendency to remain at least largely with traditionally 
dominant elements (e.g. states).  Within pluralist traditions, no single source is regarded 
as having a complete monopoly and concomitantly, some degree of distribution of power 
must exist.  Such a distribution could exist also in terms of the dichotomy of potential 
power as opposed to actual power, as many pluralists contend that potential power 
commonly transcends actual power wielded and that merely having the realistic potential 
to exert power and influence reflects pluralistic, egalitarian distribution at least to some 
degree. Keck and Sikkink (1998, 95) argue that CSOs within a transnational arena can 
exhibit any of four distinct types of political power: information politics---the 
supply/movement of information, symbolic politics---i.e. claim-making using symbols or 
actions, leverage politics---ability to call upon influential political actors, and 
accountability politics---i.e. ability to hold IOs accountable (Thiel 2017).  
 With regard to this research, the degree to which CSOs/NGOs in formal 
association with the UN have actually contributed to pluralism and transnational 
democracy is called into question.  Within the UN-civil society dynamic, specifically the 
ECOSOC consultative status program with CSOs/NGOs, there does not appear to be a 
distribution of power (actual or potential) inclusive of CSOs as UN-member states retain 
largely monopolistic control---agenda setting, policy formulation, oversight, etc.  As 
 59 
 
noted in the study’s first research questions, uneven patterns of participation may exist in 
terms of regional representation and also with regard to policy issues focus areas, 
meaning not all regions or issue areas may be proportionally represented via civil society 
presence within the UN framework.  Specifically, the formal pathway between 
CSOs/NGOs and UN-ECOSOC, the most meaningful manifestation of UN interaction 
with transnational civil society thus far cultivated, may exist more in name and idea 
rather than practice, in which case the program’s contribution to democratic pluralism at 
the UN has fallen short of initial expectations. 
 
Concepts of Transnational Democracy 
 Democracy has become a key concept among those who advocate increased 
legitimacy for international political institutions, but defining a vision of transnational 
democracy is a subjective process (Nasstrom 2010).  As a concept or system, democracy 
is not constrained to any one level of government, but is to be found in the juxtaposition 
of a multiplicity of self-governing and self-organizing entities constituted on diverse 
spatial scales from the local to the global (Agne 2010; McGrew 2002).  Perhaps the 
central idea underlying democracy is that it is rule by the people, or more narrowly---rule 
by a polity, which poses difficulties in democratizing international governance 
institutions such as the UN as there is no single polity or body of people from which to 
establish a democracy (Nasstrom 2010).  Echoing the latter sentiment, Bartelson (2010, 
218) states that “global political authority is relatively weak and decentralized, and the 
pluralistic makeup of global society has conspired against the formation of a global 
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demos that could provide global institutions with the kind of legitimacy that derives from 
popular consent.”  Legitimacy within the context of political institutions, transnational or 
otherwise, reflects the popular recognition as rightful by those over whom the institution 
claims to possess authority (Bartelsen 2010; Reus-Smit 2007).  Describing the efforts of 
CSOs/NGOs to influence transnational development organizations and other IGOs, 
potentially including roles as legitimizing agents, Udall (1998, 391) describes the primary 
goal as the promotion of “democracy and development alternatives that are socially just 
and environmentally sound.” 
 Whether or not IGOs such as the UN can or should be models of democratic 
norms in every respect is one of the key political controversies in the current age of 
globalism (Agne 2010).  Some scholars have argued that expectations for democratic 
traditions at the transnational level are a given and that they are intrinsically useful and 
necessary in global politics and can help frame and reinforce democratic societal norms 
and expectations for state-level democratic traditions (Bohman 2007).  Archibugi (2008) 
contends that while most benefits of democracy can perhaps be more readily experienced 
at the national or local level, the principles of democracy should not stop at the level of 
international governance, particularly in the loosely governed, yet increasingly 
interconnected global society of today which impacts people’s lives to such a degree.  He 
argues that even if a perfectly democratic transnational system cannot be achieved, it is 
possible to grant global public opinion a greater role---certainly extending beyond just 
that of western nations---in order to increase the legitimacy of world political arenas, and 
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potentially address many problems facing the world while still allowing for the self-
determination and sovereignty of nations (Ibid).    
 While at face value the prospect of increased democracy within transnational 
institutions sounds wholly positive, innocuous and free of controversy, the concept can be 
problematic.  Issues related to even the partial transfer of sovereignty from state to 
transnational institutions remain highly controversial and politically charged, even 
galvanizing public opinion as witnessed recently when a majority of British voters opted 
out of the EU principally over the real or perceived process of national sovereignty 
potentially being eroded via a transnational entity, with similar national-sovereignty 
movements growing in other EU member states as well.  Yet, eroding or replacing state 
sovereignty in favor of some variation of a global liberal democratic body is not the only 
pathway of furthering increased democratic pluralism within the international community 
(Agne 2010).  Addressing this, Agne (2010, 178) explains: 
  From a different perspective, democratization of global politics is neither 
 driven nor constituted by governments but by voluntary associations of 
 individuals who act within and beyond their national boundaries and with a 
 significant degree of independence from governments…Exactly what actors 
 should be regarded as fulfilling the criteria of voluntary association is a matter of 
 debate.  All observers include NGOs and social movements.  Some also include 
 private companies, labor unions, and philanthropic foundations.  
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Shortcomings of CSOs/NGOs in Maintaining Productive Relationships with the 
UN/IGOs  
 Sandel (2000) notes that if the increasingly globalized character of contemporary 
world economics and politics needs more transnational forms of governance, it remains 
unclear whether international forums, civil society or otherwise, can inspire the shared 
identity, allegiance or commonality of perspectives upon which democratic transnational 
governance would depend.  The concept of a truly global civil society as opposed to a 
patchwork of disparate, competing groups reflective of contrasting national and regional 
agendas may in fact not be realizable in the short-term via the UN or other IGOs as 
catalysts.  Sandel (2000, 289) discusses the difficulty inherent in forging such a global 
integration within the context of what is arguably the most successful supranationalistic 
body to date, stating that “even the European Union, one of the most successful 
experiments in supranational governance, has so far failed to cultivate a (true) common 
European identity sufficient to fully support its mechanisms of economic and political 
integration.”  Similarly, Thiel (2011) concludes that the transnational political 
space/culture of the EU is to a great degree limited, often containing significant 
constraints such as nationalistic agendas that impede the emergence of a truly 
consolidated and transnational European identity.  
 The roles to potentially be played by CSOs/NGOs within international institutions 
and the justifications for such organizations to be given access remain subject to debate.  
While a common perception exists within the arena of international governance that 
states and IGOs can benefit from utilizing civil society in roles such as policy experts, 
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providers of services, and compliance monitors, knowledge of the effectiveness of 
CSOs/NGOs related to each of the latter and the complex variables related to such roles 
remains tenuous at best (Tallberg 2010).  Considerable question exists concerning the 
legitimate, effective impact of CSOs/NGOs within the UN and other transnational bodies.  
For example, in assessing the impact of civil society advocacy campaigns, including 
some high profile initiatives, upon projects related to development within the World 
Bank, Fox and Brown (1998, 534-535) concluded their collective impact was negligible 
and amounted to little more than “window dressing.”    
 Rational-choice institutionalism and the proposition that institutions are created or 
integrated to address shortcomings or improve functional efficiency within a system may 
offer potential insight as to the possible motives of governments and IGOs in 
collaborating with civil society institutions (Tallberg 2010).  In offering a well-
formulated rational functionalist account seeking to justify CSO/NGO involvement in 
international or state governance, Raustiala (1997, 719) argues that “rather than 
undermining state sovereignty, active NGO participation enhances the abilities of states 
to regulate globally…(and) the empirical pattern of NGO participation has been 
structured across time and policy areas to reap those gains.”  Governments and IGOs that 
potentially see benefit to be derived (whether real or perceived) from direct, formal 
associations with CSOs/NGOs may pursue such arrangements out of self-interest rather 
than altruism or ideological commitment.  Accordingly, many government and IGOs may 
not be engaging global civil society behind the goals of furthering pluralism or 
democracy-building but because they regard such organizations as having something they 
 64 
 
need (O’Brien et al 2000).  International institutions may be to a great degree the 
outcomes of strategic choices made by state actors in response to needs/problems related 
to issues such as transaction costs and problems of monitoring and enforcement 
(Deitelhoff 2009; Kalm 2010).  
 Other theoretical perspectives regard emerging transnational norm conformity 
rather than intrinsic self-interest as primary motivating factors for increased NGO and 
civil society access to international governance.  In short, more IGOs are in general 
granting CSOs/NGOs access to their institutional processes out of the perception that this 
is a newly standardized norm and expectation within the framework of transnational 
politics that such actions bolster democratic legitimacy.  Within the field of international 
relations, such an approach is supported by sociological institutionalism and 
constructivism which focus upon processes of norm diffusion and institutional replication 
as catalysts for construction and spread of international norms.  Addressing such 
processes, Tallberg (2010, 50-51) explains: 
  This norm conceives of NGOs as representatives of an emerging global 
 civil society, whose organized participation can address the democratic deficits of 
 traditional international institutions.  States and institutions have either come to 
 adopt this through socialization, or adapted strategically to it for purposes of 
 legitimizing existing governance structures.  The norm originates from various 
 sources: international law, development ideology, normative democratic theory, 
 and domestic political structures.  This approach predicts that practices of 
 transnational access will become increasingly homogeneous, with extant 
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 differences explained by variation in the spread and consolidation of the norm of 
 global participatory democracy.  
 It is likely that many different theoretical perspectives are at least partly 
applicable in attempting to explain growing civil society influence within transnational 
governance.  As intergovernmental organizations have become more prevalent and have 
grown in power and influence, many including the UN have arguably become 
increasingly sensitive to perception and criticism related to the need for democratic 
norms to be institutionalized and accordingly, the theories espoused by sociological 
institutionalism and constructivism in terms of CSOs/NGOs at least partly addressing a 
democratic deficit are not without merit.  However, participation of civil society or other 
non-state actors within IGOs is significantly older than relatively recent concerns 
regarding the democratic traditions of global or regional governance (Charnovitz 1997; 
White 1968).  If the UN or other IGOs can more efficiently distribute aid or provide other 
services, or receive worthwhile expertise or something else of potential benefit through 
associations with CSOs/NGOS---which is almost certainly the case in at least many 
instances---then rational-choice institutionalism is also at least partly applicable in 
explaining the phenomenon. 
 A range of other considerations may also have played at least some role in the 
trending associations between IGOs and civil society, some of which examine the 
motivations of civil society rather than governments or IGOs.  For example, if certain 
political decisions are increasingly made and policy increasingly formulated in 
transnational settings superseding the state, it is reasonable to expect CSOs/NGOs with 
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vested interests to pursue status as transnational actors as well in order to have a voice at 
that level of decision-making (Steffek 2010).  Also, it has been theorized that under 
certain circumstances CSOs/NGOs might seek to directly engage with IGOs to sidestep a 
national government that is either repressive toward them or otherwise not responsive to 
the needs or interests of the organization (Steffek 2010; Keck and Sikkink 1998).  As an 
additional example of processes driving CSOs/NGOs to seek standing in the transnational 
arena, it has been suggested that many civil society actors are not necessarily autonomous 
actors and are dependent upon their environments and actors within their orbits for 
resources (Pfeffer and Salancik 2003).  Resource-dependency theory contends that NGOs 
or other organizations depend upon economic, material or political resources which they 
obtain from actors within their environment and thus interaction with actors is necessary, 
as is the expansion of the parameters of the environment to the international arena in 
order to pursue additional resources (Liese 2010).   
 Many observers believe that at present CSOs/NGOs may have grown their scope, 
status and responsibilities beyond the realistic limits of their operational capabilities 
(DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; Thompson 2008).  Increasingly, questions have been raised 
concerning the roles for which CSOs/NGOs are suited to play, to whom they should be 
accountable and where they fit within the structures of governance locally, nationally and 
internationally (Jordan and Tuijl 2006).  One of the highest profile and harshest public 
critics of the expanded role of CSOs/NGOs within the international arena is John Bolton, 
former US Ambassador to the United Nations, who has expressed misgivings concerning 
the “extra-national clout of NGOs” within global governance and concern that “civil 
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society sees itself as beyond national politics”, which is one of the reasons its recent 
successes have such profoundly anti-democratic implications (Bolton 2000; Charnovitz 
2006).  In analyzing Bolton’s staunch opposition to the integration of NGOs within 
international governance, Charnovitz (2006, 24-25) notes that… 
  The problem as analyzed by Bolton is that NGO participation ‘provides a 
 second opportunity for intrastate advocates to reargue their positions, thus 
 advantaging them over their opponents who may be either unwilling or unable to 
 reargue their cases in international fora’.  Moreover, he contended that ‘the civil 
 society idea actually suggests a “corporative” (authoritarian corporatism) 
 approach to international decision-making that is dramatically troubling for 
 democratic philosophy because it posits “interests” (whether NGOs or businesses) 
 as legitimate actors along with the popularly elected governments’…Bolton does 
 not advocate suppressing NGOs, but he seems to want government (and the UN) 
 to shut its eyes to them. 
 
 While few criticisms of the expanded role of CSOs/NGOs go as far as the latter 
analogy to corporatist agendas, other critical appraisals have been offered.  McKeon 
(2009, 2) argues that the problem does not lie with the trend of growing influence of such 
organizations within international governance---regarding the latter trend as a potentially 
positive development for democratic traditions---but rather that such integration has 
fallen short of expectations.  She states that civil society’s influence within the UN and 
other IGOs has “failed thus far to move from generic and often episodic participation to 
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meaningful incorporation of these actors into global political process.”  Thompson (2008) 
notes that although the number of CSOs/NGOs active within the global arena including 
the UN has expanded greatly in recent decades, it remains unclear that their ability to 
actually influence agendas and outcomes is significant or has kept pace with their 
expanding numbers.   
 The very success of the expanding numbers and diversity of NGOs and 
international civil society is potentially creating a logistical dilemma.  Just within the 
framework of the United Nations, the presence of literally thousands of CSOs/NGOs with 
consultative status and thousands more with less formal affiliations, each potentially 
vying for influence and promoting its agendas, has brought diversity to the international 
arena but simultaneously made many logistical considerations more cumbersome and 
problematic including making it increasingly difficult for states, IGOs and other actors to 
decide which voices they will listen to and making it more difficult for each CSO/NGO 
to provide input (Thompson 2008). 
 Another issue receiving critical scrutiny from some observers is the inconsistent 
and often contradictory manner in which different types of actors are treated within the 
organizational dynamic.  Exploring the harsher scrutiny faced by civil society in vetting 
and regulatory processes as opposed to treatment afforded to commercial interests 
McKeon (2009, 171) cites the following contrasting circumstances occurring during a 
recent conference of the Rome-based UN Food and Agriculture Organization:   
  …Few absurdities in the way the UN works are more flagrant than the 
 zeal that is invested in vetting and policing CSOs as compared with the relative 
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 indifference to the antics of representatives of transnational corporations…A 
 delegation member of a highly respected NGO was carried off to be interrogated 
 by the Italian police for passing notes around inviting delegations to refrain from 
 electing the US to the FAO Council following the invasion of Iraq.  At the same 
 time, the transnational sugar lobby conducted itself outrageously in a FAO 
 technical committee, attempting to purchase developing country votes and 
 intervening in a heavy-handed way in the discussions.  Yet no disciplinary action 
 was taken. 
 The NGO consultative status program with ECOSOC has long been a politicized 
process and many examples exist of political machinations and controversy within the 
system.   During the Cold War a number of international CSOs/NGOs including several 
labor organizations became sympathetic to the Soviet Union leading to internal dissent 
and to many pro-western elements within the groups to calve off and form their own rival 
organizations with the backing of western governments (Willetts 1999).  From the 
inception, political problems have arisen with CSOs/NGOs that offer criticisms of the 
governments of specific (often authoritarian) states, usually related to human rights 
issues.  Traditionally, the ensuing response of states to the latter has been to deny the 
right of IOs or other external actors to interfere in their sovereign affairs and also to 
denounce CSOs/NGOs and the UN’s NGO system in general (Willetts 1999).  Currently, 
the UN is caught between a past tradition of international governance by sovereign state 
actors and the emerging need for transnational governance incorporating CSOs/NGOs 
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and other non-state actors on an equitable basis and thus far it has been unable to 
integrate the two competing paradigms cohesively (McKeon 2009). 
 The second and third research questions inquire as to why some organizations 
with UN consultative status participate in the program and others do not, and what factors 
account for participation or the lack thereof.  The answers to the latter questions may 
shed light on the processes regulating the association between CSOs/NGOs and the UN 
and also the degree to which it is equitable, egalitarian and as such a catalyst for 
democratic pluralism within international governance or conversely if obstacles to 
meaningful participation are unevenly distributed among types of NGOs, policy areas, or 
world regions.  The survey component of the research in particular may shed light on 
how and why many CSOs/NGOs fall short of making meaningful contributions through 
their association with the UN. 
 
Credibility Issues 
 An interesting dichotomy also exists concerning CSOs/NGOs and issues related 
to legitimacy or trust.  In one sense, CSOs/NGOs are held in high regard.  For example, 
the 2014 Edelman Trust Barometer found that such organizations were the most trusted 
institutions globally, while confidence in elected officials, government institutions and 
business was significantly lower and continuing to decline (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; 
ETB 2014).  However, many scholars are calling for reappraisals and increasingly 
challenging the status and legitimacy afforded to CSOs/NGOs which ostensibly hold 
governments and other entities accountable within transnational regimes but often fall 
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short of substantive accountability themselves (DeMars and Dijkzeul 2015; Peruzzotti 
2006; Jordan and Tuijl 2006).   
 A curious dichotomy is also visible with the concept of CSOs/NGOs helping to 
facilitate democratic norms within international organizations such as the UN.  An 
expanded and formalized presence of civil society allows a larger number and more 
diverse array of voices to potentially be heard and hopefully adds to the perspectives 
contributed by state actors and the commercial sector.  This role of civil society as a 
catalyst for democracy within international institutions is arguably its most important role 
in that it at least potentially affords a voice to the grassroots and concomitantly 
strengthens democracy and international policy formulation through advocacy (Clark 
2008).  However, NGOs and other manifestations of civil society pose governance 
concerns in that many, possibly most, are not strictly democratic, have oligarchical, 
charismatic, unelected (by popular vote) or largely unaccountable leadership with limited 
membership and participatory rights---many of the same undemocratic characteristics 
that civil society criticizes and seeks to reform if found within government (Albrow and 
Holland 2008).   
 In the 1980s continuing into much of the 1990s, the burgeoning number and 
strength of NGOs and civil society in general was lauded as symptomatic of the 
advancement of democracy and strengthening of pluralism via the perception that voices 
were being given to larger numbers and more diverse segments of populations and such a 
view was especially true of regions such as Eastern Europe that had historically been 
characterized by authoritarian rule.  Many aid donors also started to view CSOs/NGOs as 
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more reliable, capable and honest aid recipients than governmental entities, particularly 
in regions associated with autocratic, unstable, or corrupt histories (Armstrong 2006).  
Even if NGOs/CSOs did not have popularly elected leadership or otherwise had much if 
any accountability their growth was initially equated with the advancement of pluralistic 
democracy.  Addressing this evolving perceptual trend and its eventual revision, 
Peruzzotti (2006, 43) explains:   
  For many years, particularly when those organizations largely operated in 
 authoritarian environments, the issue of the representativeness and accountability 
 of civic actors could easily be brushed aside given the illegitimate nature of many 
 domestic governments and the continuous threat they presented to any form of 
 social activity that dared to challenge and expose their abuses of power and 
 human rights.  However, the increased presence of democratically-elected 
 governments in developing countries makes it difficult to keep avoiding an 
 analysis of the relationship between civil society actors and representative 
 institutions. 
 By the late-1990s, among many nations that had long-established democratic 
traditions and increasingly among emerging democracies constructing the institutional 
frameworks of freedom, the perception that NGOs were hallmarks of democracy or that 
they were the voices of the people was being increasingly challenged.  Elected officials in 
particular began to increasingly question the popular perception of CSOs/NGOs as 
democratic institutions, as representatives of populations or even appreciable segments 
thereof, and in the case being made by many NGOs and other civil society elements that 
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their organizations should have voices comparable if not equal to that of elected national 
governments within transnational institutions including the United Nations.  Criticisms 
centered upon the issues that the organizations are often led by groups of self-appointed 
rather than popularly-elected leaders, many such organizations are not even membership-
based, and many are not often exposed to comparable levels of public scrutiny or 
accountability as governmental bodies---i.e. the claims of NGOs and civil society to 
reflect democratic trends fell short with regard to representation and accountability 
(Peruzzotti 2006).  Whereas within representative democracy elected officials are the 
primary architects of policy formulation and decision-making, there is no real means of 
ensuring that CSOs/NGOs represent their constituencies and as the result legitimacy 
issues can be raised (Kroger 2013). 
 
Democratic Representation 
 The study of representation within democratic institutions has primarily focused 
upon the political input of individual citizen voters (e.g. Przeworski et al 1999).  
However, the importance of civil society should not be discounted, as a representative 
government presumes a meaningful interaction between the system of governance and 
various manifestations of those represented (Peruzzotti 2006, 44-45).  Peruzzotti (2006, 
47) argues that both representation and accountability can be enhanced by civil society in 
two respects: 
  First, civil society enhances representative government by adding  new 
 voices and concerns to the political agenda, thematizing novel issues, and 
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 criticizing existing public policies and legislation.  Second, civil society can also 
 contribute to improve the quality of representative arrangements by demanding 
 effective legal accountability.    
 Accountability can be thought of as the “ability to ensure that officials are 
answerable for their behavior in the sense of being forced to inform and justify their 
decisions and of being eventually sanctioned for those decisions (Peruzzotti 2006, 45).”  
Similarly, Paul (1992, 1047) defines accountability as “holding individuals and 
organizations responsible for performance.”  Both definitions were framed principally 
with public officials in mind, which begs the question as to how or if a private, 
autonomous CSO/NGO can be subject to accountability standards deemed suitable for 
public agencies.   
 If accountability is by its very nature an externality in that it requires a capacity 
for control by elements not part of the body being held accountable, then improved 
accountability and transparency on the part of CSOs/NGOs could perhaps best be 
achieved via the vehicle of internal and external reporting requirements (Armstrong 
2006; Mulgan 2000).  In addition to heightened expectations for self-regulation, the 
World Bank and other IGOs have supported the practice of CSOs/NGOs reporting to 
government agencies and donors concerning their finances and activities, and also 
extending the right for legitimate government inspectors to enter the premises of such an 
organization or site(s) under its control to check conditions and inspect records, even at 
random (Ibid).  In many countries such as Uganda or the Philippines, both CSOs/NGOs 
and governments are perceived to have roles in ensuring accountability via formal 
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oversight (Okwaare and Chapman 2006).  For example, an outcome of the inspection and 
oversight process is that some form of official designation such as the certification of an 
organization being in “good standing” may be conveyed, indicating the legitimate status 
of the group and its conformity with accountability practices to donors and others (Golub 
2006).  
 In addition to their own accountability, NGOs and other civil society 
organizations can potentially make substantive contributions as agents of accountability 
and change within government, including transnational institutions.  By monitoring and 
denouncing rights violations or the subvention of the law or due process, and also via 
facilitating efforts to improve the procedures and agencies that frame and regulate the 
conduct of government or the commercial sector, organs of civil society can strengthen 
and often activate vehicles of legal accountability.  Historically IGOs have asserted that 
they derive accountability from the governments of member states, which at least in the 
case of democratic nations have citizens which elect governments to represent their 
interests at all levels including international forums and thus citizens are represented 
indirectly with their national governments retaining ultimate control of representation 
(Kovach 2006).  
 
Theory and Reality 
 Many of the goals of democratic pluralism within the context of transnational 
governance are potentially admirable.  Such objectives include giving voices to 
marginalized peoples, issues and regions that may not otherwise receive attention 
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internationally, the diversification of international agenda setting and discourse beyond 
the traditionally state-centric approach, and the facilitation of communication and 
collaborative effort within global civil society.  The practical realization of such 
objectives as theorized in the literature would indeed serve to democratize, diversify and 
concomitantly lend additional legitimacy to transnational governance in general and the 
operations of IGOs such as the United Nations.        
 However, it is my contention that such goals have not been fully realized.  Despite 
the commonly-held perception of the UN’s interaction with NGOs and global civil 
society as a successful manifestation of the principles of democratic pluralism within 
transnational governance, the realities of the relationship may in many respects fall short.  
The guiding hypotheses of this research contend that:  (1) imbalances (gaps) exist 
regarding CSO/NGO participation with the UN both in terms of regional involvement 
and with regard to policy areas; (2) a combination of various factors facilitate varied 
degrees of participation or the lack thereof among different CSOs/NGOs; and (3) 
although a formal association may exist officially, most organizations in consultative 
status with UN-ECOSOC make little-no contribution to the UN’s goal of substantive 
engagement with pluralist international civil society.   
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III. CHAPTER 3:  
MACRO-SCALE PATTERNS OF CSO/NGO PARTICIPATION WITHIN UN-
ECOSOC 
 
Introduction 
 The first 2 research questions inquire as to (1) the patterns of participation of 
NGOs/CSOs in the UN-ECOSOC consultative status (CS) program in terms of the 
proportionality of country and regional representation, and (2) the patterns of 
participation and proportional representation in terms of policy issue/focus areas such as 
human rights, development, etc.  These questions led to the formulation of the first 
guiding hypothesis which contends that imbalances exist in patterns of participation of 
organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC with regard to country/regional 
involvement (e.g. CSOs of developed states are proportionally better represented than 
those of developing states) and regarding the policy issue areas with which the 
organizations are concerned.  The UN’s publicly available iCSO database provides 
detailed statistics concerning the names and types of organizations in the CS program, 
their locations, policy/focus areas, and level of CS accreditation.  The latter datasets were 
used to operationalize the first guiding hypothesis. 
 Between June-September 2016, the United Nation’s iCSO database was analyzed 
to identify macro-scale patterns of participation on the part of civil society organizations 
at the UN, with a focus upon CS organizations within ECOSOC.  The following four 
broad data categorizations were analyzed: (1) organization type; (2) geographical 
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scope/scale of organizations; (3) types of formal UN accreditations held; and (4) 
policy/focus areas primarily as evidenced via database categorizations of fields of 
expertise.  To identify spatial patterns such as geographical plurality, each of the latter 
four categories was cross-referenced with six world regions: Africa, Anglo-America (the 
US and Canada), Asia, Europe, Latin America and the Caribbean, and Oceania 
(essentially-Australia and New Zealand).  The iCSO database also has a category 
indicating “no region specified”, but as the numbers for the latter appeared to in most 
cases be negligible and in any event would not contribute to understanding spatial 
patterns, data in the latter category was not analyzed.  Each of the four categories was 
also cross-referenced with the accreditation levels (General, Special, Roster) of NGOs 
holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC as the latter organizations are in theory the 
most important vehicle for formal UN interaction with civil society and as such the most 
important focus of the research. 
 It is worth noting that the data provided in the UN iCSO database is fluid in that it 
appears to be updated on at least a monthly basis, if not even more frequently in some 
instances.  This of course means that the statistics obtained from the database may vary 
somewhat from month to month as some organizations are removed for inactivity or 
perhaps more commonly, newly affiliated organizations are added on an ongoing basis 
throughout the year.  An example of the fluid and ever-changing nature of the 
information provided by the database can be seen in terms of the breakdown of NGOs in 
consultative status with ECOSOC.  As reflected in Table 3.1, the number of NGOs by 
accreditation level and in total varied over the three separate occasions (July, October, 
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and November) in 2016 when the database was consulted, though the variations were not 
great.  Given the volume of information and the time-consuming nature of obtaining 
these data, it was not possible that all data for each category could be extracted at the 
same moment, but rather data was obtained progressively over the course of several 
weeks---principally between July and October 2016.  Accordingly, slight numerical 
incongruities may exist among data sets gathered across categories from one month to the 
next.   
 Such variations are not thought to have had any significant impact upon this 
research, merely anchoring the findings or research procedures to the iCSO data 
reflecting a particular month or other point in time as would also be the case in most any 
other research-related undertaking.  For example---with regard to sample selection, as 
noted in Chapter 1, of 4,601 CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status in August 2016, 
4,383 (95.3%) were identified within the iCSO database as speaking English at least as 
one of several languages.  In alphabetical order, all 4,383 organizations were numbered 
consecutively in the same order as they were listed within the database.  The online 
resource www.stattrek.com was utilized to generate 439 random, non-duplicated numbers 
which served as the basis for the 10% sample selection in the research.  Beginning with 
analysis of types of organizations, subsequent sections provide overviews of findings 
with regard to those randomly selected CSOs/NGOs which returned survey 
questionnaires.   
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Table 3.1:  Organizations in Consultative Status with UN ECOSOC, 2016 
 
Accreditation Level July October November 
General Status 144 (3.2%) 147 (3.1%) 151 (3.2%) 
Special Status 3437 (75.4%) 3572 (76%) 3595 (75.9%) 
Roster Status 979 (21.5%) 986 (21%) 993 (20.9%) 
Total 4560 4705 4739 
 
Types of Organizations 
 The UN’s iCSO database establishes 15 organizational categories according to 
typology, as listed in Table 3.2.  At the time these data were tabulated for the research 
(August-September 2016), a total of 39,329 entries existed for Organization Type within 
the iCSO database.  Many organizations were subjectively classified and cross-listed 
among multiple, partially-overlapping categories.  For example an NGO providing 
university scholarships or otherwise promoting academic advancement for indigenous 
people could potentially be categorized under the organizational typologies Academics, 
Indigenous, and (the oddly broad category of) NGOs among others.    
 Adding to the subjective nature of organizational classification within the 
database is the delimitation of what is or is not an NGO.  While just over 72% of entries 
were officially classified as being NGOs, it appears that the vast majority (in excess of 
90%) of organizations listed by organizational type meet most definitional criteria as non-
governmental organizations.  Of the 15 categories utilized for organization type, perhaps 
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the best examples of non-NGO typologies include IGOs (0.9%), Local Government 
(0.6%), Media (0.4%), and Private Sector (1.8%), which collectively only comprise 3.7% 
of total entries listed.  Most of the latter organizational classifications would also strain to 
meet even the broadest and most inclusive definitional criteria as to what constitutes civil 
society institutions despite being listed in the UN database of international civil society 
organizations. 
 Considerable range existed in terms of numbers of entries corresponding to each 
of the 15 organizational typologies.  As reflected in Tables 3.2-3.4, the organizational 
types with the largest number of entries were NGOs (28,361 entries or 72.2% of all 
entries), Indigenous (2,385 or 6.1%), Associations (2,287 or 5.8%), Academics (1,389 or 
3.5%), and Foundations (1,126 or 2.9%).   Of the latter, the categories of NGOs, 
Associations, and Foundations collectively make up nearly 81% of all entries yet due to 
the lack of any clear definitional criteria used by the UN to distinguish between them 
(and other categories as well), substantial overlap and subjectivity exists among 
organizational typologies.  The latter reality, in effect limits the potential usefulness of 
the data/findings in this category, blurring the distinctions among different types of 
organizations, and making it difficult to assess variations and possible unevenness among 
types of organizations---e.g. most/all organizations classified as Ageing, Foundations, 
Indigenous, are likely NGOs in scope.  Classifications with the fewest number of entries 
were Local Governments (225 or 0.6%), Media (172 or 0.4%), Cooperatives (128 or 
0.3%), Ageing (118 or 0.3%), with Trade Unions having the least number of entries (88 
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or 0.2%).  Collectively, entries for the latter 5 categories constituted only 1.8% of 
organizations classified by typology. 
 One of the more interesting patterns revealed from analysis of the iCSO database 
is the relatively modest representation of NGOs/CSOs actually holding consultative 
status (CS) with UN-ECOSOC among the total number of organizational entries.  The 
latter affiliation program is regarded as the most substantive and formal vehicle for UN 
interaction with international civil society.  However among organizational typology 
entries, organizations with consultative status are disproportionately under-represented 
and comprise only small fractions of the entries.  As of October 2016, of 39,329 
institutional entries according to organization type, only 4,705, slightly less than 12% of 
the total entries, corresponded to those holding consultative status.  In only 2 categories--
-NGOs and Foundations---did entries related to consultative status organizations reach 
even low double digits as a percentage of total organizations listed in the iCSO database.  
As reflected in the data provided in Table 3.2, in many individual categories NGOs/CSOs 
holding CS comprised a negligible fraction of the total institutional entries by 
organizational type:  Cooperatives 3.1%, Academics 2.3%, Indigenous 2.3%, Institutions 
1.3%, Private Sector 1.3%, IGOs 1.1%, Media 0.6%, and Local Government 0.0%.  If the 
assumption can be made that those NGOs with CS are customarily among the civil 
society institutions most actively engaged with the UN (a perception furthered by the UN 
itself), a possible implication of this numerical underrepresentation within the iCSO 
database is that many of the nearly 40 thousand entries are for organizations that in 
reality may not be engaged with the UN to any substantive degree contrary to what an 
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organization’s listing within the database may imply.  The latter perception is bolstered 
by the presence within the iCSO database of many organizations that have previously 
been stripped of CS due to inactivity, including several NGOs with which I am 
personally familiar and that to the best of my knowledge have never had any substantive 
form of interaction with the UN before or after removal of consultative status.  
 
Table 3.2: iCSO Database Entries - Organizational Type and UN Consultative Status  
 
 
Org.  Overall  General  Special Roster   
Type  Total (%)  Status  Status  Status  (CS Total/%)  
 
Academics 1389 (3.5%)  1  31  0 (32/2.3%) 
Associations 2287 (5.8%)  1  171  5 (177/7.7%) 
Disability 731 (1.9%)  0  49  0 (49/6.7%) 
Foundation 1126 (2.9%)  3  113  1 (117/10.4%) 
Indigenous 2385 (6.1%)  1  53  0 (54/2.3%) 
Institution 395 (1.0%)  0  5  0 (5/1.3%) 
I.G.O.  355 (0.9%)  0  3  1 (4/1.1%) 
Local Govt. 255 (0.6%)  0  0  0 (0/0%) 
Media  172 (0.4%)  0  1  0 (1/0.6%) 
N.G.O. 28361(72.2%)  138  3108  978 (4224/14.9%) 
Others  819 (2.1%)  0  13  0 (13/1.6%) 
Private Sector 720 (1.8%)  0  9  0 (9/1.3%) 
Trade Union 88 (0.2%)  0  5  1 (6/6.8%) 
Ageing 118 (0.3%)  1  9  0 (10/8.5%) 
Cooperative 128 (0.3%)  2  2  0 (4/3.1%) 
 Totals: 39329   147  3572  986 (4705/12.0%) 
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Table 3.3: iCSO Entries - Organizational Type by MDC (More Developed Countries)  
Region  
 
Org.  Overall     Anglo-          (MDC 
Type  Total (%)*  Europe  America** Oceania*** Total/%*) 
 
Academics 1389 (3.5%)  260  405  44 (709/51.0%) 
Associations 2287 (5.8%)  652  162  45 (859/37.6%) 
Disability 731 (1.9%)  95  103  24 (222/30.4%) 
Foundation 1126 (2.9%)  231  183  23 (437/38.8%) 
Indigenous 2385 (6.1%)  116  430  135 (681/28.6%) 
Institution 395 (1.0%)  73  50  9 (132/33.4%) 
I.G.O.  355 (0.9%)  116  35  10 (161/45.4%) 
Local Govt. 255 (0.6%)  29  21  4 (54/21.2%) 
Media  172 (0.4%)  28  27  5 (60/34.9%) 
N.G.O.  28361(72.2%)  4126  3922  558 (8606/30.3%) 
Others  819 (2.1%)  161  158  18 (337/41.1%) 
Private Sector 720 (1.8%)  135  147  21 (303/42.1%) 
Trade Union 88 (0.2%)  28  7  4 (39/44.3%) 
Ageing  118 (0.3%)  23  24  10 (57/48.3%) 
Cooperative 128 (0.3%)  23  24  7 (54/42.2%) 
 Totals: 39329  6096 (15.5%) 5698 (14.5%) 917(2.3%) (12711/32.3%) 
*Overall totals and percentages include entries for which no region was specified. 
**The UN iCSO Database denotes “North America” as 1 of 6 regional categories, but only 
provides data for the 2-country region of Canada and the United States.  The geographically 
correct term for the Canada/U.S. sub-region of North America is “Anglo America”.  The database 
provides statistics for Mexico and the countries of the Caribbean and Central America---all of 
which are located on the North American continent---within the regional category “Latin America 
and the Caribbean”.  
***The region known as Oceania is customarily regarded as being comprised of Australia, New 
Zealand, and numerous Pacific Island microstates and dependencies.  Nearly all NGOs identified 
within the Oceania category of the iCSO database were in either Australia or New Zealand and 
accordingly data for this region was regarded as representative of MDCs rather than LDCs.  
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Table 3.4: iCSO Entries: Organizational Type by LDC* Region  
Org.  Overall      Lat. Am. (LDC 
Type  Total**  Africa  Asia  & Carib. Total/%**) 
 
Academics 1389   5  233  238  (476/34.3%) 
Associations 2287   753  300  375  (1428/62.4%)  
Disability 731   171  217  67  (455/62.2%)  
Foundation 1126   192  275  221  (688/61.1%) 
Indigenous 2385   333  340  472  (1145/48.0%) 
Institution 395   62  110  91  (263/66.6%) 
I.G.O.  355   85  76  32  (193/54.4%) 
Local Govt. 255   44  40  87  (171/67.1%)  
Media  172      40  46  25  (111/64.5%)  
N.G.O.  28361  7610  6111  1888  (15609/55.0%) 
Others  819   132  158  134  (424/51.8%)  
Pvt. Sector 720   137  103  169  (409/56.8%) 
Trade Union 88   17  17  16  (50/56.8%)  
Ageing  118   19  29  13  (61/51.7%) 
Cooperative 128   24  28  22  (74/57.8%) 
 Totals: 39329  9524 (24.2%) 8083 (20.6%) 3850 (9.8%) (21557/54.8%)  
*The terms LDC (Less/Least Developed Countries) and MDC (More Developed Countries) are 
used in this study to draw a basic distinction between regions characterized predominantly by 
more highly developed economies as opposed to those primarily characterized by emerging 
economies.  It should be stressed that such distinctions may be at least partly subjective in nature 
and that homogeneity does not exist within each region concerning development levels.  Less 
developed nations exist within MDC regions (e.g., Moldova in Europe) and many countries 
within regions broadly classified as predominantly LDC/developing are highly developed (e.g., 
Japan in Asia).  Also, given the rapid economic growth experienced in recent decades by many 
emerging nations such as China and India, the development status of many historically LDC 
nations has improved markedly and may be better characterized as gradations between such 
dichotomous classifications such as MDC vs. LDC or developed vs. developing.  However, 
within regional studies it remains customary to classify Africa, Asia, and Latin America and the 
Caribbean as (predominantly) LDC/developing regions and Anglo-America, Europe and 
Australia/Oceania as (predominantly) MDC regions (e.g. Getis, Bjelland and Getis 2014; 
Rubenstein 2014).   
**Overall totals and percentages include entries for which no region was specified 
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 As reflected in Tables 3.3 through 3.5, the UN’s iCSO database contains 
substantially more entries for organizations headquartered in LDC regions than for 
historically economically and politically dominant MDC regions.  Africa, Asia and Latin 
America and the Caribbean had 9,524, 8,083 and 3,850 database entries respectively and 
a collective total of 21,457 entries, meaning 62.8% of all region-specific entries (34,168 
entries had a regional categorization, several thousand others were categorized as “no 
region specified”) according to organizational type were for entities in predominantly 
LDC regions.  Europe, Anglo-America and Oceania had 6,096, 5,698, and 917 entries 
respectively for a combined total of 12,711 entries or 37.2% of all regions according to 
organizational type.  It appears that both in terms of total number of entries and 
percentage of all such entries, LDCs are better represented within the fabric of UN 
relations with international civil society as reflected in the iCSO database than at any 
prior point.  
 It is also worth noting that within the iCSO database categorizations by 
organizational type, LDC regions have the largest total number of organizations listed in 
11 of 15 categories. As reflected in Table 3.4, Asia leads in 6 categories: disability, 
foundations, institutions, media, ageing, and cooperatives.  Latin America and the 
Caribbean leads in 3 categories: indigenous, local government, and private sector.  Africa 
has the largest number of entries in the 2 categories of associations and NGOs.  As is 
illustrated in Table 3.3, among MDC regions, Europe had the largest number of entries in 
the categories of associations and IGOs and Anglo America led in number of entries for 
academics.  Oceania, with its comparatively small population, led no category in total 
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number of entries.  The remaining topical category “others” was fairly evenly divided 
among most world regions. 
 While such statistics derived from the iCSO database do not address depth or 
substance of participation, numerically they indicate record degrees of parity and 
plurality between civil society organizations among developed and developing nations 
and among most world regions.  In short, the civil society organizations of developing 
nations are at least on paper better represented within the UN framework than at any 
point in history.  However it must be noted that complete parity does not exist when 
compared to proportion of world/regional population.  As noted in Table 3.5, the three 
MDC regions of Anglo-America, Europe and Oceania collectively constitute just 15.3% 
of the world’s population in 2016 but they are headquarters to 37.2% of all institutional 
entries by organizational type in the iCSO Database.  Conversely, Asia, Africa and Latin 
America and the Caribbean collectively comprise 84.7% of the world’s population but 
are home to just 62.8% of institutional entries listed in the database.  However the latter 
disparity stems primarily from the acute underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from Asia.  
Although Asia accounts for nearly 60% of the earth’s population it is the host region for 
only 23.6% of entries listed in the iCSO database by organizational typology.  Both 
Africa and also Latin America and the Caribbean are home to a higher percentage of civil 
society organizations listed in the iCSO database than they comprise of the world’s 
population, a trait they share with MDC regions---though Anglo-America, Europe and 
Oceania possess even more favorable balances of civil society representation in the 
database relative to their proportion of global population.  Such disproportional  
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Table 3.5: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by World Region  
 
World Region Number of iCSO Database 
Entries by Org. Type (%*) 
Population of World Region 
(% of 2016 World Pop.)**  
Africa 9,524 (27.9%) 1,216.1 million (16.4%) 
Asia 8,083 (23.6%) 4,436.2 million (59.7%) 
Anglo America 5,698 (16.7%) 360.5 million (4.9%) 
Europe 6,096 (17.8%) 738.8 million (9.9%) 
Latin America & Caribbean 3,850 (11.3%) 641.0 million (8.6%) 
Oceania 917 (2.7%) 39.9 million (0.5%)  
Totals 34,168* 7,432.5 million 
       *(www.worldometers.info 2016)  
*Total and percentages do not include entries for which no region was specified  
 
representation was also found in other categories analyzed in the iCSO database 
including areas/fields of CSO/NGO expertise. 
Areas of Expertise and Fields of Activity 
 The iCSO database compiles statistics related to the expertise and specialized 
fields of activity of organizations into 11 categories.  Analysis of this dataset was 
undertaken to help cultivate a clearer understanding of the variations within focus areas 
of UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs and also as correlated to ECOSOC consultative status as 
well as to obtain an overview of spatial patterns.  The focus was upon identifying macro-
scale patterns for each of the 11 categories.  Each category provided more specific data 
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subsets ---for example, the category “Population” further breaks down CSO fields of 
activity into subsets including international migration, morbidity and mortality, 
population growth, reproduction among others.  However, the large number of 
subcategories (e.g. 68 specialties related to the category Economic and Social, and 50 for 
Sustainable Development) associated with each area posed logistical issues in terms of 
the practicality of the time commitment required for analysis, the inability to easily 
display findings for all subcategories within the research findings, and the limited value 
understanding subcategory patterns offered to a study, focused upon macro-scale 
patterns.  
 As reflected in Table 3.6, among the 11 categories organized by fields of 
activity/expertise, the Economic and Social category contained the most entries with 18, 
939 or 23.5% of the total.  Entries related to Social Development with 14,106 (17.5%), 
Sustainable Development with 14,062 (17.5%), and Gender Issues/Women with 11,719 
(14.6%) were also well represented within the categorizations, but outside the latter 4 
fields, total numbers of entries were considerably more modest.  As anticipated, the 
smallest numbers of entries were associated with the region-specific categories of 
Conflict Resolution in Africa (1,777/2.2%), New Partnership for Africa’s Development---
NEPAD (2,041/2.5%), and Peace/Development in Africa (2,761/3.4%).  The smallest 
number of entries among non-region-specific categories were for Statistics with 2,797 
(3.5%) and Financing for Development with 3,962 (4.9%), reflecting the highly 
specialized nature of both areas of expertise.      
 90 
 
 Largely repeating the pattern found with analysis by organizational type, 
organizations with ECOSOC consultative status comprised small percentages of entries 
sorted according to fields of activity/expertise.  Of 80,440 entries only 11,785 or 14.7% 
were associated with organizations holding ECOSOC consultative status (CS), 
principally special status (84.7% of CS-related entries), as indicated in Table 3.6.  
Representation of CS organizations varied substantially across the 11 categories with 
entries related to Economic and Social issues having the largest---though meager--- 
percentage at 20.2%, followed by Gender Issues/Women at 16.4%, and Sustainable 
Development at 13.1%.  The smallest percentages of entries associated with organizations 
holding consultative status were in the region-specific categories Peace and Development 
in Africa at 9.6%, Conflict Resolution in Africa at 9.6%, and NEPAD (New Partnership 
for African Development) at 8.1%.     
 Analysis of iCSO data along regional lines revealed some interesting patterns 
related to CSO/NGO fields of activity/expertise.  As can be seen in Tables 3.7 and 3.8, 
with 65.7% of the total, LDC regions had the largest number of overall entries and also 
had the most entries in each of the 11 subcategories.  Entries for Asian-based CSOs led in 
the 4 subcategories Economic and Social, Public Administration, Social Development, 
and Statistics, with entries for African-based CSOs leading in all 7 remaining areas.  
Among both MDC and LDC regions, entries were most numerous for the 4 subcategories 
of Economic and Social, Social Development, Sustainable Development, and Gender 
Issues/Women.  The subcategories with the smallest number of entries were also the same 
for both MDC and LDC regions: Statistics, and the 3 region-specific subcategories of 
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Peace/Development in Africa, Conflict Resolution in Africa, and NEPAD.  Among MDC 
regions, Europe had the most entries in 10 of 11 subcategories, with Anglo-America 
leading in entries related to Gender Issues/Women as the lone exception.  In all 11 
subcategories, Latin America and the Caribbean was in 5
th
 place and Oceania last among 
the 6 world regions analyzed.  Analysis of the scope and scale of organizational 
operations revealed similar regional variations/disparities.  
 
Table 3.6: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and 
Correlated with ECOSOC Consultative Status (CS) Accreditation Levels  
 
Field of   Total #  General  Special  Roster 
Activity/Expertise Entries(%) Status  Status  Status (CS Total / %) 
 
Economic and Social 18939(23.5%) 144  2759  920 (3823 / 20.2%) 
Financing for Devt. 3962(4.9%) 14  416  24 (454 / 11.5%) 
Gender Issues/Women 11719(14.6%) 74  1713  130 (1917 / 16.4%) 
Population  4016(5.0%) 16  483  13 (512 / 12.7%) 
Public Administration 4260(5.3%) 11  436  13 (460 / 10.8%) 
Social Development 14106(17.5%) 56  1652  122 (1830 / 13.0%) 
Statistics  2797(3.5%) 10  325  13 (348 / 12.4%) 
Sustainable Devt. 14062(17.5%) 68  1632  141 (1841 / 13.1%) 
Peace/Devt. in Africa 2761(3.4%) 8  246  10 (264 / 9.6%) 
Conflict Res. in Africa 1777(2.2%) 4  161  6 (171 / 9.6%) 
NEPAD  2041(2.5%) 4  158  3 (165 / 8.1%) 
 Totals:  80440  409  9981  1395 (11785 / 14.7%) 
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Table 3.7: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and 
Correlated by MDC Regions  
 
Field of Activity/    Anglo-    MDC 
Expertise (Totals)  Europe  America Oceania Totals (%)  
 
Economic and Social (18939) 3643  3413  501  7557 
Financing for Devt. (3962) 706  570  75  1351 
Gender Issues/Women (11719) 1741  1743  251  3735 
Population (4016)  708  510  73  1291 
Public Administration (4260) 746  592  79  1417 
Social Development (14106) 2270  1986  316  4572 
Statistics (2797)  451  384  47  882 
Sustainable Devt. (14062) 2352  2006  336  4694 
Peace/Devt. in Africa (2761) 460  431  8  899 
Conflict Res. in Africa (1777) 281  252  6  539 
NEPAD (2041)   278  220  14  512  
 Totals: (80440)  13636(17.0%) 12107(15.1%) 1706(2.1%) 27449(34.2%) 
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Table 3.8: UN-Affiliated Civil Society Organizations by Fields of Activity/Expertise and 
Correlated by LDC Regions  
 
Field of Activity/      Lat. Am. LDC 
Expertise (Totals)  Africa  Asia  & Carib. Totals (%) 
 
Economic and Social (18939) 4331  4689  2056  11076 
Financing for Devt. (3962) 1219  1068  331  2618 
Gender Issues/Women (11719) 3869  3280  865  8014 
Population (4016)  1205  1152  379  2736 
Public Administration (4260) 1092  1292  468  2852 
Social Development (14106) 3860  4197  1499  9556 
Statistics (2797)  728  928  260  1916  
Sustainable Devt. (14062) 3959  3773  1643  9375 
Peace/Devt. in Africa (2761) 1587  264  36  1887 
Conflict Res. in Africa (1777) 1029  205  22  1256 
NEPAD (2041)   940  524  83  1547  
 Totals: (80440)  23819(29.6%) 21372(26.6%) 7642(9.5%) 52833(65.7%) 
 
 
Scope and Scale of Operations of Organizations within the iCSO Database 
 The iCSO database contained a total of 30,538 entries sorted by operational scope 
and scale of UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs.  Of those entries, 61.2% (18,694) were for 
organizations headquartered in LDC regions and 38.8% (11,844) for those in MDC 
regions, again reflecting strong representation of organizations based in LDCs, but lack 
of parity relative to their proportion of the world’s population.  Organizations were 
categorized as to whether their scope of operations was international, regional, national, 
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or local in character and the total numbers involved indicate some degree of overlap in 
that a single organization may be listed in multiple regions and also under more than one 
categorization as to scope of operations. 
 Given the nature of the iCSO database as providing information related to 
international civil society organizations that ostensibly have some connection with the 
UN, it was expected that entries for organizations which are international in scope would 
be dominant, but that was not necessarily the case.  Entries with an international 
categorization totaled 10,620 or 34.8% of all entries categorized by operational scope, the 
largest number of entries among the gradations of scope/scale, but not overwhelmingly 
so.  The second largest number of entries was for national organizations with 10,097 or 
33.1% of entries.  Somewhat surprisingly, organizations with only a local scope of 
operations were well represented within the iCSO database with 5,844 or 19.1% of 
entries overall.  Organizations with a regional scope of operations (those with some form 
of presence in or involvement with a small number of countries in the same geographical 
vicinity) had 3,977 or 13% of entries. 
 Interestingly, considerable variations between organizations headquartered in 
MDCs versus LDCs existed among the operational scope categories, as can be seen in 
Tables 3.10 and 3.11.  Among entries categorized as international in their scope of 
operations which was the most common categorization with 10,620 total entries, Europe 
with 3,364 (31.7% of total) and Anglo-America with 3,318 (31.2%) entries, dominated. 
The latter reflecting the preponderance of externally-oriented organizations which are at 
least in part established around the goal of delivery of aid or services to developing areas 
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abroad.  In all three remaining categories related to operational scope, (regional, national, 
and local) entries for LDC-based organizations were overwhelmingly dominant, with 
Africa having by far the most entries for regional (1,147 – 28.8% of total) and national 
(3,665 – 36.3%) categories, followed by Asia, Latin America and the Caribbean, and in 
distant 4
th
, 5
th
 and 6
th
 place, the MDC regions of Europe, Anglo-America and Oceania 
respectively.  Among entries categorized as local in their scope of operations, Asia had 
the most (1,664 – 28.5%), followed by Africa (1,441 – 24.7%), with the remaining 4 
regions in the same sequence as previously mentioned.   
 These findings might at first glance imply a dichotomous situation in which LDC 
regions appear to be more commonly characterized by more bottom-up approaches to 
NGO/civil society operations, whereas in MDCs a more top-down, hierarchical model 
may often prevail in terms of the international dynamic.  However, this dichotomy 
between MDCs and LDCs may also be a reflection of the differences in funding realities 
as more LDC-based organizations that are local, national or regional in scope may seek 
external sources of financing and other forms of assistance internationally (funding from 
MDCs, IGOs etc.) and pursue a presence within IGOs or transnational civil society to 
better facilitate such a funding approach---and the latter conclusion is at least tacitly 
supported by survey data discussed in Chapter 4 .  In contrast, comparable organizations 
(i.e., also local or national in scope with a bottom-up orientation) within MDCs may be 
less intrinsically-motivated to pursue international relationships as the latter may appear 
to be  of less practical importance to them in terms of financial support, legitimacy or 
otherwise.  
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Table 3.9:  Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by ECOSOC Consultative Status  
 
Operational  General Special Roster 
Scope/Scale  Status  Status  Status  Totals 
 
International   121  1836  329  2286 (49.9%) 
Regional  12  308  25  345 (7.5%) 
National  6  1002  97  1105 (24.1%) 
Local   8  327  513  848 (18.5%) 
 Totals:  147 (3.2%) 3473 (75.8%) 964 (21.0%) 4584 
 
 
 
 
Table 3.10: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by MDC Region  
Operational    Anglo-    MDC Total 
Scope/Scale  Europe  America Oceania (%/Overall Total) 
 
International   3364  3318  251  6933 (22.7%) 
Regional  543  516  227  1286 (4.2%) 
National  885  647  258  1790 (5.9%) 
Local   864  792  179  1835 (6.0%) 
 MDC Totals: 5656  5273  915  11844 (38.8%) 
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Table 3.11: Scope/Scale of CSO Operations by LDC Region  
Operational      Lat. Am. LDC Total 
Scope/Scale  Africa  Asia  & Carib. (%/Overall Total) 
 
International   1315  1722  650  3687 (12.1%) 
Regional  1147  846  698  2691 (8.8%) 
National  3665  3195  1447  8307 (27.2%) 
Local   1441  1664  904  4009 (13.1%) 
 LDC Totals: 7568  7427  3699  18694 (61.2%) 
 
 
 Somewhat surprisingly, of all 30,538 organizational entries categorized according 
to operational scope/scale, only 4,584 (15.0%) were for organizations which actually held 
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.  Among the latter, organizations with an 
international scope of operations were prevalent with 2,286 entries or 49.9% of the total 
as noted in Table 3.09.  Organizations with a national or local operational scope followed 
with 1,105 (24.1%) and 848 (18.5%) respectively and in turn only 345 (7.5%) 
organizations with a regional scope.  As expected, the level of consultative status most 
common (75.8% overall) across all categories of operational scope was Special Status, 
with Roster Status (21.0%) being the second-most common.    
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Table 3.12: Organization Type by Operational Scope/Scale in iCSO Database  
 
Organization  
Type  International  Regional National Local  Total  
Academic 724  208  266  162  1360   
Association 791  197  876  232  2096  
Disability 175  67  273  81  596 
Foundation 480  116  348  91  1035 
Indigenous 587  463  628  773  2453 
Institution 153  38  110  40  341 
IGO  188  47  53  24  312 
Local Govt. 39  13  42  106  200 
Media  75  15  37  11  138 
NGO  7000  1797  7166  7949  23912 
Others  264  61  157  243  725 
Private Sector 347  68  164  65  644 
Trade Union 26  10  36  5  77 
Ageing 25  9  55  15  104 
Cooperative 42  7  41  27  117 
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 Several interesting patterns emerged from cross-referencing organizations in the 
iCSO database by the 15 organizational typologies and the 4 gradations of operational 
scope.  As reflected in Table 3.12, in 8 of 15 organizational typology categories, 
international scope of operation was the most common, often by a wide margin: 
academic, foundations, institutions, IGOs, media, others, private sector, and cooperatives.  
National operational scope was prevalent in 4 organizational typologies: associations, 
disability, trade unions, and ageing.  Local operational scope was the most common in 3 
organizational typologies: indigenous, local government, and NGOs.  Regional 
operational scope did not have the largest or even second largest number of database 
entries in any of the 15 organizational typologies.   
 Oddly, only 106 (53%) of 200 organizations with a typological classification of 
local government within the database were categorized as having a local scope of 
operations.   Among local government entities, the iCSO database classified 39 as having 
an international operational scope, 13 as regional and 42 as national.  While it is perhaps 
to be expected that some subjectivity be involved in the classification of international 
civil society organizations into categories, scrutiny of the organizations actually listed in 
the iCSO database raises questions as to how organizations came to be categorized as 
having an international, regional, national or local scope of operations.  Table 3.13 
displays 33 of the 39 organizations classified by the iCSO database as being “Local 
Government” entities that have an “international” scope of operations, concepts that 
would seem to be self-contradictory.   For example, it is difficult to comprehend how the 
Guinea Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the International Development Institute or the 
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Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation (Honduras) could be regarded as 
local government entities.  Likewise, it is not clear how the Central Bureau of Statistics 
of Aruba, the Municipal District of Andoas (Peru), or the Provincial Council (of Kandy, 
Sri Lanka) could be classified as having an international scope of operations.   Table 3.13 
also displays organizations classified by the iCSO database as being “Local Government” 
entities that are “regional” in operational scope, many of which also do not appear to be 
ideal examples of either of the latter categories---e.g. the National Association on Early 
Childhood does not appear to be either a local government entity or regional in its scope 
of operations.  Such issues within the categorizations of operational scope are not unique 
examples as unusual misclassifications and inconsistencies can be found throughout the 
iCSO database.   
 Other examples of potential misclassification of organizations within the iCSO 
database can be seen within the IGO organizational typology.  While 188 (60.3%) of 312 
entries were deemed to be international in terms of their operational scope, 47 (15.1%) 
were classified as regional in scope.  The latter categorization is logical in that IGOs 
can/do exist for smaller or more regional or sub-regional groups of countries (e.g. 
CARICOM, CARIFTA, and MERCOSUR) as well as existing at the global or macro 
scale.  More unusual is the categorization of 53 IGOs (17%) as national in operational 
scope and 24 (7.7%) as local.  Examples from the iCSO database of IGOs deemed to be 
local in scope of mission include the Bureau of Normalization of Quebec, the New South 
Wales Department of Family and Community Services, the Office of the Council of State  
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Table 3.13: Organizations Classified in the ICSO Database as Being Local Government  
Entities that are Alternatively International or Regional in Scope of Operations  
 
Organizations Classified as both “Local  Organizations Classified as both “Local 
Govt.” and “International” in Scope  Government and “Regional” in Scope 
C40 Climate Leadership Group  Energie & Umweltagentur Niederosterreich 
Camara Municipal de Bauru   Haryana Forest Department 
Caucus de Femmes elues Locales du Mali Hon. Governor Roel Ragay Degamo 
Central Bureau of Statistics Aruba  ICLEI Africa 
Climate Alliance    Instituto Natureza do Tocantins 
Clinton Senior Center    Mashhad Municipality 
Direct Email Marketing   Pauline Gregory-Lewis 
Eastern Band of Cherokee Indians  Principalia di Mindanao 
Empresas Publicas de Medellin  Regione Abruzzo 
Governo do Estado do Acre   The National Assoc. on Early Childhood 
Grand Duchy of Flandrensis   Undersecretariat of Treasury, Agric. Dept. 
Guinea Ministry of Foreign Affairs  Urban Policy Unit, Govt. of KPK, Pakistan 
International Development Institute 
Ministry of Planning & Devt. Corporation  
Municipalidad Distrital de Andoas 
Oluyole Local Government 
Prefeitura de Campinas 
Principado Ilheu de Pontinha 
Principality of Kaharagia 
Principato di Burke Island 
Provincial Council 
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(Ghana), and the Pilipino United Party of the Philippines, Inc., none of which appear to 
be either IGOs or local in their scope/scale of operations. 
 
Proportional Representation among Regions/Countries within the ECOSOC 
Consultative Status Program 
 Proportionality is an element of plurality important to this study in that 
understanding the degree to which regions are proportionally represented is a reflection 
of the degree of spatial parity in the relationship between the UN and transnational CSOs.  
Earlier in this chapter study data as displayed in Table 3.5 illustrated that iCSO entries 
organized by organizational type were proportionally imbalanced in that the number of 
entries for all MDC regions were greater relative to their share of global population than 
entries for LDC regions, with entries from Asia-based CSOs especially underrepresented.  
Analysis of data specific to entries for organizations with consultative status revealed an 
even greater degree of disproportionate dominance of MDC-based organizations as 
reflected in Table 3.14.   
 While the predominantly MDC regions of Europe, Anglo America and Oceania 
collectively comprise only 15.3% of the world’s 2016 population, they are the 
headquarters of 61.2% of organizations that presently hold consultative status with UN-
ECOSOC, reflecting MDC-based organizations are represented at a rate four times 
greater than their proportion of the global population.  Europe comprises 9.9% of the 
global population yet is home to 32.5% of CSOs holding consultative status, Oceania 
comprises 0.5% of the population yet hosts 2.2% of CSOs with consultative status (of 96 
 103 
 
Oceania-based organizations identified as having consultative status, 70 (73.0%) were in 
Australia or New Zealand, a reflection as to why Oceania was regarded as a 
predominantly MDC region in this study), but Anglo America was even more 
disproportionately dominant as it constitutes only 4.9% of the global population but is 
headquarters to 26.5% of CSOs holding consultative status. 
 LDC/developing regions comprise 84.7% of the world’s population yet are home 
to only 38.7% of the organizations listed as holding consultative status.  Africa 
constitutes 16.4% of the global population yet is headquarters to a comparable, though 
slightly smaller 15.3% of CSOs with consultative status.  Latin America and the 
Caribbean comprise 8.6% of the world’s population yet are home to just 5.4% of 
organizations with consultative status.  By far the largest proportional 
underrepresentation among MDC regions is for Asia which constitutes 59.7% of the 
global population yet was identified as headquarters to only 18.0% of CSOs presently 
holding consultative status.  Such findings clearly support the contention of the first 
guiding hypothesis that imbalances exist within the CS program with regard to 
proportional parity among countries and regions and also between developed and 
developing areas.     
 It is worthy to note that disparities also exist among MDC versus LDC regions 
with regard to the type/level of consultative status held.  General consultative status is the 
highest level of accreditation and affords the greatest degree of access and input as 
discussed in Chapter 2.  Of the 6 world regions delimited within the iCSO database the 3 
with the smallest percentage of general status CSOs were all MDC/developing regions: 
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only 1.2% of African-based CS organizations hold General Status, only 2.8% of Asia-
based CS organizations, and 2.5% among those based in Latin America and the 
Caribbean.  While no general status organizations were identified as being based in 
Oceania, 5.4% of Europe-based CSOs holding consultative status were accredited at the 
general level and 3.2% for those headquartered in Anglo America.  However, the largest 
percentages by far among CS organizations for roster status, presumably the most 
restrictive accreditation level in terms of opportunities to participate in ECOSOC 
processes, were also for CSOs based in Europe (20.2% of CS organizations held Roster 
Status) and Anglo America (19.1%), perhaps mitigating any real or perceived dominance 
the latter regions potentially possess via having a greater proportion of CSOs in general 
consultative status. 
Table 3.14: Parity of ECOSOC Consultative Status Organizations by World Region  
and Relative to Proportion of Global Population  
   
  General Special Roster  Total / % of % of World 
  Status  Status  Status  all CS orgs Population  
 
Africa  8  624  42  674 / 15.3% 16.4% 
Asia  22  704  68  794 / 18.0% 59.7% 
Europe  78  1066  289  1433 / 32.5% 9.9% 
LA/Carib. 6  198  34  238 / 5.4% 8.6% 
Anglo Am. 37  909  223  1169 / 26.5% 4.9% 
Oceania 0  83  13  96 / 2.2% 0.5% 
Total  151  3584  669  *4404 
 *Number reflects those organizations holding consultative status identified by region 
within the iCSO database.  Over 300 organizations with consultative status were 
classified as “no region specified” within the database. 
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Table 3.15: Twenty Most Populous Countries by Number of ECOSOC consultative status 
Organizations and Relative to Proportion of Global Population  
   2016 Population /  Number of ECOSOC CS  
Country  % of World Total  Orgs. / % of Total CS Orgs. 
China   1,382.3 million / 18.6%  54 / 1.2% 
India   1,326.8 million / 17.9%  217 / 4.9% 
U.S.   324.1 million / 4.4%   1026 / 23.3% 
Indonesia  260.6 million / 3.5%   12 / 0.3% 
Brazil   209.6 million / 2.8%   30 / 0.7% 
Pakistan  192.8 million / 2.6%   76 / 1.7% 
Nigeria  186.9 million / 2.5%   138 / 3.1% 
Bangladesh  162.9 million / 2.2%   34 / 0.8% 
Russia   143.4 million / 1.9%   63 / 1.4% 
Mexico  128.6 million / 1.7%   36 / 0.8% 
Japan   126.3 million / 1.7%   68 / 1.5% 
Philippines  102.3 million / 1.4%   23 / 0.5% 
Ethiopia  101.9 million / 1.4%   9 / 0.2% 
Vietnam  94.4 million / 1.3%   3 / 0.07% 
Egypt   93.4 million / 1.3%   30 / 0.7% 
Germany  80.7 million / 1.1%   78 / 1.8% 
Iran   80.0 million / 1.1%   46 / 1.0% 
DR Congo  79.7 million / 1.1%   47 / 1.1% 
Turkey   76.6 million / 1.1%   33 / 0.7% 
Thailand  68.1 million / 0.9%   18 / 0.4% 
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 Using the iCSO database, a case study analysis was undertaken to glean variations 
among countries in terms of degree of proportional representation/parity within the 
ECOSOC consultative status program.  Table 3.15 presents data from the case study of 
the world’s 20 most populous countries---more logistically practical than examining all 
of approximately 200 countries in the world---relative to the number of organizations 
holding consultative status headquartered in each and the percentage of the latter relative 
to the total (global) number of CS organizations for which a regional association was 
specified in the iCSO database.  Of the countries, 11 were in Asia, 4 in Africa, 2 each in 
Europe and Latin America and the Caribbean, and 1 in Anglo America.  Many of the 
same patterns related to proportional equity (or lack thereof) as previously presented in 
Tables 3.5 and 3.14.  Countries in LDC/developing regions were in general 
underrepresented relative to the proportion of population they contain---with Asia-based 
CS organizations the most underrepresented, and most countries in MDC regions 
disproportionately overrepresented. 
 Of the 20 most populous countries, only 3 were in predominantly MDC regions: 
Germany, Russia and the US.  Among CSOs holding ECOSOC consultative status, those 
based in the US were represented vastly out of proportion to the country’s percentage of 
global population.  While the US contains only 4.4% of the world’s population, 23.3% of 
all organizations holding CS (for which a region was specified in the iCSO database) are 
headquartered in the US.  Germany was also disproportionately overrepresented though 
by a more modest margin, constituting 1.1% of global population and hosting 1.8% of all 
CS organizations.  Russia, which for the purposes of this study was regarded as being in 
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Europe, was the only country from a predominantly MDC region to be proportionally 
underrepresented with 1.9% of global population but home to only 1.4% of all CS 
organizations.   
 With the exception of the Democratic Republic of Congo, which achieved parity 
with 1.1% of global population and hosting 1.1% of all CS organizations, and Nigeria, 
which was overrepresented among all CS organizations at 3.1% relative to its percentage 
of global population at 2.5%, all other 15 countries from predominantly LDC/developing 
regions were underrepresented in the consultative status program relative to their 
proportion of global population, though to widely varying degrees.  China, the world’s 
most populous country was among the most proportionally underrepresented with 18.6% 
of the world’s total population but home to a mere 1.4% of all organizations holding 
consultative status.  India, the second most populous state was also proportionally 
underrepresented though not to the same degree with 17.9% of the world’s population but 
headquarters to only 4.9% of CS organizations.  The most underrepresented country by 
far among the 20 most populous states was Vietnam, with a population of nearly 95 
million---1.3% of the global total---yet home to only 3 CS organizations, or 0.07% of 
CSOs in formal association with ECOSOC. 
 Another interesting pattern can be seen in the data collected for the most populous 
countries.  Of the 20 countries listed in Table 3.15, Freedom House (2016), which 
annually evaluates all countries as to the degree of freedom/democracy present, classifies 
10 as being “free” (democratic) and 10 as being either “not free” or only “partially free” 
(undemocratic or quasi-democratic).  Those regarded by the organization as being 
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free/democratic include: Bangladesh, Brazil, Germany, India, Indonesia, Japan, Mexico, 
Nigeria, Pakistan, and the US.  Those deemed as being unfree/undemocratic include 
China, DR Congo, Egypt, Ethiopia, Iran, the Philippines, Russia, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Vietnam.  The latter breakdown presents an interesting opportunity to expand the brief 
country case study in order to also compare proportional representation within the 
consultative status program between democratic and non-democratic countries.      
 Much scholarship has been devoted to the issue of civil society within 
authoritarian or quasi-democratic regimes including the reality that although it may exist 
in some form, civil society may often be diminished or heavily “regulated” (e.g. Cosby 
2012; Lewis 2013).  Even as regimes may begin to transition toward democratic 
processes and institutions, civil society institutions may often be weak and remain under 
the auspices of state organs or merely a reflection of the wariness of a historically-
subjugated polity to be openly associated with often politically tinged civic activism in a 
public sphere (Diamond 1994; Howard 2002).  If domestic civil society may often be 
stunted in non/quasi-democratic societies, it stands to reason that transnational civil 
society may be muted to an even further degree as such regimes may not be willing to 
permit alternative voices to have a forum within the international arena.  The results of 
the analysis largely support the latter perspectives and reflect a higher degree of 
underrepresentation for most of the world’s 10 most populous countries deemed to be 
non or partially-democratic. 
      As reflected in the right column of Table 3.15, of the 10 countries with the 
lowest percentages of all CS organizations, 6 are non/quasi-democratic.  Of the 5 lowest 
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percentages, 4 are non/quasi-democratic countries: Ethiopia with 0.2%, the Philippines 
with 0.5%, Thailand with 0.4%, and Vietnam with 0.07%.  In an effort to objectively 
compare degrees of parity among the 20 countries, the percentage of all CS organizations 
headquartered in each country was divided by the percentage it comprises of the global 
population, yielding a parity score.  A parity score of 100% (DR Congo) indicates an 
equal proportion of CS organizations based in the country relative to its share of global 
population.  Scores greater than 100% indicate overrepresentation within the CS program 
relative to a country’s percentage of global population (US with 529.5% 
overrepresentation proportional to population, Germany with 163.6% overrepresentation, 
and Nigeria with 124.0% overrepresentation) and scores less than 100% denote 
underrepresentation.  Table 3.16 displays the parity scores in descending order and 
compares results for democratic and non/quasi-democratic countries.  All 3 parity scores 
reflecting overrepresentation within the CS program were for democracies: the US, 
Germany and Nigeria.  While scores for many democratic countries also fell below 100% 
parity, the average score for the 10 most populous democracies was 111.5%, indicating 
overrepresentation in the CS program relative to population.  Only 1 of the 10 most 
populous non/quasi-democratic countries achieved parity (DR Congo) with the majority 
of the rest falling far short.  Of the 4 lowest parity scores, 3 were for non/quasi-
democratic countries: Ethiopia with 14.3% parity, China with 6.5%, and Vietnam with 
5.4%.  One of the starkest contrasts was with the average parity score for the 10 most 
populous non/quasi-democratic states: 48.8%, less than half the mean parity score for the 
10 democratic states.  
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Table 3.16: Parity Scores (Percentage of all CS Organizations Relative to Percentage of  
Global Population) for 10 Democratic and 10 Non/Quasi-Democratic Countries  
 
Democratic   Parity   Non/Quasi-  Parity 
Country  Score   Democratic Country Score 
US   529.5%  DR Congo  100.0% 
Germany  163.6%  Iran   91.0%  
Nigeria  124.0%  Russia   73.7% 
Japan   88.2%   Turkey   63.6% 
Pakistan  65.4%   Egypt   53.8% 
Mexico  47.1%   Thailand  44.4% 
Bangladesh  36.4%   Philippines  35.7% 
India   27.3%   Ethiopia  14.3% 
Brazil   25.0%   China   6.5% 
Indonesia  8.6%   Vietnam  5.4% 
Average Score: 111.5%  Average Score: 48.8% 
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 The often substantial variations among countries and regions with regard to levels 
of transnational civil society involvement with the UN found via the latter two analyses 
closely mirrors the results of a case study undertaken as a test case in the early stages of 
this research.  In 2015 I used the iCSO database to gauge proportional representation of 
countries and sub-regions of Europe with regard to UN associations.  The method 
involved identifying the number of entries in the iCSO database for each European 
country corresponding to 13 of the 15 categories (all categories except “collectives” and 
“other”) for organization type.  In turn the total population for each country expressed in 
millions was divided by the total number of entries specific to the country within the 
iCSO database related to organizational typology (not specific to just organizations with 
consultative status).  For example, the iCSO database indicated 3 CSOs for Iceland which 
has a population of 0.317 million, a number which divided by 3 (for the total 
CSOs/NGOs listed in the database) yields 9.5 CSO entries per million people.  The 
resulting score---the number of iCSO database entries per million people in the country’s 
population---is a different numerical approach than that used in the analysis illustrated in 
Table 3.16 but nonetheless an effective means of objectively comparing parity among 
countries regarding the degree to which their CSOs had any associations with the UN.  
This case study of the 50 countries of Europe was inordinately time consuming, requiring 
several weeks of data compilation and analysis, and thus was not repeated for all 200 or 
so countries on earth as an element of the main research.  However, as a case study it 
lends insight into often substantial variations among countries and among sub-regions, 
patterns that are likely to be found in other world regions outside Europe and the study 
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also revealed a noteworthy gap between EU and non-EU nations regarding indications of 
CSO involvement with the UN. 
 Comparisons of the proportional representation (parity) of the CSOs of 
countries/regions at the UN could potentially be approached in many different ways.  For 
example, it may prove interesting to undertake such a study of CSO parity at the UN via 
weighting for various economic influences---i.e. to what degree do countries’ degree of 
CSO representation reflect aspects of their economic size or influence?  According to the 
data presented in Tables 3.15 and 3.16, the United States is vastly overrepresented by 
having large numbers of US-based CSOs involved with the UN, far out of proportion to 
the US percentage of global population.  If countries’ percentage of global GDP were 
weighted rather than proportion of population, the results would diminish such an 
appearance of overrepresentation at least to some degree---as the US accounts for 
approximately 16% of global GDP and around 23% of CSOs which hold consultative 
status with UN-ECOSOC are US-based.  If countries were weighted based upon the 
portion of the UN budget they funded, the US would essentially have parity within the 
ECOSOC consultative status dynamic, as it finances approximately one-fourth of the UN 
budget and is headquarters to a comparable share of the CSOs which hold consultative 
status. 
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Table 3.17: UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Mediterranean, 
Northern, and Western Europe  
 
Region/  N./iCSO entries (N./iCSO) Region/  N./entries per (N./iCSO) 
Country per million people (entries) Country million people (entries) 
Northern Europe    Western Eur./British Isles 
Denmark 13.8 (77)   Andorra 10.6 (32) 
Finland  9.3 (49)    Austria  13.3 (109) 
Iceland  9.5 (3)    Belgium 31.1 (325) 
Norway 19.9 (102)   Britain  14.4 (915) 
Sweden  13.3 (129)   France  9.4 (623) 
 Mean: 13.1 (72)   Germany 3.8 (306) 
      Ireland  15.9 (77) 
Mediterranean Europe   Liechtenstein 54.1 (2)   
Cyprus  13.7 (16)   Luxembourg 17.3 (9) 
Greece  6.2 (67)    Netherlands 14.8 (250)   
Italy  7.4 (455)   Switzerland 68.6 (553)   
Malta  29.1 (12)    Mean: 23.0 (291)   
Monaco 290.3 (9)   Mean w/o microstates: 21.4 (395) 
Portugal 4.8 (52)    Mean w/o microstates/Switz.: 14.7 (372)  
San Marino 90.0 (3)          
Spain  6.4 (306) 
Turkey  2.1 (169) 
Vatican 1000.0 (1) 
 Mean:  145.1 (109) 
Mean w/o Microstates: 6.8 (178) 
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Table 3.18: UN iCSO Database Entries by European Country/Sub-Region: Former  
Soviet Eastern Europe and Non-Soviet Eastern Europe  
 
Region/  N./iCSO entries (N./iCSO) Region/  N./entries per (N./iCSO) 
Country per million people (entries) Country million people (entries) 
 
Former Soviet Eastern Europe  Non-Soviet Eastern Europe 
Armenia 9.2 (28)    Albania  10.6 (32) 
Azerbaijan 7.0 (68)    Bosnia-Herz. 4.4 (17) 
Belarus  0.6 (6)    Bulgaria 4.8 (33) 
Estonia  7.2 (9)    Croatia  5.4 (24) 
Georgia 14.0 (69)   Czech Rep. 2.7 (29) 
Latvia  3.7 (8)    Hungary 3.2 (32) 
Lithuania 4.0 (14)    Kosovo  0.5 (1) 
Moldova 7.3 (26)    Macedonia 12.0 (25) 
Russia  1.4 (200)   Montenegro 18.5 (12) 
Ukraine 2.1 (92)    Poland  0.9 (33) 
 Mean:  5.7 (52)    Romania 2.8 (60) 
      Serbia  4.9 (35) 
      Slovakia 1.7 (9) 
      Slovenia 3.0 (6)  
       Mean: 5.4 (25) 
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 While this research did not explore proportional weights for economic 
considerations it did seek to address variations in parity (proportional plurality) via case 
studies of countries and regions and assess the degree to which their CSOs/NGOs were 
represented within the UN framework, with proportion of population being the most 
obvious means of weighting for influence and objectively appraising degrees of parity.  
In this research, each of two case studies that were undertaken for analysis of 
proportionality/parity among countries used distinct approaches.  The approach taken to 
examine degrees of parity for the 20 most populous countries weighted each based upon 
their proportion of global population.  The approach taken in examining European 
countries and sub-regions did not account for proportion of world population, but rather 
provided a score reflecting the number of iCSO database entries per million people in the 
countries’ populations.  An unforeseen outcome was that disproportionately high scores 
could be yielded for many microstates and for certain other countries.  For example, only 
1 organization was identified in the database for Vatican City, yet given its population 
(1,000), the resulting score of 1,000 CSO/NGO entries per million people in the national 
population not only distorts the reality for that single country, but potentially distorts 
averages for the sub-region in which the country is located and the entirety of Europe.  
Additionally, certain other countries---Switzerland in particular---due to unique 
circumstances as host to many IGOs and NGOs may also present an issue with distortion 
of averages.  For these reasons, distinction is made in Table 3.17 and in the discussion 
between (1) overall averages (means) for sub-regions and (2) averages that exclude data 
for microstates and/or Switzerland in order to present a more realistic average.        
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   As reflected in Tables 3.17 and 3.18 substantial variation existed between some 
European sub-regions and often among countries within a single sub-region.  Western 
Europe (for purposes of this discussion Western Europe as a sub-region is comprised of 
France, Germany, Andorra, the 3 Benelux nations and the 3 Alpine nations---Austria, 
Liechtenstein, and Switzerland), Britain and Ireland had the highest averages for both 
mean number of CSO entries in the database and CSO entries per million people.  Even if 
disproportionately high averages for Switzerland and the microstates are removed from 
consideration, the remaining 7 countries of the sub-region had the highest mean number 
of CSO entries at 372 and the highest mean of 14.7 entries per million people.  Of the 7 
remaining countries within the sub-region Britain with 915 and France with 623 had by 
far the highest numbers of CSO entries in the database, but tempered by their large 
populations, they averaged 14.4 and 9.4 entries per million people respectively.  
Comparatively, Ireland had only 77 CSO entries in the database, but factored into its 
relatively small population, it attained a score of 15.9 entries per million people.  
Germany had the lowest number of CSO entries in the database per million people with 
3.8, only around one-eighth that of Belgium, a prominent focal point for IGO and NGO 
activity, with 31.1 CSO entries per million people.    
 The countries of Northern Europe (geographically defined as the Scandinavian 
countries of Denmark, Norway and Sweden, plus the historically and otherwise 
associated countries of Iceland and Finland) exhibited the second highest score for 
number of CSO entries per million people at a mean of 13.1 for all 5 nations.  The latter 
statistic ranged from a low of 9.3 in Finland to a high of 13.8 in Denmark, a narrower 
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range of fluctuation than found in most European sub-regions analyzed.  The region was 
third among the European sub-regions in terms of actual number of CSO entries with a 
mean of 72, and a range of between 3 for Iceland and 129 for Sweden.      
 Excluding microstates, Mediterranean Europe had the second highest mean of 178 
CSO entries per country and the third highest score per million people with a mean of 6.8 
among the 6 non-microstates.  As can be seen in Table 3.17, the latter statistic was 
considerably inflated by the inclusion of the microstates, particularly the Vatican.  Even 
if data from microstates is excluded, like the findings for Western Europe, results for the 
region demonstrated considerable variation, ranging from a low in 2.1 entries per million 
people in Turkey (included as (a) a portion of Turkish territory lies northwest of the 
straights connecting the Aegean and Black Seas---widely accepted as a boundary 
between Europe and Asia, and (b) Turkey is pursuing EU membership and closely orbits 
with the continent economically and otherwise) to 13.7 in Cyprus.  Substantial 
fluctuations also existed among total number of CSO entries per country ranging from 
Cyprus with 16 to Italy with 455.         
 Data for Eastern European countries formerly a part of the Soviet Union and those 
that were not was tabulated separately.  My initial thought process was that since in 
general more westernization and economic development (i.e., increases in most measures 
of standard of development) has occurred in the areas of Eastern Europe that were never 
part of the Soviet Union, the latter may exhibit stronger indications of transnational civil 
society as measured by the iCSO database.  However, this did not prove to be the case, as 
only slight differences existed between these 2 classifications of Eastern Europe and both 
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in terms of total CSO/NGO entries per country (mean of 52 for former Soviet areas, 25 
for non-Soviet areas) and number of entries per million people (mean of 5.7 for former 
Soviet areas, 5.4 for non-Soviet areas), the data collected favored former Soviet nations. 
 Within both categories of Eastern European countries, substantial variations 
existed.  Among formerly Soviet areas the average number of total entries per country 
ranged from 6 in Belarus to 200 in Russia and number of entries per million people 
ranged from 0.6 in Belarus to 14 in Georgia.  Among countries never a part of the USSR, 
Kosovo had the lowest score of any European nation in terms of number of CSO entries 
per million people with 0.5 and with only 1 organization reported in the iCSO database, 
tied with the Vatican for the lowest total number of CSO entries in Europe.  Romania had 
the largest number of total CSO entries with 60 and Montenegro with 18.5 had the largest 
number per million people. 
 The statistical contrast between Eastern European countries versus that of other 
parts of the continent was striking.  If microstates are excluded, European countries had a 
mean of 127 total CSO/NGO entries per country and 9.5 entries per million people of 
population---if data from Switzerland is also excluded the numbers drop to 117 and 8.1 
respectively.  For purposes of comparison, if the latter numbers (those excluding all 7 
microstates and Switzerland) are used, they dwarf the averages for all 24 Eastern 
European countries: 36.2 mean total CSO/NGO entries per country and 5.5 entries per 
million people of population.  Clearly plurality in the form of equitable proportional 
parity does not exist among Europe’s sub-regions and there is no reason to suspect that 
this phenomenon of wide sub-regional variation is atypical.         
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 In comparing data between countries that were EU members versus countries that 
were not, substantial contrast was also found to exist.  Among the 28 EU-member states 
the mean number of iCSO database entries was 144 yielding a mean of 9.4 entries per 
million people in population---excluding microstates yielded a mean of 154 entries and 
8.3 per million people.  Numbers for EU candidates (6 nations at the time: Albania, 
Iceland, Macedonia, Montenegro, Serbia, and Turkey) produced a comparable though 
slightly higher score of 9.6 iCSO database entries per million people and a mean of 46 
entries per country.  The 16 European nations that were neither EU members nor 
candidates for admission had a mean 99.6 iCSO database entries per million people and 
74 entries per country, with both numbers substantially inflated by the inclusion of 5 
microstates and Switzerland.  Exclusion of the latter 6 nations from consideration yielded 
a considerably lower mean of 6.7 entries per million people and 60.9 entries per country.  
The exclusion of microstates from both tallies and of Switzerland from the results of the 
non-EU states---likely reasonable steps given the statistical anomalies they represent, 
gives the EU members a nearly 20% higher score of 8.3 database entries per million 
people versus the non-EU states with 6.7.     
 
Other Forms of UN Accreditation of CSOs/NGOs (Apart from ECOSOC 
Consultative Status) 
 While the primary formal vehicle for UN affiliation with transnational civil 
society is the consultative status program within ECOSOC, other venues also exist, 
usually specific to a particular purpose or event.  In some instances, CSOs/NGOs are 
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accredited specifically so that they may participate in a special summit or symposium in 
which case the accreditation is temporary, ending with the conclusion of the event.  An 
example of such a temporary accreditation regime was that associated with the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development (WSSD) which took place in South Africa between 
August and September 2002 and formally accredited over 700 participating 
organizations.  An additional and smaller-scale example of temporary accreditation 
specific to a project or summit is the UN’s recurring conference related to Small Island 
Developing States (SIDS).  At the 3rd SIDS conference held in Samoa in 2014, in 
addition to the representatives of states which were in attendance, 23 CSOs/NGOs were 
formally accredited as participants.    
   Other more long-standing forms of UN accreditation of representatives of civil 
society also exist, perhaps the best known of which are the programs related to the 
Commission on Sustainable Development (CSD), the Department of Public Information 
(DPI) and the Financing for Development Office (FDO).  Established by the General 
Assembly in 1992, the CSD has since its inception sought to engage with as diverse a 
range of stakeholders as possible, including the accreditation of hundreds of CSOs/NGOs 
which have interest in its mission.  The DPI was established in 1946 to promote 
awareness of UN programs, often via establishing various constituencies internationally 
including collaborations with over 1,500 CSOs/NGOs, many of which have a formal 
accreditation with DPI.  FDO (which is also variously referenced by the acronyms FFD 
and FfDO) was established within the UN Department of Economic and Social Affairs in 
2003 to provide sustained support and follow-up for initiatives related to international 
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development, one element of which is the NGO Committee on Financing for 
Development which accredits organizations both as full and associate members. 
 As was expected, analysis of the numbers for other UN affiliation programs for 
CSOs/NGOs revealed them to have only fractions of the involvement of the ECOSOC 
consultative status program.  To the best of my knowledge, the 5 programs analyzed are 
the most viable alternatives to the CS regime for UN engagement with international civil 
society, but each of the 5 deals with a more narrow policy niche than the flagship 
ECOSOC forum which was intended to be more general in scope.  As indicated in Table 
3.19, the DPI program for CSOs/NGOs had by far the most region-specific (entries with 
no region specified were not included in the data table and were generally negligible in 
number) entries at 868, most of which were from organizations headquartered in Anglo-
America (404 or 46.5%) or Europe (222 or 25.6%).  The DPI accreditation program for 
CSOs/NGOs appears to present organizations with opportunities for engagement 
throughout the year, whereas the other 4 programs, even if theoretically ongoing in a 
couple of cases (CSD and FDO), seem to be primarily focused around periodic summits 
or other special events, thus providing a more limited dynamic for interaction.   
 Of the remaining affiliation programs, the summit-specific civil society 
accreditation regime of WSSD had the second-largest number of region-specific entries 
with 603, most of which were from Anglo-America (142 or 23.5%), followed closely by 
Asia (136 or 22.6%) and Europe (134 or 22.2%).  The CSD program had the third-largest 
number of entries at 425, the largest numbers of which were from Anglo-American (116 
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Table 3.19: UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs Apart from ECOSOC  
Consultative Status by World Regions  
 
Region  CSD  DPI  FDO  WSSD  SIDS Totals 
Africa  49  44  63  117  1 274 
Asia  91  94  20  136  2 343 
LA & Car 73  59  18  51  6 207 
LDC Totals 213(50.1%) 197(22.7%) 101(57.1%) 304(50.4%) 9(60.0%) 
Anglo Am 116  404  28  142  2 692 
Europe  77  222  38  134  3 474 
Oceania 19  45  10  23  1 98 
MDC Totals 212(49.9%) 671(77.3%) 76(42.9%) 299(49.6%) 6(40.0%) 
Totals:  425   868  177  603  15 2088 
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or 27.3%) or Asian (91 or 21.4%) organizations.  The FDO program contained only 177 
total entries, most commonly from African (63 or 35.6%) or European (38 or 21.5%) 
organizations.  The most narrow in geographical or circumstantial focus of any of the 5 
programs, the iCSO Database only yielded 15 entries for SIDS, most commonly from 
Latin America and the Caribbean (6 or 40.0%) reflecting the presence and influence of 
Caribbean microstates and small states within the program. 
 While these 5 CSO affiliation programs are distinct from the ECOSOC 
consultative status (ECOSOC-CS) regime, I was curious to see the degree of overlap 
between organizations with consultative status and those participating in any of the 
alternative affiliations.  Although the initial expectation was that overlap would exist in 
that most organizations participating in these 5 programs would also hold consultative 
status with ECOSOC, this does not appear to be the case according to the data collected 
from the iCSO website.  As noted in Table 3.20, the largest number of entries for 
ECOSOC-CS organizations was in the DPI program.  The latter had 393 CS 
organizations as affiliates, by far the highest ratio (393:868 or 45.3%) relative to the total 
number of entries among any of the 5 CSO affiliate programs, but still not an indication 
that most DPI organizations also hold ECOSOC-CS.  Ratios of the number of ECOSOC-
CS organizations relative to total number of entries for each of the 4 other alternative 
accreditations were much lower, seemingly confirming that most organizations within 
each of these alternative CSO/NGO affiliation programs in fact do not also hold 
ECOSOC consultative status simultaneously: CSD 114:425 (26.8%); FDO 32:177 
(18.1%); WSSD 98:603 (16.3%); SIDS 1:15 (6.7%).   
 124 
 
 Whereas the ECOSOC consultative status program is broader and more diverse in 
its range of policy foci, each of the 5 alternative accreditation programs is markedly 
narrower in focus and in potential applicability to the operational parameters of civil 
society organizations.  However, the narrow focus of the 5 alternative programs may 
actually appeal to certain CSOs with highly specialized interests to a greater degree than 
the more general forums of ECOSOC-CS, to which such specialized (e.g. oriented toward 
development financing) CSOs/NGOs may feel they have less to contribute.  In short, the 
ECOSOC-CS program may not be competing to a great degree with these 5 alternative 
affiliation programs for the same civil society organizations as affiliates.   
 
Table 3.20: Other UN Accreditation/Affiliation Programs for CSOs by ECOSOC  
Consultative Status Level  
 
Other UN  General Special Roster 
Accreditation  Status  Status  Status  Totals 
 
CSD   6  33  75  114 
DPI   41  258  94  393 
FDO   0  25  7  32 
WSSD   2  77  19  98 
SIDS   0  1  0  1 
 Totals:  49  394  195  638 
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 Evidence of this can also be seen in the data collected for the CSD program in 
Table 3.20.  In no other instance in this study did entries for ECOSOC affiliates with 
Roster Status substantially outnumber those holding Special Status within a category.  As 
Special Status is by far the most common accreditation status within the ECOSOC 
affiliation program (see Table 3.1 – as of November 2016, 75.6% held Special Status and 
20.9% held Roster Status), organizations holding that level of accreditation would 
presumably always outnumber those with other accreditation levels.  Yet within the CSD 
program 75 (65.8%) of 114 ECOSOC-CS organizations held Roster Status.  Roster Status 
is for organizations with a specialized and limited scope, circumstances which seem to 
apply to each of these 5 programs to varying degrees at least in comparison to the 
potentially broader parameters of the ECOSOC-CS regime.  In 4 of the 5 alternative 
affiliation programs, the percentage of Roster Status organizations is higher than the 
ECOSOC-CS average of 20.9%, intimating that these alternative UN-accreditation 
programs may appeal to CSOs/NGOs with more specialized parameters.  The following 
sections provide a summary overview of findings from analysis of the iCSO database and 
their significance to relevant research questions and guiding hypotheses.  
 
Overview of Analysis of iCSO Database 
 Throughout much of the 20
th
 century what few examples existed of transnational 
civil society were predominantly located in MDC/developed regions, but the explosive 
growth of NGOs globally over the course of recent decades has facilitated more balance 
in the number, distribution and influence of civil society organizations.  Just as the 
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governments of predominantly LDC/developing regions have become increasingly active 
within transnational organizations in recent decades, civil society in the global south has 
also become increasingly visible within the global arena (Tandon and Kak 2008).  By the 
1990s NGOs and civil society among LDCs were rapidly emerging and were becoming 
comparable in numbers to their northern counterparts, yet sometimes continued to be 
overshadowed politically within international forums by northern organizations which 
were better organized and financed (Tandon and Kak 2008).  Tandon and Kak (2008, 80-
81) elaborate on the challenges faced by global south NGOs in obtaining a voice in the 
UN and international community: 
  Emerging civil society in Asia, Africa and Latin America (initially) had 
 weak capacity in the areas of intellectual material, institutional capacities, and 
 local/regional coordination, as well as a lack of regulatory frameworks in many 
 countries.  Most governments of these southern countries had a “suspicious” 
 orientation toward CSOs and it was therefore necessary to create a modern 
 framework of regulation for government-NGO relations…In 1991, the idea of 
 strengthening civil society by uniting NGOs on a global stage manifested in 
 CIVICUS: the World Alliance for Citizen Participation which (facilitated) 
 unprecedented strength and global outreach for participating organizations. 
 
 While issues such as freedom to operate independently of government influence, 
political parity (clout) domestically and abroad, and funding/resource availability may in 
some instances continue to favor MDCs within contemporary transnational civil society, 
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significant progress toward parity has been made and the CSOs/NGOs of the developing 
world may be more vibrant than at any point in history.  For example, in recent decades 
communist China has witnessed substantial growth in the total number and variety of 
NGOs, yet compared with counterparts in many other regions, Chinese NGOs have not 
fully matured and many have a reputation for corruption or perhaps more commonly, 
poor leadership and ineffectiveness (Xiaoguang and Li 2006).  A further example can be 
evidenced in Indonesia in which NGOs and civil society is vibrant and thriving today, 
under decades of the Soeharto dictatorship civil society was viewed with suspicion by the 
government which sought to control it rather than support or engage with it (Antlov, 
Ibrahim and Tuijl 2006). 
 Rates of progress have not been uniform, particularly when comparing 
circumstances in democratic versus non-democratic countries---which usually have a 
regional correlation via the global north/south dichotomy.  The prevalence of democracy 
and other regime types can vary regionally and at least historically such patterns may 
have correlated with the presence of NGOs and civil society or the lack thereof, as 
customarily the latter have been more closely associated with democratic rather than 
authoritarian traditions.  For example, the dearth of democracy in much of the MENA 
(Middle East and North Africa) has impeded the advance of organized civil society which 
has struggled for the mere right of free association more so than working toward 
achieving specific policy objectives such as human rights, and this situation has not been 
helped by the breakdown or absence of popular movements such as organized labor, 
often a catalyst for civil society elements in other world regions (Sayed-Said 2004).  Not 
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only have most states in the Middle East restricted the growth and expansion of civil 
society internally, but such restrictions have also contributed to the isolation of groups in 
the region from interacting with each other and at the international level (Samad and 
Mohamadieh 2008).  However, even under such circumstances an often more muted form 
of civil society has played an increasingly important role in observing and reporting on 
compliance with both human rights, environmental and other initiatives in many 
countries around the world and accordingly such organizations are rightly regarded as 
elements of the international contract helping to regulate behavior in those policy areas 
(Lake 2000). 
 Interestingly, such uneven patterns of civil society development could be seen in 
data gleaned from this research.  Imbalances in representation and participation of 
CSOs/NGOs were consistently visible in statistics derived from the database.  Civil 
society in developed/MDC regions was usually overrepresented to a substantial degree 
relative to proportion of population, while that of developing/LDC areas---particularly 
Asia---was consistently underrepresented proportionally.  At least some of the latter 
disparity can be attributed to contrasts in economic prowess between the global north and 
south, as organizations in developing nations may often lack the financial resources to 
fully participate in international conferences, etc.  Other factors such as democratic 
versus authoritarian political climate in the host country can also be seen within the data 
presented in this research to impact the degree of participation of CSOs/NGOs within 
international forums such as UN-ECOSOC.  The following provides a summary 
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overview of the findings revealed via analysis of the UN iCSO database as related to the 
first two research questions and first guiding hypothesis.        
 
Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses 
 As has been previously discussed, the concept of pluralism within a political 
dynamic is somewhat subjective and open to interpretation.  For definitional clarity, this 
study defined political pluralism succinctly in Chapter 1 as the sharing of influence 
among and active engagement of a diverse group of stakeholders within a political 
dynamic.  Following the exploration of statistics gleaned from the iCSO database and 
analysis of plurality within the UN dynamic with transnational civil society, perhaps a 
slightly more detailed definition of political plurality can be framed: the equitable and (to 
the greatest extent feasible) proportional distribution of influence among as many 
segments of society as possible in order that broader input and participation in policy 
issue areas be facilitated.  As noted in Chapter 1, for the UN dynamic with transnational 
civil society this means that the greater the diversity of representation among civil society 
in terms of regional/geographical representation as well as representation of policy/issue 
areas, the greater the degree of contribution from diverse sources, and the influence of 
pluralism. 
  Relative to the relationship between the United Nations and transnational civil 
society, an exploration of political pluralism entails assessments of the degree and nature 
of actual CSO/NGO engagement (i.e. is the influence of civil society at the UN 
actual/potential or largely symbolic?) and the degree of proportional and equitable civil 
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society representation.  Analysis of the UN iCSO database revealed clear answers to the 
first research question and to the elements of the second research question and first 
guiding hypothesis as related to proportional representation and regional/geographical 
equity.  In gauging proportional representation across policy/issue areas substantial 
imbalances could also be seen among countries/regions.  
  
Research Questions 
1a – What are the patterns of participation of NGOs in UN-ECOSOC programs in terms 
of country and regional representation and are world regions and countries proportionally 
represented? 
 Much of the data derived from the iCSO database does not address depth or 
substance of participation.  However, the fact that in many categories (e.g., organizational 
type) entries for LDC/developing regions outnumber those of MDC/developed regions 
indicate notable improvement in degrees of parity and plurality within the UN-civil 
society dynamic between developed and developing nations and among most world 
regions.  In short, the civil society organizations of LDC/developing nations are at least 
on paper better represented within the UN framework than at any point in history, though 
such improvement with regard to increased inclusion and participation of historically 
underrepresented countries and world regions does not necessarily mean that plurality in 
the form of proportional parity has been achieved. 
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 In analyzing the iCSO database, this research used a multifaceted approach in 
exploring the first research question and gauging the degree of plurality in terms of 
proportional representation among regions and countries within the UN dynamic with 
transnational civil society.  One element entailed analysis of parity among world regions 
with regard to the spatial distribution of all organizations presently holding consultative 
status with UN-ECOSOC.  While sizable numbers of organizations from Africa, Asia and 
Latin America and the Caribbean did have consultative status, in all three regions their 
numbers were not equivalent to their proportions of global population---with Asian-based 
CSOs being especially underrepresented within the ECOSOC program.  Conversely 
CSOs/NGOs based in the predominantly developed regions of Anglo America, Europe 
and Oceania were overrepresented relative to those regions’ share of global population.   
 The latter findings were mirrored in a case study of the 20 most populous 
countries in the world and the degree to which each was represented proportionate to its 
share of global population within the ECOSOC consultative status program.  Among the 
17 countries located in predominantly developing/LDC regions all but 2 were 
proportionally underrepresented, mostly by wide margins.  All 3 of the countries in 
predominantly developed/MDC regions were overrepresented within the consultative 
status program relative to their percentages of global population.  This case study also 
afforded an opportunity to compare data between democratic and non-quasi-democratic 
nations regarding CSO representation within the UN dynamic.  Among the 10 most 
populous countries deemed to be democratic, the mean parity score was 111.5% 
(overrepresentation relative to population) while among the 10 countries deemed 
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non/quasi-democratic, a substantially lower mean of 48.8% (underrepresentation) 
contrasted sharply.  The latter findings help illustrate that disparities between the 
vibrancy of civil society in the global north and south could reflection a combination of 
not just economic disadvantages in less developed areas, but also political considerations, 
as the majority of non/quasi-democratic regimes are found in the global south.   
 An additional case study was undertaken in which the 50 countries of Europe and 
the sub-regions in which they are located were examined for spatial patterns regarding 
general entries (not specific to the ECOSOC consultative status program) in the iCSO 
database.  The analysis compared the total number of entries in the database as well as 
scoring each on the number of database entries per million people in each country’s 
population.  The contrast between the 26 higher income countries of Mediterranean, 
Northern and Western Europe---areas never under communist rule, with the 24 lower-
income, former communist bloc countries of Eastern Europe was stark with the former 
far better represented within the CS program.  Data within this region-specific case study 
was also analyzed according to whether countries were (1) in the EU, (2) EU candidates--
-at the time, or (3) neither members nor candidates to join the EU.  The 28 EU members 
had the highest mean number of CSO entries with 154 and second-highest mean of 8.3 
entries per million people.  EU candidates had the highest mean CSO entries per million 
people with 9.6 and the lowest mean of 46 entries per country.  Non-EU 
members/candidates had the lowest mean by far with 6.7 entries per million people, but 
an average of 60.9 entries per country, a larger number than EU-candidate countries, but 
less than half that of EU members.  
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1b – What are the patterns of participation and proportional representation in terms of 
policy/issue focus areas? 
 In undertaking analyses of policy/topical areas as represented within the UN 
iCSO database, patterns of regional participation could usually be evidenced.  The 
database was analyzed for general entries (not just those NGOs/CSOs currently holding 
ECOSOC consultative status) related to organizational type and fields of 
activity/expertise as specified by the UN.  Additionally, data was also examined 
regarding NGO/CSO scope and scale of operations, and with regard to UN CSO 
accreditation/affiliation programs outside ESOSOC-CS---programs that generally had 
narrower policy/focus areas (e.g., Commission on Sustainable Development).  
Consistently in each of the latter categories examined, data revealed overrepresentation of 
CSOs based in predominantly MDC/developed world regions and underrepresentation of 
those in predominantly LDC/developing regions with regard to the regions’ proportions 
of global population.    
 The study did not identify any substantial deficiencies in the form of gaps in 
broad policy/issue areas, but fluctuation was found across topical and policy areas in 
terms of numbers of CSOs involved reflecting diversity of specializations and interest 
areas.  It was expected that greater numbers of CSOs would be connected to broader 
policy areas such as economic/social development as opposed to more narrow and 
specialized focus areas such as statistical analysis or finance and such patterns were 
revealed in the study.  Among organizations with CS analyzed by organizational type---if 
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the oddly broad database category of “NGOs” is excluded, the most common categories 
were indigenous at 6.1% followed by associations and academics with 5.8% and 3.5%, 
respectively.  The least common were ageing and cooperatives, each with 0.3% and trade 
unions with 0.2%.  Among entries sorted by fields of activity/expertise, the most common 
were those related to economic and social with 23.5%, followed by social development 
and sustainable development, each with 17.5%.  The least common were entries related to 
statistics with 3.5% and the region-specific categories of NEPAD and conflict resolution 
in Africa with 2.5% and 2.2%, respectively.     
 
Guiding Hypotheses 
1. Imbalances exist in patterns of participation of NGOs in consultative status with the 
UN Economic and Social Council with regard to country/regional involvement (e.g. 
NGOs of developed/MDC states are proportionally better represented than those of 
developing/LDC states) and regarding the policy issues with which the NGOs are 
concerned.   
 
 Analysis of statistics obtained from the UN iCSO database via descriptive 
statistics strongly supports the contention of the first guiding hypothesis that proportional 
imbalances exist within the UN-civil society framework.  Consistently, many distinct 
case study elements of the research, drawing upon the iCSO database and using a variety 
of comparative measures demonstrated that UN-affiliated NGOs/CSOs headquartered in 
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the predominantly MDC/developed regions of Anglo America, Europe and Oceania are 
disproportionately overrepresented relative to those regions’ percentage of global 
population.  Conversely, NGOs/CSOs based in the predominantly LDC/developing 
regions of Africa, Asia and Latin America and the Caribbean, while often large in overall 
numbers, are as a whole disproportionately underrepresented relative to their percentage 
of global population.  The latter inequity in proportional representation/parity was found 
to be especially stark for Asian-based NGOs/CSOs.     
 Substantial imbalances were also found to exist across policy/focus areas with 
which NGOs/CSOs within the CS program are concerned.  For example, in examining 
entries by organizational typology, NGOs/CSOs related to academics, indigenous issues, 
or foundations were well represented, whereas those related to ageing, labor or media 
were scarcely represented.  Likewise, examination of database entries classified by fields 
of expertise revealed certain fields such as economic and social, social development, 
sustainable development, and women/gender issues to be represented to a considerably 
greater degree than other ostensibly important fields such as finance, population/ 
demography, public administration, and statistics.   
 Accordingly both components of the first guiding hypothesis appear to have been 
confirmed via analysis of the iCSO database in that imbalances clearly exist with regard 
to both regional/country representation as well as policy issues.  Chapter 4 analyzes 
results of survey data to address the second and third guiding hypotheses, which assert 
respectively that a range of factors in combination lead to some organizations to 
participate more than others in the CS program and that due to such factors most 
 136 
 
organizations within the CS program do not participate/contribute in any meaningful 
way.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 137 
 
IV. CHAPTER FOUR:  
APPRAISAL OF CSO/NGO PARTICIPATION AND BARRIERS TO 
PARTICIPATION 
 
Dahl (1982) famously opined that “like individuals, organizations ought to possess some 
autonomy, and at the same time they should also be controlled. Crudely stated, this is the 
fundamental problem of pluralist democracy.” 
 
Introduction 
 The 3
rd
 component of the initial research question inquires as to the type and 
degree of participation which exists among organizations holding consultative status (CS) 
with UN-ECOSOC, the primary vehicle for UN interaction with international civil 
society.  The final two research questions ask why some organizations within the CS 
program participate and other do not, and also how many CS-accredited organizations 
fail to participate in UN-ECOSOC functions?  The latter research questions led to the 
formulation of the first and second guiding hypotheses which respectively stipulate that a 
variety of factors such as financial ability and time/personnel commitments contribute to 
some CS-organizations being more active than others and that most organizations within 
the CS program are inactive and thus do not contribute in any meaningful way to the UN 
goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society.  These guiding hypotheses 
were operationalized via a detailed survey questionnaire (provided in Appendix A) 
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mailed to a random selection of 10% of all CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with UN-
ECOSOC. 
 
 Participant Self-De-Selection from Survey and Possible Bias 
 Some indication exists that many---possibly most---subjects randomly selected to 
participate in the study may have opted out of participating in the survey due to 
reluctance to report little-no activity within the UN consultative status program.  During 
the course of the study, it was not uncommon to receive questions from participants 
addressing a range of issues.  The most common single topic about which I was 
approached related to NGO’s dearth of participation with the UN.  Five participants 
contacted me to ask for guidance or express concerns related to the latter, often framing 
the comments as “many of the questions do not apply to us” as they had not participated 
in any programs or otherwise communicated with or made any contribution to the UN.  
Most of these participants also stated some variant to the effect that they did not want to 
“bias” or “skew” the data by responding with consistent 0s or 1s to number line or other 
survey items attempting to gauge levels of participation.  Several made comments to the 
effect that they had “done nothing” or “had nothing to report” and thus did not feel they 
could/should participate in the research.   
 My responses always stressed that such responses were perfectly valid, made 
positive contribution to the research, and also that if only the most active organizations 
self-report their experiences, the results would be skewed from the other direction.  
Participants were reassured that activity levels within the program appeared to vary 
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widely and that they appeared to be many other NGOs with participation rates similar to 
their own.  Also, I always stressed that responses were totally anonymous and the 
identities of respondents and the NGOs with which they are affiliated would always be 
kept completely confidential, information which had also been provided in the 
survey/consent documentation and in the introductory email.  Those efforts were largely 
in vain as only 1 of those 5 subjects returned the survey questionnaire and that 
respondent---with whom I spent more time communicating than any other participant---
left many survey items blank rather than provide scores so low as to indicate little-no 
participation or communication within the consultative status program or little-no 
benefits derived from the affiliation.   
 In addition to the latter experience, the average responses for survey items 
attempting to gauge levels of participation in its various forms were in general higher 
than I had initially expected at the start of the research.  Among the 62 questionnaires 
returned, most indicated high-moderate number-line scores in terms of networking, 
perceptions as to UN valuation of CSO participation, and the degree to which 
participation in the CS program is justified.  Most respondents also reported via other 
objective survey items participating in an NGO coalition (51.6%), and most reported 
participating in at least 1 UN forum at the New York (78.2%) and Geneva (50.9%) 
headquarters, though not at Vienna (20.0%) or the regional UN offices.  Most (75.4%) 
also reported communicating with the UN since being in the CS program with email and 
telephone calls being the most common mediums.  A majority (61.2%) of respondents 
also indicated that they had presented a written statement at a UN venue, although only a 
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minority (40.3%) indicated they had presented a verbal statement, and smaller 
percentages still indicated that they had actually been asked to present a written or verbal 
statement. 
 The possibility must be considered that portions of the survey data compiled 
during the course of this research could demonstrate bias favoring (over-representing) the 
NGOs that are more active participants in the consultative status program.  If true, actual 
rates of participation on the part of NGOs within the UN-ECOSOC consultative status 
program may be less than numbers derived from this study indicate.  There is no known 
reason why data bias favoring (via over-representation of) inactive NGOs would have 
resulted in findings skewed in that direction as those organizations would logically be 
less inclined than more active NGOs to submit a completed questionnaire and also among 
those which did submit the survey, less active organizations may be more inclined to 
omit responses to many individual survey items rather than report data they may regard 
as unfavorable to them.  Accordingly, if data generated in this survey are skewed, it is in 
the overestimation rather than underestimation of activity levels of NGOs within the 
consultative status program. 
 
Operationalization 
 Most questions contained in the survey instrument were objective in nature and 
allow for numerical appraisal and comparison in addition to allowing for ease of response 
and minimal time commitment on the part of participants.  Number lines were utilized for 
most (32 of 48---or 67% of total) survey items, wherein respondents indicated their 
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reaction/score along a range of between 10 (high) to 0 (none/no) applicability.  The 
number lines as printed in the survey utilized only whole numbers, but as many 
respondents marked scores between 2 whole numbers, half scores were recorded---i.e. a 
response circling, underlining, highlighting (etc.) only the number 5 was recorded as a 
score of 5, but a marking/indication falling between 5 and 6 on the printed number line 
was recorded as 5.5.  The mean score for each number line item was tabulated and the 
latter along with the graphed distribution of responses is provided in the analysis.  
Additionally, in an effort to better understand and analyze responses to number line items 
and the range of responses, a percentage breakdown of responses is provided according to 
whether they were high, medium/moderate or low-range scores.  The latter scoring was 
undertaken via division of all 21 possible numerical scores into 3 equidistant ranges: 
scores ranging from 10-7---high; 6.5-3.5---moderate/medium; 3-0 low. 
    In addition to number line items, 13 other questions (27%) included in the 
survey were objective in nature, requiring responses that were either numerical or 
otherwise quantifiable, allowing for objective analysis and comparison.  As was also the 
case with number-line items, these questions generally had a high rate of completion 
among returned surveys, with the vast majority of respondents providing data for all 13 
items.  These survey items were analyzed according to numerical totals and on a 
breakdown of percentage of responses.    
 Only 3 survey items were open-ended discussion questions.  Given the overall 
length of the survey and time commitment needed to complete and submit the 
questionnaire, the number of subjective discussion-oriented questions---the most time-
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consuming items to complete, was minimized in an effort to avoid adversely impacting 
response rate.  The responses to the subjective, open-ended survey items were evaluated 
via qualitative content analysis.  All such responses were read to identify the nature of 
feedback and what patterns existed among responses.  Via coding of feedback, response 
categories were created to aid in framing and analyzing content of discussions and also to 
allow for some degree of objective comparison.  For example, with regard to the initial 
question as to ‘why did your organization seek consultative status with the UN?”, 
responses were found to fall into 1 of 2 basic categories: reasons specific to the particular 
mission/scope of the CSO; or reasons that were more general in scope.  The follow up to 
the latter question, asked if those goals had been achieved and why or why not.  
Responses were found to fall into 1 of 4 types: yes---unqualified; yes---partly or 
qualified; no; or unknown/TBD.  The third open-ended item asked how the UN could 
improve the experience for organizations in the CS program.  The latter yielded a widely 
diverse range of comments, but which could be sorted/organized around 10 distinct 
themes---some more commonly cited in the feedback than others: access, bureaucracy, 
communication, expertise, fairness/equity, funding, general guides, networking/capacity-
building, meetings, specific to policy/focus areas of organization.  
 
Profile of Survey Participants 
 As illustrated in Table 4.1, the number of questionnaires returned was roughly 
proportionate to the overall percentage of CS organizations holding Special accreditation 
status.  However, among survey respondents, those with General status were 
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disproportionately overrepresented and those with Roster status disproportionately 
underrepresented---both to substantial degrees.  The latter patterns cannot be attributed to 
skewed sampling and survey participant selection as the proportion of CSOs randomly 
selected for the survey closely mirrored the distribution of accreditation levels of the 
general population, partial confirmation that the random sampling process yielded a 
representative sample.  As previously discussed, it is my belief that a self-(de)selection 
occurred with the surveys wherein those CS organizations with higher levels of UN 
activity/involvement (e.g. those holding General status) would be more likely to report 
this and return the survey questionnaire, and conversely those with little-to-no UN 
involvement (possibly disproportionately concentrated as a pattern among Roster status 
organizations) would be less intrinsically motivated to complete the survey and in effect 
self-incriminate. 
 
Table 4.1: Levels of Consultative Status Accreditation of NGO Survey Respondents  
versus Distribution of Accreditation Levels within CS Program Overall  
 
Accreditation Levels of  439  Accreditation Levels of Accreditation Levels of 
Randomly Selected CSOs  Survey Respondents  all CSOs (Nov. 2016) 
General  16 (3.6%)  14 (23.3%)   151 (3.2%) 
Special  339 (77.2%)  43 (71.7%)   3595 (75.9%) 
Roster  84 (19.1%)  3 (5%)    993 (20.9%) 
Total  439   60*    4739 
*Of 62 returned surveys, 2 respondents did not identify their level of accreditation  
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 Table 4.2 presents a comparison of the spatial and MDC/LDC distribution 
patterns of CSOs randomly selected to receive the survey questionnaire relative to 
distribution of all CSOs with CS status and regional proportion of world population.  The 
regional distributions of those organizations randomly selected to receive the survey 
questionnaire closely mirrors the regional distributions of all CSOs holding consultative 
status with Un-ECOSOC, an indication of the validity and representative nature of the 
sample selections.  Overall, 33.9% of CSOs randomly selected were from predominantly 
LDC/developing regions, while the latter constitute 38.7% of all organizations within the 
CS program.  Likewise 66.1% of CSOs randomly selected were from predominantly 
MDC/developed areas, with the latter comprising 61.3% of all CS organizations.   
 Data obtained for this comparison illustrates the lack of regional parity within the 
CS program overall.  While the 3 predominantly LDC/developing regions of Africa, Asia 
and Latin America and the Caribbean collectively constitute 84.7% of the world’s 
population, as of November 2016 only 38.7% of CSOs holding consultative status with 
UN-ECOSOC were headquartered in those regions.  Although all 3 developing regions 
were proportionally underrepresented within the program, the disparity was especially 
great with regard to Asia, which comprises 59.7% of the world’s population yet is host to 
only 18% of organizations within the CS program.  Conversely, the 3 predominantly 
MDC/developed regions of Anglo America, Europe and Oceania collectively make up 
just 15.3% of the global population yet all 3 were proportionally overrepresented and 
collectively host 61.3% of all CSOs holding consultative status.  
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Table 4.2: Regional and LDC/MDC Distribution Patterns of (1) CSOs Randomly  
Selected for Survey, (2) All CSOs with ECOSOC CS, and (3) Relative to  
Proportion of Global Population  
 
Regional Distribution of 439  Regional Distribution  Regional Proportion 
of  
Randomly Selected CSOs  of all CSOs w/ CS  Global Population  
 
Predominantly LDC/Developing Regions 
Africa  57 (13% of 439) 674 (15.3% of 4404)  16.4% 
Asia  70 (15.9%)  794 (18.0%)   59.7% 
Latin Am/Car 22 (5%)  238 (5.4%)   8.6% 
 Totals: 149 (33.9%)  1706 (38.7%)   84.7%  
Predominantly MDC/Developed Regions 
Anglo Amer 130 (29.6%)  1168 (26.5%)   4.9% 
Europe  154 (35.1%)  1434 (32.6%)   9.9% 
Oceania 6 (1.4%)  96 (2.2%)   0.5% 
 Totals: 290 (66.1%)  2698 (61.3%)   15.3% 
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Survey Responses – General Background 
 The first 2 survey items were also 2 of the 3 open-ended discussion questions.  
Respondents were asked why their organization sought consultative status with the UN 
and in turn were asked if those goals had been achieved and why or why not.  Of 62 
survey questionnaires returned, the vast majority---57 (91.9%) provided feedback for one 
or both of these items.  In general responses for the first survey item related to why the 
organization sought CS with the UN were more detailed than information provided for 
the follow up question inquiring as to whether those goals had been realized.  Responses 
to the first question were organized into 2 basic categories: those that are specific to the 
policy/focus area of a particular organization/respondent; and those that were more 
general in scope. 
 Of the respondents addressing the first question, 18 (31.6%) cited reasons that 
were specific to the policy/focus area of their specific CSO as motivating factors for 
seeking consultative status.  For example, a labor-related CSO responded that it sought to 
represent workers and unions interests and protect their rights, stating that “it is 
inconceivable that the UN or any other major international institution function without 
direct involvement and input of trade union organizations.”  Another highly specialized 
CSO indicated their desire to contribute their expertise in risk governance/management 
and identify collaboration opportunities and stay updated as to international 
developments related to the latter.  Development-related issues (economic or 
human/social) were the most commonly cited policy/issue areas as drivers.  Several 
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responses also touched upon the organization’s desire to increase its profile specifically 
within the policy/issue area(s) in which it specialized.   
 The majority of responses---39 (68.4%)---focused upon a diverse array of more 
general motivating factors.  Among the most common responses were those indicating a 
desire to be involved in various respects with the UN including the ability to attend 
conferences and obtain information about international issues.  Others referenced the goal 
of networking or otherwise interacting with other NGOs.  Sharing of information or best 
practices or international outreach in general were commonly cited motivating factors.  
Several respondents were also quite candid in that they explained that no or few clear 
goals for their participation in the CS program had ever been defined. 
 Overall, there seemed to be a roughly equal division between the number of 
altruistic motivators (e.g., contribute expertise to the UN; collaborative research/projects) 
as opposed to incentives of a more intrinsic nature (e.g., increased credibility or visibility 
for the organization; new funding opportunities) revealed by respondents, with 
altruistic/external motives being provided slightly more commonly.  Interestingly, 
respondents citing mostly or entirely altruistic/external motives for seeking consultative 
status with the UN were somewhat more likely to indicate their goals for participating in 
the CS program had been achieved than organizations which listed more intrinsic 
motivations for participating.  The implication of the latter is that the CSOs whose sole or 
top priority was to contribute are perhaps more likely to find success and satisfaction than 
those organizations which chiefly sought some form of tangible benefit from the 
association.  
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 In some respects the follow-up question to the first survey item yielded more 
interesting results, particularly with regard to measuring participation and the 
considerations which promote or impede the latter---the focal points of the second and 
third guiding hypotheses.  Among the 56 respondents providing feedback as to whether 
their goals for seeking CS with the UN had been realized, 26 (46.4%) indicated “yes”, a 
2:1 margin over the 13 (23.2%) organizations which indicated “no”.  In justifying their 
responses, those organizations reporting that their goals had been realized had most 
commonly sought to enhance their profile/visibility internationally, participate in UN 
forums/functions, or to facilitate better networking, idea-sharing or other forms of 
communication internationally.  While some respondents indicating one or more of the 
latter as goals, noted they had not been achieved, the majority of the organizations 
indicating that no goals had been achieved via the CS program either (1) indicated lack of 
clearly framed goals from the outset, or (2) had originally sought specific benefits for 
their organization which at least in some cases (i.e., funding opportunities or “UN 
training”) may have been unrealistic.   
 An additional 8 respondents gave feedback that could be best described as a 
qualified or partial “yes”.  Such a response would indicate realization of only some of 
multiple objectives or only partial achievement of a stated objective.  For example, one 
respondent noted in the first question that their goal was to “obtain recognition via the 
UN system as an exceptional NGO and also to use the forum to share thoughts and 
ideas.”  In the follow up question the same respondent noted that they had only partially 
realized their goals in that they “welcome the recognition (via the CS accreditation) but 
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find it difficult to share information or promote their organization’s expertise” due to 
logistical barriers such as time, personnel and funding constraints.  If such responses are 
included with feedback equating to an unqualified “yes”, a total of 34 respondents 
(60.7%) indicated they at least some of the goals which motivated their organization to 
pursue CS affiliation. 
    A total of 9 respondents (16.1%) essentially indicated that they could not 
effectively judge whether or not their goals for the CS program had been achieved.  In 
some cases respondents indicated that they have not held CS long enough yet to assess 
whether their goals have been achieved, although in 2 such cases respondents have 
possessed the accreditation for several years.  In other cases, it appears the organizations 
at least initially had intentions of participating but as yet have not due to logistical 
constraints.  One such respondent noted that the levels of attainment of their goals in the 
CS program are as yet unclear as “the channels (for participation) are not convenient”.  
Another indicated that they are still seeking “ways to contribute and work within the UN 
system in ways that our finances and other limitations allow.” While not all respondents 
elaborated specifically as to why they were unable to realize their initial goals relative to 
the CS program, among those that did provide details, limited organizational resources 
including financial constraints were the most commonly mentioned theme. 
 One of the more interesting patterns to emerge from analysis of the follow-up 
question as to whether goals had been achieved and why/why not, was the dichotomy of 
responses related to the organizational goal’s breadth of scope.  As indicated in Table 4.3, 
among the 56 respondents providing feedback for the survey item, 18 (32.1%) had 
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indicated in the previous question that their organizational incentive for seeking CS 
accreditation was linked to some specific aspect of the CSOs policy/issue area such as 
development, labor, or human rights.  The majority of respondents addressing this survey 
item---38 or 67.9%---did not cite goals specific to their organization’s policy/focus area, 
but indicated more general objectives such as participation in UN forums, have a voice in  
 
Table 4.3:  Responses to Whether CSO Goals for CS Program Had Been Achieved or  
Not: A Comparison of Broad/General Goals versus Those Specific to a  
Particular Aspect of Organization’s Policy/Issue Area  
 
Responses from CS Organizations Indicating Highly Mission/Policy-Specific Goals for 
CS Program Participation 
Responses: N and Percentage of Total 
      Partial or 
Yes  No  Unknown Qualified Yes  Total Responses 
7 (38.9%) 5 (27.8%) 5 (27.8%) 1 (5.6%)  18 
 
  
 
Responses from CS Organizations Indicating Broader, More General Goals for CS 
Program Participation 
 
Responses: N and Percentage of Total 
      Partial or 
Yes  No  Unknown Qualified Yes  Total Responses 
19 (50%) 8 (21.1%) 4 (10.6%) 7 (18.4%)  38 
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international issues, interact with other NGOs, enhanced credibility, etc.  Among those 
respondents indicating goals specific to their organizational scope/focus, notably fewer 
(38.9%) indicated “yes” or partially/qualified yes (5.6%) as to their goals within the CS 
program being attained as opposed to responding organizations which had specified 
broader, more general goals (50% - yes, 18.4% partially/qualified yes).  More 
respondents indicating CS program goals specific to their CSOs policy/focus areas also 
indicated “no” (27.8%) or “unknown” (27.8%) regarding achievement of said goals than 
was the case with those indicating more general goals (21.1% - no, 10.6% unknown).  A 
possible conclusion is that some organizations within the CS program may find it easier 
to realize goals that are more general in focus rather than objectives specific to particular 
aspects of their organizational mission and in turn may find the experience of 
participation in the CS program more fulfilling.  
 Regardless of the breadth of goals which initially motivated the organizations’ to 
pursue CS accreditation, the sometimes detailed and impassioned feedback of many of 
the respondents indicating that they have not achieved their goals during their 
experiences with the CS program contribute to understanding many obstacles within the 
dynamic.  For example, common themes in the survey findings were that many CS-
accredited organizations lack the resources to participate and/or do not know how to 
derive meaningful benefits from the program.  One respondent indicated that “all we have 
received (from the UN) are invitations to conferences, but our organization…lacks the 
resources to attend.  One time we were able to attend an ECOSOC conference, but the 
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benefits to our organization were unclear…and nothing learned seemed immediately 
relevant to our needs.” 
 Another potentially important issue for the CS organizations which hoped to 
interact with representatives of foreign governments---for reasons such as impacting 
policy formulation internationally---is the segregation of civil society venues from 
country delegations and other UN bodies and the potentially inadequate space available 
for NGOs to function effectively within the CS program.  One respondent provided 
detailed feedback concerning the latter trend, stating that “in the last decade we have seen 
at the UN, the shrinking of physical and communication space and the NGOs are now 
cordoned off into the ‘ghetto’ of the Church Centre, Salvation Army, Armenian Centre 
and other venues for our meetings, called (by the UN) ‘parallel events’ either opposite the 
UN Building or even further away.”  The respondent continued: “This means that it is 
very rare indeed for official government delegates ever to attend the parallel events where 
very different messages and information…can be relayed, different from the formal 
speeches in the UN Building.”   
 A different respondent noted that one potential solution to the shortage of 
meeting/communication space for NGOs might exist in the form of coalitions: “The large 
number of CS organizations means that all cannot speak at official meetings, but often 
multiple views can be presented through a single speaker who represents a larger group 
of organizations.”   However, the survey results indicate only around one-half of 
respondents have ever participated in an NGO coalition and among those which do it 
seems unlikely that the views of each NGO could be heard on each issue of potential 
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importance to them.  No solution appears to be in sight in terms of the segregation of CS 
organizations via the ‘parallel event’ approach.  One respondent noted that although they 
had been hosting events and otherwise actively participating at the UN for the past 18 
years, “over the last decade (since the implementation of the ‘parallel events’ strategy) I 
feel that no one making policy, i.e. government delegates, can hear us and so our issues 
are ignored.”  Among the organizations recently admitted to the CS program which 
hoped to proactively influence international policy-making, but see no substantive 
opportunity to do so, and among the long-time participants who have witnessed their 
initial access to international delegations and UN bodies which contribute to policy 
formulation progressively erode, it is understandable that some degree of disillusionment 
may occur and that the latter and the combined realization of increasingly limited access 
to corridors of power and influence could potentially undermine the ability or willingness 
of organizations to fully participate in the CS program.    
 The third survey question inquired as to the level of CS accreditation of 
participants and whether they felt the classification level was appropriate.  Of the 45 
responses to the latter portion of the question, the vast majority---39 or 86.7%---deemed 
their organization’s classification/accreditation level within the CS program as 
appropriate, including all respondents from General Status organizations.  However 2 of 
3 (66.7%) Roster Status organizations which submitted the completed survey indicated 
they found their organizational classification/accreditation level inappropriate, as did 4 of 
43 (9.3%) organizations with Special Status.  While the questionnaire did not specifically 
ask respondents to elaborate as to why, it can be inferred that in all 6 cases, the CSOs 
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believed a higher level of CS accreditation was more suitable for their organizations.  It is 
worth noting that the question regarding appropriate accreditation level had among the 
lowest response rates of any survey item, with only 45 (72.6%) of 62 respondents 
answering, indicating that many participants were either unsure as to the appropriateness 
of their CS accreditation level or were otherwise uncomfortable addressing the question 
directly. 
 Participants were also asked via a number-line question to indicate the degree to 
which their CS accreditation level/type impeded their ability to participate in UN 
programs, with 10 denoting a very high degree of difficulty and 0 no difficulty.  As 
illustrated in Figure 4.1, a total of 56 respondents had a mean score of 3.7 indicate low-
moderate levels of difficulty posed by their CS status.  31 (55.4%) of 56 respondents 
indicated a low score of 3 or less and 15 (26.8%) indicated a moderate-range score of 
between 3.5 to 6.5.  However, a substantial minority of 10 respondents (17.9%) indicated 
a high score of between 7-10, conveying real or perceived difficulty posed by their 
consultative status accreditation level in interacting with the UN---presumably the 
restrictions placed on the ability to make formal statements.  As was previously discussed 
(see page __), CS organizations with General status have the most freedom and flexibility 
in conveying positions on issues, with those holding Special status are more restricted, 
followed by Roster status which imposes the greatest restrictions. 
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Figure 4.1:  Degree to which Level/Type of Consultative Status Impedes CSO’s Ability 
to Participate in UN Programs  
 
 
 Another survey item asked respondents to indicate on number lines how they 
would rate the importance of each of 5 specific considerations concerning their 
organization’s desire to have UN consultative status.  The factors specified were: (1) 
general prestige/visibility, (2) credibility in fundraising, (3) networking with other 
CSOs/organizations, (4) contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other 
organizations, and (5) contributing written or verbal position statements on issues.  
Figures 4.2-4.6 provide the total number, mean and range of number line responses for 
each of the latter 5 items. 
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Figure 4.2: Importance of General Prestige/Visibility Concerning CSO Desire to Have 
UN Consultative Status  
 
Figure 4.3: Importance of Credibility in Fundraising Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN 
Consultative Status  
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Figure 4.4:  Importance of Networking with Other Organizations Concerning CSO Desire 
to Have UN Consultative Status  
 
Figure 4.5: Importance of Contributing/Exchanging Research with the UN and Other 
Organizations Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status  
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Figure 4.6: Importance of Contributing Written or Verbal Position Statements on Issues 
Concerning CSO Desire to Have UN Consultative Status  
 
 The variation in mean scores across the 5 considerations was not substantial, with 
general prestige/visibility scoring highest at 7.7, followed closely by networking with 
other organizations, contributing written/verbal position statements, and 
contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other organizations with means of 7.6, 
7.4, and 7.2 respectively.  All of the latter can be regarded as high-range scores and 
reflect almost equally high importance afforded by most respondents for each of the latter 
4 considerations.  The remaining item, credibility in fundraising yielded a somewhat 
lower mean score of 6.0, which although still moderately high, indicates fundraising was 
not a primary concern for most and was of the least importance among the considerations 
respondents were specifically asked to rate.   
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 Participants also had the option of specifying other considerations important to 
their organization’s desire to obtain consultative status.   A total of 15 respondents 
specified a diverse range of other factors not addressed in the 5 number line options.  All 
of the additional considerations specified were rated high (7-10) in importance, and 7 of 
the factors were rated 10 on the scale, denoting utmost importance.  Table 4.4 presents a 
comprehensive list of each of the additional considerations as specified by respondents.  
Not all of the comments were detailed and some were not directly linked to the question 
at hand (e.g. “our CS level impedes us”), but some of the comments were insightful.  For 
example, several related directly to the national circumstances in which the CSO was 
based including participation in advocacy that would be limited in the home country.  
Several organizations also specified considerations specific to their policy areas or scope 
of mission.  
 In an effort to gauge the types of actual positive impacts (as opposed to initial 
goals/incentives for obtaining CS addressed in a previous survey item) UN consultative 
status has had upon CSOs within the program, as well as general patterns and motivations 
for participation, participants were asked to use number line scores to rate the beneficial 
impact of each of 6 areas specified in the questionnaire: (1) making meaningful 
connections with other NGOs in the US; (2) making meaningful connections with other 
NGOs internationally; (3) making meaningful contributions to the UN; (4) general 
prestige/visibility; (5) media publicity; and (6) aiding in fundraising.   Figures 4.7-4.12 
provide the total number, mean and range of number line responses for each of the 6 
survey items.     
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Table 4.4: Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as  
Being Important to Their Decision to Obtain CS Accreditation  
 
Recruiting for organization 
Joining other UN organizations (UNFCCC) 
Interaction with Other NGOs within our country 
Create awareness of global interdependency among UN membership 
Legitimize our work when lobbying the government 
Participate in global advocacy processes that are limited by our own national government 
Universal peace 
New ideas 
Media coverage of UN involvement 
Raise awareness about needs/rights of people with intellectual disabilities 
Submit accurate data/information about our country (Iran) 
Political considerations in determining the status of our organization 
Advance the cause of families globally 
Discussion 
Our level of (CS) accreditation impedes us 
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 Considerable variation in mean scores existed across the 6 areas, with 3 areas 
achieving either high or moderate-high mean scores and 3 with moderate or low-
moderate scores.  The highest mean and the only mean which would qualify as a high-
range score in terms of benefits derived from the CS program was the 7.1 average for 
prestige/legitimacy earned for your organization.  A similar survey item asking 
respondents why they initially sought consultative status also ranked prestige as the 
highest consideration, seemingly indicating that this goal of enhanced status via official 
association with the UN is both a top initial priority and one that has been largely realized 
as a benefit by organizations within the program responding to the survey.   
 Making meaningful contributions to the UN and making meaningful connections 
with other organizations internationally had the next highest mean scores of 6.4 and 6.1 
respectively, both falling in the upper end of the moderate range for scores.  Interestingly, 
both of the latter survey items relating to benefits realized also had roughly equivalent 
survey questions related to initial motivation for pursuing CS with the UN.  In both cases 
the mean scores for benefits realized were substantially lower (by a full point or more), 
implying that although many CSOs feel an overall positive impact was experienced it 
may have fallen short of initial expectations formulated at the onset of pursuing/obtaining 
consultative status. 
 Substantially lower mean scores were obtained for the remaining 3 survey items 
within the category.  Media publicity for your organization and making meaningful 
connections with other NGOs in the US had means of only 4.8 and 4.7 respectively, 
denoting that neither were generally regarded as a primary benefit by respondents.  
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Beyond initial press attention that may be derived upon first obtaining formal 
accreditation with UN ECOSOC, it stands to reason that CSOs with little-no substantive 
activity level within the program would not receive further media attention.  Initially I did 
not know what to expect in response to the item gauging connection with US-based civil 
society.  Given the prominence of US-based CSOs internationally in general and within 
the CS program in particular and also given the importance of the US as a source of 
funding and other support for initiatives related to international civil society, I had been 
curious to see if non-US organizations specifically coveted building relationships with 
US counterparts, but survey findings indicate that the latter clearly is not the case for 
most respondents. 
 The lowest mean score for the series of items inquiring as to organizational 
benefits derived from the CS program were for aid in fundraising for your organization, 
with 3.9---the lowest mean score obtained for any number line item in the study.  The 
latter results parallel the mean score for credibility in fundraising, which also scored 
lowest among items gauging initial motivation for obtaining CS accreditation.  The 
survey results related to fundraising were among the more surprising outcomes of the 
study.  Though I did not have a clear sense as to whether UN affiliation would actually 
prove to be beneficial in fundraising (through prestige/credibility of association etc.) in 
reality, I had initially assumed it would be among the top priorities or perceived 
advantages among CSOs seeking to obtain CS.  Survey results clearly indicated that at 
least for the majority of respondents neither was the case.   
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Figure 4.7: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections 
with Other NGOs in the US  
 
 
Figure 4.8: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Connections 
with Other NGOs Internationally  
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Figure 4.9: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Making Meaningful Contributions to  
the UN 
 
Figure 4.10: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Prestige/Legitimacy Derived for 
Organization  
 
 165 
 
Figure 4.11: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Media Publicity  
 
 
Figure 4.12: Beneficial Impacts of CS Accreditation: Aid in Fundraising  
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 Participants were also given the option of indicating “other” as a beneficial impact 
of obtaining CS and were asked to specify.  A total of 10 respondents volunteered such 
information, with most of the comments being scored positively and 1 comment scored at 
0: “no known/observable benefit derived”.  A comprehensive summary of the comments 
offered is provided in Table 4.5.  The majority of the comments related to legitimacy or 
credibility which had been represented as a number line item, though respondents often 
elaborated as to how (or with what entity) credibility had been enhanced.  In two 
instances respondents noted how CS status had benefited their organization with regard to 
its specific policy area or scope of mission---i.e., personal safety awareness, connections 
with exchange students.  One response centered upon benefitting from obtaining general 
information stemming from the CS program.  
Table 4.5: Range of Additional Considerations Specified by Survey Respondents as  
Benefits Derived from Their Organization Obtaining CS Accreditation  
 
Educational resources/materials and useful information 
Shows our work has international respect & we may be able to influence international 
 policies 
Awareness of personal safety issues 
Credibility/legitimacy to participate in national processes 
Credibility when offering consulting or collaborating 
Beneficial impact with national government (Bangladesh) 
Credibility/trust in relationship with government 
Credibility with our beneficiaries (donors) 
Legitimacy when lobbying government and political parties 
Meaningful connections with US exchange students 
No known/observable benefit derived 
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 Within the “general background” section of the questionnaire participants were 
also asked which leader/position within their organization was chiefly responsible for 
seeking CS with the UN.  In constructing the survey, I hoped that this item may help shed 
some light on why some CSOs within the CS program participate and some do not.  For 
example, if the goal of obtaining CS accreditation was in most cases initiated by a board 
member or other person (e.g., donor or volunteer) other than a member of senior 
leadership in charge of day-to-day operations, perhaps lack of managerial support for the 
association with the UN could be inferred.  However, the latter was not found to be the 
case among respondents, with around two-thirds indicating it was senior management 
within their organization that bore most responsibility for seeking CS accreditation.   
Among the fixed-choice options the most common response was executive director with 
34.4%, followed closely by CEO with 31.3%.  15.6% of respondents indicated that one or 
more board members were primarily responsible.  Participants also had the option of 
indicating “other” and asked to specify the job title, an option chosen by 18.8% of 
respondents.  A fairly diverse range of titles/responses were provided with president, 
secretary general, director of a specific division/program, or a committee or committee 
chair the most common responses. 
 In a question also relatable to the questionnaire section regarding participation, 
organizations receiving the survey were asked if their organization had ever 
communicated with the UN since obtaining CS accreditation---excluding the routine 
required submission of quadrennial reports.  The goal of the latter survey item was 
obviously to help gauge degrees and patterns of participation of CSOs within the CS 
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program.  Of 61 surveys answering the question, a large majority---75.4%---indicated 
that they in fact had communicated with the UN.  The manner in which organizations 
communicated and the frequency of interactions are explored in the “participation” and 
“networking/communications” sections of the survey, findings of which are discussed 
beginning on page 173. 
 
Survey Responses – Accreditation and Representation 
 UN offices are geographically dispersed throughout many world regions.  The 
largest---and via serving as the seat of the General Assembly, Security Council and many 
other key UN bodies, the most important---UN presence is its primary headquarters in 
New York.  The Geneva headquarters is second in size and also in importance as it is 
home to some 25 major UN divisions/programs including the Office of the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, United Nations High Commissioner for 
Refugees, and the World Health Organization.  Third in size and significance is UN 
headquarters in Vienna, host to several UN agencies/programs including the International 
Atomic Energy Agency.  Additionally, the UN maintains regional headquarters in 5 
locations: Addis Ababa, Ethiopia---North Africa; Bangkok, Thailand---Asia and the 
Pacific; Beirut, Lebanon---Mideast and Western Asia; Nairobi, Kenya---Sub-Saharan 
Africa; and Santiago, Chile---Latin America and the Caribbean. 
 As part of the effort to discern patterns and degree of CSO participation with the 
UN, the survey questionnaire contained items designed to gauge levels of participation at 
different UN locations: each of the 3 UN headquarters in New York, Geneva and Vienna 
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and also 4 of the 5 regional offices---in an oversight, reference to Nairobi was not 
included in the survey, but as almost no respondents indicated any presence or history of 
activity at the regional centers, the latter omission likely had little impact on the study 
findings.  The first such survey item asked participants to indicate if a representative of 
their CSO has successfully obtained a UN grounds pass/ID (the latter is a higher standard 
for the designated UN representative of a CSO---rather than merely submitting names of 
intended representatives---as obtaining the grounds pass requires their physical presence 
on site and often indicates the representative actually attended a function at the site) for 
each of 7 locations.  Those indicating that representatives had obtained passes/IDs were 
asked to indicate the number of representatives obtaining passes/IDs for each site. 
 UN guidelines allow each organization holding consultative status to designate up 
to 7 representatives for annual passes at each of the 3 UN headquarters locations (up to 9 
temporary passes may also be requested which are valid for up to 3 months), and up to 2 
representatives for each regional site.  It was expected that CSO-designated 
representatives would be concentrated in New York and the other 2 headquarters sites in 
descending order of site importance with far fewer representatives designated at regional 
offices and as illustrated in Table 4.6, this is precisely what the survey data reflected.  42 
CSOs indicated their representatives had successfully obtained their credentials for New 
York, followed by 26 for Geneva and 9 for Vienna.  Only 2 organizations (both based in 
the Mideast---one of these in Lebanon) reported credentialed representatives for Beirut, 
and only 1 organization (based in Africa) reported credentialed representation for Addis 
Ababa, with 0 reported for Bangkok or Santiago.  The mean number of CSO 
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representatives among organizations reporting representation at the sites was highest at 
5.0 in New York, followed by Geneva with 2.5 and Vienna with 1.9.  The 2 regional 
offices each had a mean of 1 designated representative. 
 These distributions are logical in that organizations are designating 
representatives where there are larger numbers of UN offices/programs, larger UN staffs 
and consequently potentially more opportunities to participate in UN functions via their 
consultative status.  Many of the UN’s most important organs and conferences are based 
in New York, as is ECOSOC itself, the parent organization of the CS program and chief 
catalyst of the UN-civil society dynamic.  Smaller numbers of other UN agencies/projects 
are headquartered in Geneva and in turn Vienna and both sites are often host to 
conferences though not at the size or frequency associated with New York.  Regional UN 
offices have considerably smaller staffs, more narrow scope of operations and are 
principally host to projects or conferences that are specific to their respective 
geographical areas such as regional economic commissions.  The CSOs that via their CS 
accreditation designate representatives to the regional UN offices likely are either 
headquartered in that region or have a large proportion of their programs specific to the 
region.  The latter reality was reflected in the survey findings as the only respondents 
reporting credentialed representatives at regional offices of the UN were headquartered in 
the same region---if not even the same country.   
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Table 4.6: Designation of UN Representatives by Location and Number of Grounds  
Passes/IDs Reported Obtained per Site  
 
UN Headquarters/ N of Respondents Designating  Mean N of Reps. Obtaining 
Regional Office Representatives for Site  ID/Grounds Pass for Site 
New York  42     5.0 
Geneva  26     2.5 
Vienna   9     1.9 
 Regional Offices 
Addis Ababa  1     1 
Bangkok  0     0 
Beirut   2     1 
Santiago  0     0 
 
 In attempting to assess commitment to and participation in the CS program, 
participants were asked what total number of UN representatives their organization will 
have obtained a UN grounds pass/ID (for all sites combined) in a typical year.  Among 
the 55 respondents answering the question, 4.2 was the mean total.  The latter was 
perhaps slightly higher than anticipated, but the range of responses to the survey item was 
considerable, with the majority of respondents indicating only 1 or 2 representatives 
typically obtained credentials annually, and a minority of respondents indicating numbers 
higher than the mean.     
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  Another survey item asked participants to indicate the UN site(s) at which they 
have ever participated in meetings, conferences or other functions since obtaining 
consultative status.  As expected and indicated in Table 4.7, the responses closely 
mirrored the data for accredited representatives by UN sites.  The majority of respondents 
(43 or 78.2% of responses) indicated participation at some form of event at the UN’s 
New York headquarters, followed by Geneva (28/50.9%) and Vienna (11/20.0%) 
respectively.  Only small numbers of respondents indicated ever having participated in 
any event at a UN regional site, with Santiago, Chile earning the smallest total (2/3.6%). 
 
Table 4.7: CS-Accredited CSO Participation in Functions per UN Site  
 
 
UN Headquarters/  N of Respondents Designating   
Regional Office  Representatives for Site (% of Responses) 
New York   43 (78.2%) 
Geneva   28 (50.9%) 
Vienna    11 (20.0%) 
 Regional Offices 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia 3 (5.5%) 
Bangkok, Thailand  4 (7.3%) 
Beirut, Lebanon  4 (7.3%) 
Santiago, Chile  2 (3.6%) 
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 Asked to assess the overall difficulty involved in the process of accrediting their 
UN representatives, respondents were asked to rate the level of difficulty on a number 
line with 10 indicating a very high level of difficulty and 0 indicating no difficulty.  As 
can be seen in Figure 4.13, the mean response among 57 answers was 4.9, which at face 
value would seem to indicate that the designation and credentialing of UN representatives 
does not pose a substantial challenge for most CS-accredited organizations.  However, 
among all responses, 20 or 35.1% were 7 or higher, regarded as a higher range score on 
the number line as constructed.  The exact same number of responses, 20 or 35.1% 
denoted a low score of 0-3.5.  In other words, for every organization which reported 
little-no difficulty with the process of designating/credentialing their organizational 
representatives to the UN, another organization reported high levels of difficulty.  The 
results of this survey item may serve as a good insight into barriers to participation.  For 
example, if more than one-third of CS program participants experience difficulty with 
what should be a relatively straight-forward process---a process explained in detail in 
both print and online literature made available to accredited CSOs---more complex 
undertakings such as conference participation and understanding the process of providing 
statements and engaging with coalitions/networks of other CSOs may prove daunting.     
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Figure 4.13: Level of CSO Difficulty in Accrediting UN Representatives within the CS 
Program  
 
 
 
 The final item in the accreditation/representation section asked respondents to 
select from forced-choice options in order to best characterize the nature of their 
organization’s UN representative(s).  The strategy of including this survey item was that 
it may lend insight into the nature and degree of CSO participation within the CS 
program.  Specifically, if very few board members or donors were designated as UN 
representatives, that may possibly indicate lack of support/enthusiasm from the latter 
segments for the CS program, potentially helping to explain low levels of organizational 
participation.   However, survey results indicated board members were commonly 
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appointed as CSO’s UN representatives with respondents indicating a total of 52 in the 
role, the 2
nd
 most common response.  The most common characterization of the nature of 
UN representatives was full-time employee, with 67 denoted in that role, with a tie for 
the 3
rd
 most common response between donors (indicating their appointment is not 
uncommon) and part-time employees, each with 29 representatives in the roles.  The 
forced-choice options for this item did perhaps shed some light on what was likely not a 
primary driver of lack of participation within the CS program as results showed board 
members and donors were often designated as UN representatives, implying support and 
interest in the program on their part.  However, forced-choice responses to this survey 
item did not identify issues related to designation of UN representatives that may impede 
participation.   
 Participants also had the option to indicate “other unpaid supporter” of their 
organization.  Interestingly, the latter received the highest number of responses to the 
survey item with 84 (32.2%) of 261 total responses.  This level of response for “other” 
had not been anticipated and consequently participants were not asked to specify the 
title/nature of other UN representatives.  However, some respondents did voluntarily 
denote the title or background with the most common responses including former 
employee (of various titles/responsibilities), former board member/chair, or the chair of 
various types of advisory committees within the organization such as a governmental 
affairs or public relations committee.   
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Survey Responses – Participation, Networking and Communication 
 The questionnaire items addressing participation and networking/communication 
(both forms of participation) are especially important to the contention of the third 
guiding hypothesis that most organizations within the CS program do not participate in 
the program in a meaningful way.  These questionnaire items are also of foundational 
importance to the second guiding hypothesis in that survey findings (e.g. absence of 
communication) may help in understanding some of the factors responsible for lack of 
participation on the part of many CS-accredited organizations and why some are more 
likely to participate than others.  While survey findings in general indicated somewhat 
low to moderate levels of activity, the totality of data derived from these sections of the 
questionnaire does not conclusively support the guiding hypothesis that most 
organizations in the CS program do not participate in any meaningful way or fail to make 
any substantive contribution within the UN-civil society dynamic.  The findings do 
however show minimal communication between most CSOs and the UN or secondary 
entities (other UN-affiliated CSOs, foreign governments, other IGOs) and also indicate 
that only a minority of respondents have ever hosted/organized a meeting or other event 
at a UN forum and only slightly more than half have ever participated with other CSOs in 
any UN-related network or coalition. 
 Participants were asked approximately how many UN-related conferences, 
meetings or workshops their CSO has attended in 3 different time periods: 2005-present, 
1995-2005, and pre-1995.  The results for the most recent time period are potentially the 
most useful as the majority of organizations holding CS have likely acquired the 
 177 
 
accreditation within the last decade, meaning most respondents likely did not have CS 
prior to 2005.  As can be seen in Table 4.8, 47 (75.8%) of 62 respondents reported their 
organization had participated in a UN-related function since 2005.  However the mean 
number of UN functions attended was skewed by 5 organizations which reported 
attending 100 or more functions---2 of these CSOs reported over 200.  If data from these 
5 organizations is omitted, the resulting mean number of UN functions attended drops to 
13.6, a figure that likely more closely reflects the reality of most CSOs that do participate 
in the CS program and a number that is more consistent and realistic in comparison with 
the mean numbers reported for earlier time periods.  The decline in number/mean of 
responses almost certainly reflects that fewer survey respondents had attained CS prior to 
2005 or 1995, rather than respondents becoming increasingly active over the time period, 
as upon examination of the 47 CSOs indicating activity at some point since 2005, most 
did not hold CS accreditation prior that that period.  Interestingly, the considerably 
smaller mean number of UN functions attended prior to 1995 would be consistent with 
the more limited number of formal outlets/forums for UN interaction with civil society 
that would have been available in the early 1990s and prior. 
  The second survey item related to participation, asked a short series of questions 
as to whether organizations had made written or verbal statements at a UN forum and in 
either case if they had been asked by the UN to do so.  Perhaps the most important 
contribution that CS organizations can make within the UN framework and the most 
significant form of expression available to them is to present written or verbal statements 
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related to their fields of expertise.  Further, being asked by a UN body to present a 
position statement on an issue implies a valuation of CSO input on the part of the UN and 
also conveys that the organizations within the CS program are viewed by the UN as 
relevant, competent and capable of making a worthwhile contribution to its body of work.  
Accordingly, gauging the number of written or verbal statements and the degree to which 
they were actually requested by the UN offers a meaningful glimpse into the nature and 
 
 
Table 4.8:  Participation in UN Conferences, Meetings and Workshops by  
Organizations Holding Consultative Status  
 
 
    N Respondents Mean N per  
Time Period   Not Listing 0  Respondent* 
2005-present   47   27.5* (19.4/13.6*) 
1995-2005   16   14.7 
Pre-1995   6   9.5  
 
* The mean number of UN functions attended per respondent for the period 2005-present 
is skewed by a small percentage of respondents who reported abnormally large numbers: 
5 CSOs reported 100 or more, with 2 of those reporting 200 or more.  If only data from 
the latter 2 organizations is omitted, the mean drops to 19.4 and is further reduced to 13.6 
if data from all 5 outliers is excluded.  Such statistical outliers were not present in data 
reported for the earlier time periods.  
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degree of participation of CS organizations---the core issue in the third guiding 
hypothesis.            
 A majority of respondents, 38 (61.2%), indicated that they had presented a written 
statement.  Of the latter, only 24 (38.7% of all survey respondents) had been asked by the 
UN to do so.  Less than half of all survey respondents, 25 (40.3%), indicated that they 
had made a verbal statement at a UN forum.  Only 18 respondents (29.0%) reported 
having been asked by the UN to present a verbal statement.  It is curious that only a small 
percentage of respondents indicated ever being asked by the UN to present written or 
verbal statements.  Critical interpretations of the latter could include a variety of possible 
conclusions including: (1) exponential growth of the CS program and the number of 
CSOs participating means that there are more organizations within the dynamic than can 
be effectively used/consulted as originally intended; (2) wide variations could exist in 
terms of the real/perceived credibility and competence of CS organizations with many 
CSOs not deemed by the UN to be as worthy of being solicited for input; (3) many of the 
CSOs awarded CS have such a narrow or obscure focus that there is little they can 
effectively contribute to the often broader issues with which the UN is concerned---which 
in turn raises the question of why such organizations were admitted to the CS program; 
(4) perhaps ECOSOC and other UN organs understand that many organizations in the CS 
program---especially smaller CSOs---either cannot (e.g., financially) or will not 
participate and thus does not bother with formal requests soliciting their participation.  It 
is worth noting that given the general wording of the survey item, respondents may have 
broadly interpreted the wording inquiring if they had “been asked” to provide position 
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statements to include general invitations sent out en masse to many organizations via 
conference announcements, which means the number of organizations that have 
specifically been approached by the UN to provide statements is potentially lower than 
the survey data suggests. 
 Asked if their organization had ever organized or hosted a meeting or other event 
at the UN, only 26 respondents (41.9%) of 62 to submit the survey questionnaire 
indicated in the affirmative.  Asked if their organization had ever participated in any way 
with any NGO network(s)/coalition(s) active within the UN framework, the response rate 
was only slightly better with 32 respondents (51.6%) indicating that they had done so in 
the past.  The latter survey item also asked respondents to provide the names of the 
network(s) or coalition(s) with which they had participated.  Table 4.9 provides a 
comprehensive list of all such groups identified by the 18 respondents providing 
feedback.  A total of 43 networks/coalitions were listed across a diverse range of 
policy/issue areas including human rights and social issues, democracy, development, 
and environmental issues.  While some of the networks/coalitions were temporary in 
nature, intended to serve a purpose for a specific conference or that otherwise only 
existed briefly, many are long-term in nature such as many of the standing UN groups for 
which multiple respondents indicated an affiliation (e.g. NGO Major Group). 
 One of the survey items designed to determine how CSOs perceive the UN-civil 
society dynamic asked participants to score on a number line the degree to which they 
felt that the UN values the participation of their organization, the results of which are 
provided in Figure 4.14.  Among 57 respondents in total, the mean score was a somewhat 
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mediocre 5.9, conveying that many of the CSOs do not feel valued to a great degree by 
the UN.  A large number of respondents did in fact feel that their participation was 
valued, as among the responses, 23 or 40.4% scored 7 or higher on the number line, 
indicating a high degree of valuation as perceived by the CSOs.  The largest number of 
Table 4.9:  UN Civil Society Networks/Coalitions Identified by CSOs as Groups  
with Which They Have Participated  
Arab Forum for Environment/Devt.   NGO Committee on Social Devt. 
Arab Network for Environment/Devt.  NGO Committee on CSW (3) 
CEDAW      NGO Major Group (2) 
Civil Society Network    The 3 Right-holder Group 
Climate Change Network – Nigeria   Trade Union Organizations 
Coalition for the Rights of the Child   UN DPI Office 
CONGO      UN Interagency Network (2) 
CONGO Committee on Child Rights   UN Women (2) 
CRIN       UNAC Coalition 
CSD Civil Society Forum    UNEP-TUNZA 
CSW-GO      UNESCWA Beirut Office 
ECE Forum – Geneva     UNFEM (2) 
Equality Now      UNPFA 
Equality without Reservation    VAWG   
Global Campaign-Equal Nationality   Water Event - Geneva 
Global Compact     Women in Conflict Environments 
Human Settlements/UN Habitat   Women Learning Partnership 
IANSA      Women’s NGOs 
Int’l Union for Conservation of Nature  World Mission Foundation 
KARAMA (End Violence…Arab Women)  World We Want PSG 
National Endowment for Democracy   WWSF - Geneva 
NGO COA 
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Figure 4.14: Degree to Which CS Organizations Feel the UN Values Their Participation  
 
 
 
 
 
responses, 24 or 42.1%, fell within the moderate range of a score of 3.5 to 6.5, with more 
respondents selecting a mid-range score of 5 than any other point on the number line.  A 
total of 10 respondents or 17.6% of all surveys submitted indicated a score of 3 or less, 4 
of which (7.0%) indicated a number line score of 1 or less.   
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 Using a number line to illicit responses, participants were asked to what degree 
their organization networked with other organizations in the CS program.  As noted in 
Figure 4.15, among 60 responses, the mean score was a somewhat tepid 5.5 on a number 
line scale of 10.  Nearly half of respondents (28 or 46.7%) indicated a score of 7 or 
higher, denoting a higher degree of networking with other CSOs.  However, the majority 
of responses fell within the moderate (13 or 21.7%) or low (19 or 31.7%) range, with 6 
respondents indicating a score of 0, denoting no networking-related interaction 
whatsoever.  
Figure 4.15: Degree to Which CSOs/NGOs Reported Networking with Other  
Organizations in the CS Program  
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 Several survey items sought to explore the nature and frequency of 
communication among organizations related to the CS program.  The goal of the later 
was that such questions would serve as a means of assessing the nature and levels of CSO 
participation and in general the findings showed minimal-no communication for most 
organizations.  The first such survey item asked participants if since obtaining 
consultative status have (1) other CSOs affiliated with the United Nations, (2) foreign 
governments, or (3) a UN agency/office initiated contact and if so, how many times in 
total.   
 The findings, as displayed in Table 4.10, indicate that only a minority of 
respondents had been directly contacted by any of the latter entities and in those cases, 
the frequency of contact has in general not been.  A total of 23 respondents indicated 
their organization had been directly contacted by either UN-affiliated CSOs or by a UN 
agency/office.  The mean number of contacts by other UN-affiliated CSOs was 61.7, but 
this number was skewed to a substantial degree by a single respondent claiming to have 
been contacted more than 1,000 times.  If the latter outlier is removed, the mean number 
of contacts reported from other UN-affiliated CSOs is 19.0, likely more representative of 
reality for those respondents reporting data for this survey item.  The mean number of 
times respondents reported being contacted by a UN agency/office was 17.3.  A more 
modest total of 14 respondents reported being contacted by foreign governments, a mean 
total of 20.1 times.       
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Table 4.10: Source and Frequency of Entities Contacting CS Accredited Organizations  
 
    N Respondents  Mean N Contacts per  
Source of Contact  Reporting Contact  Respondent* 
UN-affiliated NGOs  23    61.7* (19.0*) 
Foreign Governments  14    20.1 
UN Agency/Office  23    17.3  
* The mean number of times contacted by UN-affiliated NGOs is skewed by one 
respondent’s claim of having been contacted over 1,000 times.  If data derived from this 
single outlier is omitted, the mean drops to 19.0  
 
 In an effort to understand, the nature of communication that was occurring, 
respondents indicating that their organization had been directly contacted by one of the 
latter sources were asked to specify the purpose of the communication via forced-choice 
options: (1) general information sharing/introductions, (2) collaboration/sharing of 
research, (3) specific question about UN process, (4) specific question about the CSOs 
organizational scope/mission.  The most common responses were for general information 
sharing/introductions and collaboration/sharing of research which received 34 and 28 
responses, respectively.  Specific question about UN processes or the CSO itself each 
received a more modest 19 responses.  Participants also had the option of indicating 
“other” and were asked to briefly specify the nature/purpose of the communication.  A 
total of 7 respondents indicated “other” and those responses centered around the 
following topics: coalition issues, donations/fundraising, joint statements/events, and 
position papers. 
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 In an effort to gauge degree and patterns of participation with the UN, survey 
participants were asked to indicate which of 4 forms of communication (if any) they had 
used to pose a question/request to the UN and how many times they had used each 
medium: email, telephone, fax, writing.  Relatively small numbers of respondents 
indicated that they had communicated with the UN using any of the mediums.  Email was 
the most commonly used method of communicating with the UN, with 34 respondents 
(54.9% of those returning the survey) indicating its use for a mean of 7.1 times each.  
Given that most respondents appear to have held CS accreditation for a number of years, 
the frequency of email communication for most does not appear to be great and even 
poorer for other mediums.  Only 19 respondents (30.6%) reported having called the UN--
-a mean number of 5.4 times each.  15 respondents (24.2%) indicated having written to 
the UN---a mean number of 5.9 times each.  As expected, communication by fax machine 
was the least common medium with only 8 respondents (12.9) indicated they had done 
so---a mean of 4.9 times each.   
 This survey item also used number lines to ask participants to rate their level of 
satisfaction with the speed and substance of the communication experience with the UN 
for each of the 4 mediums with 10 denoting complete satisfaction and 0 complete lack of 
satisfaction, the results of which are presented in Figures 4.16-4.19.  Although a small 
percentage of respondents indicated low scores denoting dissatisfaction, the mean 
responses for each category were all mid-range and in each category there were more 
scores denoting high satisfaction levels than the opposite.  Mean scores were comparable 
across all categories with satisfaction levels reported highest for fax (6.5), email (6.4), 
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and writing (6.3) respectively, with telephone (5.6) the least satisfying medium for 
communicating with the UN reported by the CSOs.  Survey findings suggest that most 
CSOs do not perceive major communication problems to exist with the UN and 
accordingly, the latter issue is likely not a substantial barrier to participation with the CS 
program.   
 The range and distribution of responses to most survey items related to 
participation, networking and communication indicates that a small percentage of 
organizations in the CS program are very active, most organizations are minimally-
moderately active or active only occasionally, and a substantial minority do not appear to 
participate.  The latter observations may vary somewhat depending upon the measure 
being utilized.  For example, less than half of respondents had ever presented a verbal 
statement at a UN function and only around one-third had ever been asked to provide 
either a written or verbal statement.  Less than half of organizations submitting the survey 
reported ever having networked with other CS organizations and frequency of 
communication and meeting attendance related to the CS program overall appear to be 
minimal for most CSOs.  However, other indications exist denoting at least moderate 
levels of participation, such as the fact that more than half of CS organizations reported 
participating in a UN-related network/coalition or presented a written statement at some 
point (though both may be infrequent activities for most CSOs).  Also, despite evidence 
indicating a somewhat tepid degree of overall engagement, most CS organizations feel 
that the UN values their participation to a moderate-high degree.  
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Figure 4.16: Level of CSO Satisfaction with Email Communication with the UN 
 
 
Figure 4.17: Level of Satisfaction with Telephone Communication with the UN  
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Figure 4.18: Level of Satisfaction with Fax Communications with the UN 
 
Figure 4.19: Level of Satisfaction with Written Communication with the UN 
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Survey Responses – Barriers 
 The second guiding hypothesis contended that a variety of factors including 
financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding the process(es) 
through which organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC can participate, 
contribute to a disparity wherein some organizations participate in the CS program and 
others do not.   Accordingly a portion of the survey questionnaire was devoted to 
identifying barriers and the degree to which they may be impeding some CSOs within the 
program from participating.  Participants were asked to use number lines to rate each of 9 
considerations as barriers to their participation within UN programs, with a score of 10 
denoting a substantial barrier, and 0 denoting no barrier.  The responses and distributions 
of the latter for each individual item are presented in Figures 4.20 through 4.28. 
 Only 4 of the 9 items yielded mean scores higher the midpoint of 5, denoting 
more respondents than not viewed the items as barriers to participation.  Financial 
commitment/expense earned the highest mean response of 6.8.  The distribution of 
responses for the item was also telling in that 36 (61.0%) of 59 respondents scored the 
item within the high range of 7-10, indicating that the clear majority found financial 
expenses to be a substantial impediment to participating in the CS program.  The second 
highest mean score of 5.9 was for geographical proximity/distance of UN functions.  
Again, the distribution of responses placed the majority, 31 (53.4%) of 58 respondents, 
within the high range indicating this consideration is a barrier for most CSOs, and given 
travel costs, this consideration is likely inexorably linked with financial commitment as 
an obstacle.  The other two items having yielded mean scores above midpoint were 
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time/personnel commitment and understanding UN processes (clarity of opportunities to 
participate) which earned 5.6 and 5.4 respectively.  With both of the latter survey items 
the distribution of responses was somewhat more even and although the largest number 
of responses fell within the high range of 7-10 for both items---25 (41.7%) of 60 
responses for understanding UN processes and 25 (43.1%) of 58 responses for 
time/personnel commitment---responses indicate that most organizations providing 
feedback do not regard either consideration as a substantial barrier. 
   Mean scores for the remaining 5 items related to barriers were comparable and 
all within the lower end of the moderate range along the number line.  The lowest mean 
score of 4.0 was for UN restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal policy 
statements. A brief overview of restrictions as related to the CS accreditation levels of 
CSOs is provided in Chapter 2 on page 46.  In short, organizations accredited with 
General Status within the CS program have the least restrictions and most flexibility in 
formally presenting positions to UN bodies, followed by those with Special Status which 
have additional restrictions, and lastly those with Roster Status which have the most 
restrictions.  Responses to this survey item appeared to largely reflect the accreditation 
level of respondents.  Among the surveys examined with regard to this item, those 
submitted by Roster Status organizations tended to score the item as being more of a 
barrier, whereas surveys submitted by organizations accredited with General Status 
universally indicated little-no concern with this item as a barrier to participation.  Among 
the 56 respondents providing feedback for this number line item, 25 (44.6%) scored 
within the low range of 0-3, 17 (30.4%) fell within the moderate range, and the smallest 
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number of 14 (25%)---though a sizeable minority---scored within the high range 
indicating a perception of the issue as a substantial barrier to participation.  It is likely 
that had (1) CSOs with General Status not been overrepresented and (2) those with Roster 
Status not been underrepresented in the numbers of surveys returned, the results for this 
survey item would have been slanted at least somewhat more toward the issue being a 
barrier to participation. 
 Conference registration and designation/credentialing of UN representatives tied 
with a mean number line score of 4.1.  Nearly half of all respondents in both categories 
also scored in the low range of 0-3 (no-minimal barrier posed) on the number line with 
most of the remainder scoring both items in the moderate/mid-range.  While minorities of 
respondents (24.6% and 24.1% respectively) did provide high scores indicating the areas 
as barriers, the clear majority of respondents did not see either consideration as an 
obstacle.  The results of these survey items are not surprising as considerable effort has 
been made by the UN in recent years to simplify and streamline both processes---e.g. 
clarifying print and web-based guidelines and transitioning both to fully online processes.  
However, it is clear from the survey responses that a substantial minority of CS 
organizations still find the processes confusing and/or difficult. 
 The survey item quadrennial reports had a mean score of 4.2.  As explained on 
page 196, the completion and submission of quadrennial reports is at present a fairly 
simple, streamlined, fully online process that should require minimal time commitment 
and pose minimal difficulty for most CS organizations to complete.  Interestingly 
however, 9 (18.0%) of 50 respondents scored the item within the high range of 7 or above 
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indicating they perceive it as a notable barrier, and 4 (8%) respondents scored the item at 
10.  While respondents were not given an opportunity to elaborate on their reasoning it is 
possible that the infrequent nature of the report, perhaps combined with typically high 
turnover of staff at many CSOs may combine to confuse organizations, straining their 
institutional memories as to the procedure of completing such tasks only once every few 
years.  Adding to the confusion, the UN periodically changes paperwork requirements, 
shifting submission of quadrennial reports from paper submission to an exclusively web-
based process a few years ago for example.  
 The final number line item in the barriers section of the survey, support of 
organization’s board and/or donors, had a mean score of 4.3.  No preconceived notion 
existed as to what the results may ultimately be for this item, but it was hoped that some 
visible pattern may emerge to help understand why some CS organizations do not appear 
to participate within the program.  For example, if a substantial proportion of respondents 
scored the issue within the high range as a barrier, it would be obvious that lack of donor 
or board support was a key driver in minimal-no participation.  However, the latter was 
not the case.  Only 14 (25%) of 56 respondents scored the item at 7 or higher, an 
indication that a sizable minority of CS organizations are potentially experiencing 
obstacles related to boards/donors, but not most.  25 (44.6%) respondents scored the item 
3 or less, with 8 (14.3%) scoring it as 0 and 17 (30.4%) assigned a mid-range score 
indicating only moderate barriers posed.   
 In examining the returned questionnaires it appears that a disproportionate 
number of organizations indicating board/donor support as barriers to participation in the 
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CS program also indicated no-minimal activity in many respects.  Most such 
organizations appear to have fewer accredited UN representatives, have participated in 
fewer UN conferences/forums and networking venues, and are less likely to have 
presented a verbal or written statement at a UN function than CSOs reporting no barriers 
posed by board members or donors.  Several possibilities exist in terms of the minority of 
CSOs that lack board or donor support for participation in the CS program and the 
correlation with the latter findings.  For example, upon initially seeking CS affiliation the 
time/cost of active participation in the program may not have been readily apparent to 
many CSOs’ boards/donors and upon matriculating into the program, as such 
commitments became more obvious, support could have eroded with a commensurate 
perception that funding and staff time could be better directed elsewhere.  Political 
considerations such as opposition to globalization or the UN in general may also serve to 
taint the perspective of some donors and board members, preventing or diminishing their 
support for the affiliation.   
 The survey questionnaire also provided participants an opportunity to indicate 
“other” as a barrier to participation and asked them to specify those additional 
considerations not addressed via other number line options.  Only 3 respondents provided 
such feedback, potentially indicating that barriers and potential barriers to participation 
had been surmised adequately in the options provided in the questionnaire.  Responses 
included: “general (UN) bureaucracy”; “information about the community of NGOs with 
consultative status and access to the organizations is difficult”, and “completing all 
documentation online and writing reports is difficult”.  Neither the first nor second 
 195 
 
response was surprising, as the UN is frequently perceived as a bureaucratic morass and 
in particular it can be difficult to obtain detailed information including specific contact 
information for CS organizations, even when consulting the iCSO database---which often 
has missing or incomplete information.  The third response concerning difficulty in 
completing/submitting documentation is somewhat harder to understand given the 
minimal paperwork requirements, detailed instructions provided and normally fully-
online processes (and this comment was made by a CSO in a MDC/developed region) 
associated with the CS program.   
 Separate from the multi-part survey items which sought to asses barriers to 
participation or benefits derived from CS accreditation, organizations were asked to use a 
number line in addressing one of the single-most important questions posed by the 
survey: to what degree is the cost and effort of obtaining and maintaining UN 
consultative status justified by the benefits derived by your organization?  In a sense, the 
question gauges satisfaction levels of respondents based upon their experiences with the 
CS program (which in turn potentially sheds light on CSO participation/contributions), 
with a number line score of 10 indicating highly justified and 0 indicating not justified at 
all.  The key underlying implication is that if affiliated CSOs do not feel that the time, 
effort or financial commitment is justifiable relative to any real or perceived benefit 
derived, then it is understandable that the participation level of such organizations would 
be minimal.    
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Figure 4.20: Barriers: Understanding UN Processes (Clarity of Opportunities to  
Participate) 
 
Figure 4.21: Barriers: Conference Registration  
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Figure 4.22: Barriers: Designation/Credentialing of UN Representatives 
 
Figure 4.23: Barriers: Financial Commitment/Expenses  
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Figure 4.24: Barriers: Time/Personnel Commitment 
 
Figure 4.25: Barriers: Quadrennial Report  
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Figure 4.26: Barriers: Geographical Proximity/Distance of UN Functions  
 
 
Figure 4.27: Barriers: Support of Organization’s Board and/or Donors  
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Figure 4.28: Barriers: UN Restrictions Concerning Presentation of Written/Verbal  
Position Statements  
 
 Among the 55 respondents addressing the survey item, the response was largely 
favorable, as by a nearly 4 to 1 margin, more respondents indicated high levels of 
justification relative to benefits derived by their organization.  As seen in Figure 4.29 the 
mean number line score was 6.7.  Over half of respondents, 31 or 56.4%, scored the item 
7 or higher, with 16 or 29.1% indicating only moderate (or possibly---partial) levels of 
justification with mid-range scores of between 3.5 to 6.5 on the number line.  However, a 
small minority of respondents, 8 or 14.5%, conveyed that in their experiences the effort 
and cost of involvement with the CS program was largely not justified by any benefits 
derived.  As an alternative means of viewing patterns of responses, if the score 
distribution is analyzed via midpoint, 16 respondents or 29.1% of the total---a more 
substantial minority, indicated a score of 5 or less denoting marginal-no justification for 
involvement in the CS program. 
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Figure 4.29: Degree to Which Cost and Effort Associated with Consultative Status  
is Justified by Benefits Derived by Organizations  
 
 
  
 
How Could the UN Improve Experience for Consultative Status Organizations? 
 One of the last items included in the survey questionnaire was the third of three 
open-ended discussion questions which asked participants to comment on how the UN 
could improve the overall experience for organizations in the ECOSOC consultative 
status program.  Of 62 questionnaires returned, 49 (79.0%) respondents provided 
feedback for this item.  The entirety of the respondents’ diverse and often insightful 
comments and suggestions can be correlated to ten different issue areas---among which 
some overlap exists: access, bureaucracy, communication, elitism/fairness, expertise, 
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funding, general guides/training, meetings, networking and capacity building, or issues 
specific to the CSOs policy/focus area. 
 Of the latter topics, issues related to meetings and other UN forums were 
mentioned most frequently with 14 respondents or 28.6% of those commenting on the 
survey item offering feedback.  The majority of the comments complained about the lack 
of geographical diversity in scheduled UN meetings/conferences and suggested that 
either key events should be rotated among world regions or that smaller, secondary 
functions should be held in multiple world regions or even among CS organizations 
within the same country in order to permit broader participation.  Many comments also 
suggested more functions specific in scope to policy/issue areas as a catalyst for 
increased opportunities to participate.  Respondents also commented as to the need for 
more advance notice of functions, easier registration processes, more briefing of and 
interaction between CSOs leading up to meetings, more time allotted for verbal 
presentations, and the difficulty some CS organizations (principally those in the global 
south with more limited internet infrastructure) experience with connecting to UN 
webinars online. 
 Suggestions related to the need for assistance with funding for attending UN 
functions were the second-most frequently cited issue.  A total of 12 respondents, 
principally from LDC/developing areas, noted financial difficulties as an obstacle to their 
participation in UN forums.  Most suggested that the UN should prioritize at least partial 
subsidies for travel expenses for CS organizations attending sanctioned events.  Several 
noted that if funding directly from the UN was not available that efforts could be 
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undertaken to help CSOs with limited financial means identify and network with 
corporate sponsors or other donors in order that smaller grassroots organizations and 
those from less affluent countries might be better empowered to participate in the UN-
civil society dynamic. 
  Just behind money-related challenges, respondents also commonly called for 
improvements in disseminating general guidelines/information or training CS 
organizations so that they could better understand UN processes and how to participate.  
A number of respondents suggested that better, clearer, more detailed, more user-
friendly, and regularly updated print or online guidelines are needed, with several 
specifically noting that such information should include information related to 
expectations and best practices in order to better facilitate involvement from 
organizations accredited within the CS program.  Multiple respondents suggested that 
more structured, formalized guidance is needed, especially for CSOs new to the CS 
program---as the latter experience a steep learning curve, in order that they understand 
how to contribute/function.  Establishment of a UN-ECOSOC training department/staff 
specific to the CS program or pairing newly accredited CS organizations with veteran 
CSOs within the program in an informal mentorship were mentioned as possible 
pathways to improve the participation levels within the CS program.    
 Many suggestions were also offered related to improving communication in 
various respects.  Several respondents expressed desire for the UN to be more proactive 
in communicating opportunities for CSOs to contribute.  Various specific means of 
achieving the latter were suggested including the use of regular newsletters, regular 
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updates of online documentation/information, and the use of comprehensive and detailed 
calendars of upcoming UN forums---calendars which could also potentially be organized 
to show opportunities to participate by geographical region or policy/issue areas.  Some 
respondents also stressed the need for better administrative contact information for UN 
offices/bodies to be provided including the possibility of point of contact information for 
each scheduled conference or other specific event open to CS organizations.  One 
respondent noted that “obtaining answers to even basic questions remains a challenge 
beyond the ability of the current system.”   
 Issues related to access received feedback from multiple survey respondents, with 
the most common criticism relating to inability to present verbal or written statements to 
key organs such as the General Assembly or otherwise meet with the UN delegations of 
member states.  One respondent noted that “rarely do government delegates hear NGOs’ 
verbal statements---only other NGOs”, with another adding that “without access to or 
communication with member states the input of NGOs is of limited effectiveness.”  This 
appears to be a somewhat common concern on the part of many organizations in the CS 
program which may have at least initially seen their roles as potentially having impact 
upon international policy and/or that of member states.  Calls for improved access did not 
exclusively center upon increasing access to UN organs and state delegations as multiple 
respondents also noted that the original Major Groups (organizations/coalitions among 
CSOs in the CS program) no longer incorporate new organizations and that it can be very 
difficult for many CSOs outside the geographical areas of UN forums to participate---an 
issue which could be at least partly addressed via increased use of video-teleconferencing 
 205 
 
and also more advance notice of meetings/events.  While issues/recommendations related 
to access were not the most frequently cited, many of the comments/suggestions received 
were among the most fervent and impassioned received via the survey including the 
observations of one respondent bemoaning inadequate access who states that “when 
CSOs are at the UN we are merely tolerated, not really listened to.”  Likewise, another 
organization indicated that “CSOs and UN-civil society initiatives are referenced more 
and more in UN literature, but in practice (CSOs) have less and less voice.”  
 Suggestions related to how the UN bureaucracy might be improved to benefit the 
CS program were offered by many respondents.  The majority of such comments 
centered around certain processes/requirements being needlessly long and/or inordinately 
time consuming.  Several respondents mentioned reports in general, the procedural steps 
involved in designating UN representatives and in obtaining grounds passes for them, and 
multiple respondents specifically mentioned the need to improve the lengthy and time-
consuming process of processing NGO name changes within the UN bureaucracy.  
Bureaucratic and procedural norms related to conferences may also be a source of 
challenges for some CSOs, as one noted that “when making verbal statements you never 
know when you might be called so you must be ready all day and not even leave to take a 
break.”  Two respondents, both from developing nations, also noted the difficulty 
involved in obtaining visas for countries in which UN events were located.  While the 
latter issue falls outside the purview and control of the UN, the range and frequency of 
comments related to institutional bureaucracy, clearly indicates opportunities for 
improvement exist. 
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 Issues related to networking, advocacy and other forms of capacity building also 
received suggestions for improvement from multiple respondents.  Several comments 
highlighted the need for an organized community management effort within the UN 
wherein spaces could be provided for more interaction among NGOs which might 
perhaps involve establishing more forums (if even electronic/online venues)---especially 
as side venues at key conferences---so that organizations in the CS program might better 
communicate.  One such suggestion noted that to date, most networking or coalition 
efforts were solely driven by the NGOs themselves within most UN venues and that the 
UN should assume a more proactive role in facilitating such interactions.  Specifically, it 
was suggested that the UN could assist in putting NGOs in same/similar fields in contact 
with each other, and even further, organizations could be paired with others in the CS 
program to assist in completion of tasks such as carrying out research or implementing 
initiatives on behalf of the UN in the field.  Essentially, many respondents saw need and 
opportunity for the UN to facilitate capacity-building programs to boost NGO 
performance and participation. 
 A smaller number of comments related to suggestions for improvement within the 
CS program were related to issues of fairness and elitism.  More broadly, several 
suggestions supported incorporating NGOs in agenda setting within the UN and its 
various bodies so as to make the organization more egalitarian and less state-centric.  
Multiple respondents also felt strongly that certain types of organizations tended to be 
“left behind” and not included equitably even within the parameters of just the CS 
program.  For example, multiple comments touched upon the possibility of elitism in that 
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greater participation is needed from the global south and also from smaller grassroots 
organizations which may struggle to compete with well-funded multinational 
organizations for an effective voice within the UN or otherwise.  While respondents 
offered no concrete solutions to such obstacles it is clear that many CS organizations 
view the disparate power structure within the CS program as a continuing impediment. 
 Some respondents also offered suggestions related to CSO expertise and how it is 
shared within the CS program.  Much of the commentary essentially conveyed that many 
CSOs feel under-utilized as a source of expertise in their policy focus areas.  One 
respondent suggested that expertise categories should be more clearly defined and in turn 
NGOs in each area should be consulted as need arises by the UN and other entities.  
NGOs could also be associated formally with specific UN offices/bodies related to their 
scope of mission which could better utilize their expertise as a knowledge resource.  It 
was also suggested that a greater focus could be placed upon consultative work or that the 
UN could involve CS organizations with field research or other projects which could 
provide mutual benefit and also contribute to capacity building.   
 Lastly, some suggestions focused upon issues that were specific to the 
policy/issues area(s) of the respondent’s organization.  For example, a trade union 
participating in the CS program suggested that the UN should recognize the role/mandate 
of worker’s unions within the broader community of NGOs.  An NGO focused upon drug 
policies noted that efforts to support NGO participation in drug policy must be 
maintained and expanded to include state members/delegations.  An organization 
specializing in the role of families stressed that the UN and its bodies must consider the 
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significance of and impacts upon families in its deliberations.  One respondent noted that 
without regard to policy/issue area, many CS organizations are research-oriented and as 
such could prove useful to the UN in both providing objective input and in analysis. 
 
Overview of Survey Results 
 Indications exist that the 439 organizations in the CS program randomly chosen to 
receive the survey questionnaire were a viable representative sample.  As noted in Table 
4.2 the regional distribution of participants randomly selected closely paralleled the 
regional distributions of all organizations in the CS program.  Also, the accreditation 
levels of organizations randomly selected closely mirrored the distribution of 
accreditation levels of all organizations in the program, as depicted in Table 4.1.  
However, with regard to the latter, among CSOs actually returning the survey, 
organizations holding General status were somewhat overrepresented and those with 
Roster status underrepresented in what may have been self-selection by more active 
organizations and self-deselection by those that are less active or inactive.  Though the 
surveys are believed to be a representative sample, due primarily to a modest response 
rate of just over 14%, no claim is made that the results are generalizable to all CSOs in 
the CS program or otherwise in association with the UN. 
 Many of the survey items yielded results that had been expected.  For example, in 
assessing motivations for seeking CS accreditation I assumed enhanced prestige/visibility 
for the organization, networking with other CSOs or the UN, and contributing 
written/verbal statements on issues were primary motives and this was confirmed via the 
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responses.  I had also expected the UN headquarters in New York to be the focal point of 
accreditation of representatives and attendance of conferences, followed in distant second 
place by Geneva with minimal-no participation at other UN sites and this precise pattern 
was revealed by survey data.  My initial impression was that substantive communication 
was not occurring between organizations within the CS program and the UN, foreign 
governments, or with other CS accredited CSOs and this was largely (though not 
uniformly) evidenced in the survey results. 
 Other survey outcomes were unexpected.  Respondents’ perceptions of UN 
valuation of their contributions via the CS program were substantially higher than I had 
anticipated.  Organizations reported participating in NGO networks/coalitions and having 
presented written statements to greater degrees than expected.  More respondents 
indicated that their participation in the CS program was justified by benefits derived than 
I had anticipated.  Among the comments offered in response to the open-ended, 
subjective items, the degree to which many organizations expected tangible benefits---
especially access to UN or other international funding---was somewhat surprising as were 
the multiple references to difficulty in obtaining travel visas as a barrier to participation, 
an obstacle I had not previously considered.  Broadly, although levels of participation 
within the CS program could be fairly described as anemic for many, possibly most, 
CSOs/NGOs, survey results in general indicated somewhat higher levels of activity than I 
had initially anticipated. 
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Findings Relative to Research Questions and Guiding Hypotheses 
Research Question 
1c. What types and degrees of participation exist among NGOs which hold consultative 
status with the United Nations Economic and Social Council? 
 This question was partially addressed (or at least inferred) via the analysis of the 
iCSO database as discussed in Chapter 3.  As indicated in Table 3.2, a diverse range of 
organizational types and topical/policy areas are represented among NGOs in the CS 
program with indigenous organizations, associations, academic entities, foundations, and 
disability organizations among the most common represented.  Table 3.6 provides an 
overview of the fields of activity and expertise of NGOs within the CS program, the 
majority of which were related to the following areas: economic and social, gender 
issues/women, sustainable development, social development, or population issues.  As 
illustrated in Table 3.15, less than one-half (49.9%) of NGOs in the CS program are 
classified as international in their scope of operations, with the remainder being national 
(24.1%), local (18.5%) or regional (7.5%) in scope.  Analysis of the database also 
confirmed that ECOSOC is by an overwhelming degree the principle vehicle for formal 
NGO interaction with the UN, for although a range of accreditation options exist with 
other UN organs including DPI or CSD, as can be seen in Table 3.21---ECOSOC’s 
consultative status program for NGOs dwarfs all other UN-civil society partnerships in 
terms of the number of organizations involved.    
 Analysis of the survey questionnaire results revealed additional details concerning 
the type and degree of participation of NGOs in the CS program.  The majority (75.4%) 
 211 
 
of respondents indicated they had communicated with the UN since admission to the CS 
program though the survey results cannot speak to the frequency and substance of the 
communication.  The majority of respondents indicated the successful appointment of 
one or more UN representative(s), and attendance at a minimum of 1 UN 
conference/meeting, though both tend to be confined to either the UN’s New York or 
Geneva headquarters and the frequency of credentialing representatives and attending UN 
functions appears to be modest for the majority of CS organizations.  While most 
respondents (61.2%) reported having presented a written statement at the UN, the 
frequency of the latter could not be judged and only a minority of respondents reported 
ever having presented a verbal statement (40.3%) or having been asked by the UN to 
present a written (38.7%) or verbal (29.0%) statement.  Only slightly more than half 
(51.6%) of respondents indicated their organization had ever participated in any NGO 
network/coalition at the UN and less than half (41.9%) reported their organization ever 
having organized/hosted a meeting or other event at a UN forum.   
 While the study did not provide a complete picture, the information it did yield 
seems to indicate that a small minority of organizations in the CS program are involved 
to a substantial degree and regularly participate in some way, a (perhaps larger) minority 
of organizations are mostly to entirely disengaged---either never having participated in 
the first place or withdrawing from active participation at some point, and a majority of 
organizations are involved to a minimal-to-moderate degree or only sporadically 
participate throughout the time they have held CS status.  A range of possibilities exist in 
potentially explaining the latter pattern: (1) some organizations were primarily concerned 
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with prestige/credibility derived from an official association/accreditation with the UN 
(as some survey data suggests) and never intended to make meaningful contributions; (2) 
some organizations may have initially had the intention to participate but were unable to 
realize any intrinsic benefit to their organization from the affiliation and consequently 
either minimized or ceased their efforts to participate; (3) some may have had largely or 
entirely extrinsic motives and at least initially sought to contribute expertise/perspective 
rather than derive benefits, but a range of barriers such as financial or logistical hurdles as 
identified in the survey findings impeded their ability to do so; (5) those organizations 
that are larger, possess more resources financially and otherwise and that are truly 
international in their scope of operations, are much better positioned to participate in 
ECOSOC-CS or similar initiatives, than smaller organizations with less resources.  
 
Research Question 
2. Why do some NGOs in consultative status utilize the status to participate in UN 
functions but others do not? 
Guiding Hypothesis 
2. A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of 
understanding of the process through which NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC 
can participate make some NGOs more active than others. 
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 In the early conceptualization stage of this research it was obvious that substantial 
variations existed in terms of NGO participation levels within the CS program.  Multiple 
NGOs with which I was personally familiar had either lost their CS accreditation through 
inactivity or were barely retaining the status via an occasional modicum of effort.  
However, simultaneously it was clear that other organizations were active and successful 
participants within the program.  Prior to undertaking the research, I suspected that a 
range of certain considerations in combination facilitated participation on the part of 
some organizations and impeded it in others.  Not all considerations would impact every 
NGO within the program in the same way or to the same degree, but my initial thoughts 
as to possible impediments gave rise to the 9 number-line items and certain other survey 
questions designed to gauge barriers to participation.  Given the reluctance of the UN to 
directly address such issues (and potentially admit that its primary outreach effort to 
international civil society may not be as vibrant as portrayed) and the scarcity of literature 
and any previous studies directly addressing the phenomenon of lack of participation 
within the CS program, not until the survey data was obtained and analyzed could the 
impact of such factors be confirmed and at least partly understood. 
 The most important survey instrument for assessing impediments to participation 
was the section in which participants used number lines to assess each of the 9 specified 
factors as barriers.  In analyzing mean scores, it was very clear that each of the factors 
were barriers to at least some organizations, but they varied by degree of importance.  
Financial commitment/resources was the most commonly identified impediment to 
participation, closely followed in importance geographical proximity/distance of UN 
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functions, time/personnel commitment, and understanding UN processes (clarity of 
opportunities to participate, all of which yielded mean scores above the midpoint of the 
number line.  Fewer respondents identified lack of board/donor support, the quadrennial 
report, designation/credentialing of representatives, conference registration or UN 
restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal statements as substantial 
impediments but each of the latter were identified as barriers by a minority of 
organizations.  Given the option of specifying other barriers, respondents also cited the 
UN bureaucracy, completion/submission of reports and other documents, and lack of 
access to information about other NGOs in the CS program as substantial impediments. 
 Other survey items were also incorporated to assess barriers to participation.  
Asked to denote on a number line the degree to which their organization’s CS 
accreditation level impedes participation, over 41% of respondents indicated a score at 
the midpoint or higher on the number line indicating a moderate to high degree of 
difficulty posed.  Participants were similarly asked to assess the difficulty of designating 
and accrediting their organization’s UN representatives, with over 59% denoting a score 
at the midpoint or higher indicating most organizations saw the process as posing 
moderate to high degrees of difficulty.  Survey items addressing communication levels 
demonstrated moderate to minimal contact between most NGOs and the UN with a 
minority of NGOs conveying dissatisfaction with the speed/substance of the 
communication with the UN.  Only a minority of respondents reported ever having been 
asked by the UN to present a verbal or written statement and a substantial minority 
conveyed that they feel the UN does not value the participation of their organization 
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within the CS program.  The final survey item contained in the questionnaire asked 
respondents to use a number line to assess the degree to which the cost and effort of 
obtaining and maintaining CS is justified by the benefits derived, wherein a sizeable 
minority of over 29% provided a number line score ranging from 0, denoting not justified 
at all) to a midline score of 5, denoting only somewhat justified. 
 Responses to subjective, open-ended survey items mirrored the findings of the 
fixed-choice questions.  A wide range of factors were cited in response to why the 
organization sought CS accreditation, why organizational goals within the CS program 
had or had not been achieved and how could the UN improve the experience in the CS 
program.  Among the more common impediments to participation cited by respondents 
were financial considerations and difficulties related to understanding and managing the 
UN bureaucracy, both of which were referenced in the second guiding hypothesis.  Other 
commonly cited barriers included logistical and other difficulties related to attending 
meetings, difficulties in communicating and networking with other CSOs, lack of access 
or ability to share expertise, fairness issues such as limitations on CSOs in the global 
south, and general lack of clarity regarding mission or how to contribute within the 
dynamic---the latter also being cited as an example of a possible barrier in the second 
guiding hypothesis.  Interestingly, it seemed that CSOs with narrow goals that were 
specific to their policy/issue area and that were more intrinsic in nature were more likely 
to report those goals having been achieved within the CS program than counterparts 
which had formulated broader and more extrinsic goals---e.g. seeking to contribute to the 
work of the UN rather than derive funding or other benefits.  Organizations within the CS 
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program also seemed more likely to participate and report successful experiences if they 
were larger with more employees and better funding.  The CS accreditation level of 
organizations also appeared to factor into their participation level and experiences with 
those holding General status (somewhat over-represented among survey respondents) 
being on average more likely to participate and cite fewer barriers to participation, while 
those holding Roster status (under-represented among survey respondents), appearing 
less likely to participate and more likely to cite certain issues as barriers, such as ability 
to provide input.  The content of the survey feedback appears to clearly confirm the 
second guiding hypothesis in that: A variety of factors including financial ability, clarity 
of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through which NGOs in 
consultative status with ECOSOC can participate make some NGOs more active than 
others. 
  
 
Research Question 
3. How many NGOs holding consultative status fail to participate in any meaningful way 
in ECOSOC functions? 
Guiding Hypothesis 
3. Given such constraints, most NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not 
participate in any meaningful way in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive 
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contribution (providing input at conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN 
goal of engaging with pluralist international civil society.  
 The 3rd research question may prove difficult to definitively answer in an 
objective fashion short of the UN tracking and releasing such data.  Based upon my own 
experiences and anecdotal information, it appears that a large percentage of NGOs lose 
their consultative status within a few years of obtaining the status (submitting examples 
of participation is a requirement of the mandatory quadrennial report) via inactivity.  
However, statistics related to such attrition do not appear to be made publically available 
by UN-ECOSOC which touts the CS program as the pinnacle achievement in the 
international governance-civil society dynamic.  External research and tracking of such 
attrition would prove extraordinarily tedious in that currently nearly 5,000 organizations 
are in the CS program and would also require long-term effort as a 1-year grace period is 
offered for quadrennial report submission and it is possible to stave off ejection from the 
CS program for at least 1 cycle via citing justification of non-participation---meaning 
some CSOs might be inactive for 5 or even 10 years prior to losing their accreditation.  
 The manner in which the third research question and third guiding hypothesis are 
framed may also pose difficulties in that appraising what does or does not constitute 
“meaningful” participation is likely subject to a wide range of interpretation.  For 
example, does the designation/credentialing of UN representatives, timely submission of 
quadrennial reports and informal communication with other CSOs within the CS program 
constitute “meaningful” participation or should a requirement for formal involvement 
such as attendance at a UN venue be the standard?  Does attending 1 UN 
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conference/event per quadrennial report cycle (4 years) constitute “meaningful” 
participation or should the standard be attendance at one event per calendar year?  Is 
mere attendance at a UN conference/event sufficient for attaining “meaningful” 
participation or should an expectation exist that a verbal or written statement be presented 
or some other substantive contribution be made beyond merely a periodic physical 
presence at a UN venue?  In retrospect, this research could have established specific 
parameters as to the minimum criteria for “meaningful” participation---e.g. “once per 
calendar year, the organization either officially attends a UN conference/event or 
otherwise makes a substantive contribution via submission of a written statement, 
submission of research/data, formal collaboration in the field, etc.”  However, even with 
benefit of such a demarcation, debate could ensue as to the standard established for 
“meaningful”. 
 Perhaps of greater importance is the reference in the third guiding hypothesis to 
“most” organizations in the CS program not participating.  To a large degree, the survey 
findings were mixed in this regard.  Most survey respondents did not indicate that they 
had credentialed representatives or participated at UN functions in Geneva, Vienna or 
any of the regional offices of the UN, though most had done both relative to the primary 
UN headquarters in New York.  Most respondents indicated they had not ever presented a 
verbal statement or been asked by the UN to present a verbal or written statement, but 
most did indicate that they had presented a written statement (with many apparently 
doing so of their own accord without invitation) at some point.  Less than half reported 
ever having organized/hosted a meeting or other event at a UN forum, but slightly more 
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than half reported that their organization had participated in an NGO network/coalition at 
some point during their tenure in the CS program.  Most noted that they had never been 
contacted by UN-affiliated NGOs, foreign governments, or a UN body, but most 
indicated having contacted the UN at some point via email or telephone (though not fax 
or writing) with questions at some point.  While many organizations within the CS 
program do not appear to be active, and most respondents may not have engaged in any 
one of several specific types of activities, the contention of the third guiding hypothesis 
as worded---that most organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not 
participate in any meaningful way or make any substantive contribution---is not 
supported by the survey findings and is therefore not supported. 
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V. CHAPTER FIVE:  
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
 
Introduction 
 A diverse range of civil society organizations has increasingly been involved with 
the United Nations (UN).  This includes record numbers of civil society organizations 
(CSOs) and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which hold formal consultative 
status with the UN Economic and Social Council (ECOSOC), the main organ for UN 
interaction with international civil society.  A primary goal of the UN has been to 
cultivate a more effective, diverse and democratic institutional culture via the active 
inclusion of and interaction among international organizations and civil society to 
augment the traditional role of states as the primary transnational actors within the 
organization.  This study identified patterns of participation and effectiveness of civil 
society organizations within the UN, with a particular focus on participation within 
ECOSOC.   
 This study is significant for three reasons.  Firstly, the UN practice of cultivating 
formal association with reputable international civil society organizations has expanded 
markedly in recent years and has been described as the most dynamic area of growth and 
change within the UN framework (Alger 2002).  In 1946 when the practice was initiated, 
only 41 CSOs/NGOs held formal consultative status with the UN, but currently the status 
is afforded to nearly 5,000 organizations of various types, representing a wide range of 
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issues across the globe (United Nations 2016, 2).  However, it has been largely unclear 
what patterns of participation exist among the diverse range of CSOs/NGOs which have 
formal status with the UN.  Analysis of geographical, topical and other patterns of 
participation among NGOs is important in cultivating a general understanding of the 
inter-organizational dynamic.  Importantly, most previous attempts to study such issues 
have focused upon one or very limited numbers of CSOs/NGOs or have been specific to 
a particular issue area such as human rights or development rather than seeking to 
understand overall patterns of civil society participation within an IGO (Tallberg et al 
2013). 
 Secondly, the number of CSOs/NGOs with formal standing at the UN has grown 
exponentially, theoretically allowing non-state actors an unprecedented level of access 
and input.  Proponents of the trend see it as a catalyst for global justice and democracy in 
which more populations and issues are afforded a voice and in which CSO expertise on 
specific issues may be contributed, but it is also viewed as a means for the UN to research 
and implement many multilateral initiatives such as the Sustainable (formerly 
“Millennium”) Development Goals, (Grady 2005; Pubantz 2005).  Large-scale 
participation of civil society organizations within IGOs particularly in policy formulation 
roles also potentially enhances the legitimacy of the IGO in that it contributes to the 
appearance of pluralistic and democratic approaches (Tallberg and Jonsson 2010).  Yet, a 
preliminary assessment of CSO/NGO participation in UN forums suggests minimal-to-no 
actual participation by most of the organizations which have attained formal consultative 
status.  A large number, possibly the majority, of CSOs/NGOs which have obtained 
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formal status within the UN may never have engaged in any meaningful way with the 
organization, which would presumably diminish the claims related to a dramatically 
expanded role of civil society and democratic pluralism within the UN (Mowell 2015).  
To understand the effectiveness of civil society organizations within the UN framework, 
it is necessary to determine their degree of participation within the UN and also to 
understand the factors which encourage participation and barriers which may prevent 
participation.   
 Thirdly, analysis of patterns and the degree of participation may serve as a 
foundation for further research related to civil society at the United Nations such as 
understanding the political, fiscal or other reasons for CSO/NGO participation or the lack 
thereof.  Impediment to CSO/NGO participation identified in this research, can serve as 
the focus for future analyses designed to explore ways to introduce CSOs/NGOs to the 
UN bureaucracy, streamline their matriculation into the consultative status program, or 
otherwise facilitate greater degrees of participation.  More profoundly, if many NGOs 
fundamentally lack the organizational or fiscal ability or sincere commitment to engage 
with the UN via the program perhaps the consultative status program or its admission 
criteria for NGOs should be scrutinized for viability. 
 To the best of my knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of 
macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part 
of organizations holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.  It may also be among 
the first studies which endeavors to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement 
or the lack thereof on the part of organizations in consultative status.  Lastly, the study 
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appraises the findings within the theoretical framework of political pluralism in assessing 
the place and contributions of CSOs/NGOs within the UN dynamic. 
 The research findings yielded mixed results in terms of the three guiding 
hypotheses.  The first guiding hypothesis contended that imbalances exist in patterns of 
participation of organizations in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC with regard to 
country/regional involvement (e.g. NGOs of developed states/regions are proportionally 
better represented than those of developing states/regions) and also regarding the 
policy/issues areas with which the organizations are concerned.  Exhaustive analysis of 
data contained in the UN’s publicly available iCSO (integrated Civil Society 
Organizations) database, designed to illustrate the degree and nature of UN involvement 
with international civil society, conclusively proves a disproportionate 
underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from developing regions (relative to their 
composition of world population) and overrepresentation of those headquartered in 
developed regions.  The database also revealed substantial variations in the degrees to 
which policy/issue areas were represented, confirming the second element of the guiding 
hypothesis. 
 The second guiding hypothesis alleged that a variety of factors including financial 
ability, clarity of mission/purpose, and lack of understanding of the process through 
which CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with ECOSOC can participate collectively 
contribute to some organizations within the CS program being more active/engaged than 
others.  Both the second and third guiding hypotheses were operationalized via use of a 
detailed survey questionnaire emailed to a randomly selected pool of 439 organizations 
 224 
 
(10% of the total) identified as currently holding consultative status and as speaking 
English as at least one of several languages.  A total of 62 CSOs/NGOs (over 14% of 
those receiving the questionnaire) submitted the survey and those respondents revealed a 
diverse and complex range of factors that account for wide variations in participation 
within the program, including a number of considerations that had not been anticipated 
such as difficulty experienced by representatives of organizations in obtaining visas to 
travel to UN functions.  The information yielded by the survey clearly supports the 
second guiding hypothesis in that a diverse range of considerations collectively serve as 
barriers to participation in the consultative status program for many organizations.     
 The third guiding hypothesis contended that given such diverse obstacles, most 
NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC do not participate in any meaningful way 
in UN meetings or otherwise make any substantive contribution (providing input at 
conferences, submitting research/data, etc.) to the UN goal of engaging with pluralist 
international civil society.  While survey data as well as certain types of data revealed in 
the iCSO database analysis both paint a somewhat anemic picture of CSO/NGO 
participation within the CS program, the findings do not conclusively support the third 
guiding hypothesis, in part due to the subjective manner in which it was worded.  What 
does or does not constitute “meaningful” participation or a “substantive” contribution is 
subject to individual interpretation and not prone to objective measurement as worded.  In 
hindsight, this guiding hypothesis could have been framed more narrowly with definitive 
and measureable parameters such as establishing a minimum threshold of attendance at 
one UN event per year on average for meeting standards for “meaningful” or 
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“substantive” involvement.  Yet clear indications do exist of a lack of substantive 
participation on the part of many organizations in the CS program.  The study indicates 
that only a small minority of organizations within the CS program appear to be 
actively/regularly engaged, with a larger number of CSOs/NGOs making only minimal or 
infrequent contributions, while a large number appear to be mostly-to-completely 
disengaged.  Details concerning the latter and the research findings related to the first and 
second guiding hypotheses, including summations of the most interesting and important 
findings stemming from the study are provided in the next sections.  
 
Summary Overview of iCSO Database Analysis 
 Analysis of the iCSO database yielded a range of interesting findings, one of the 
first of which was that CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with UN-ECOSOC comprised 
only a small minority of the organizations listed in the iCSO database.  For example, 
among all entries categorized by organizational type, only 12% were in the CS program.  
If the assumption can be made that the CS program is comprised of the international civil 
society organizations most actively engaged with the UN, a perception furthered by the 
UN itself, a possible implication of this numerical underrepresentation within the iCSO 
database is that many of the nearly 40 thousand database entries are for organizations that 
in reality may not be engaged with the UN to any real degree contrary to what an 
organization’s listing within the database may imply.  The latter perception is bolstered 
by the presence within the iCSO database of many organizations that have previously 
been stripped of CS due to inactivity, including several NGOs with which I am 
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personally familiar and that to the best of my knowledge never had any substantive form 
of interaction with the UN before or after removal of consultative status.   
 There also appear to be irregularities and inconsistencies with how certain 
organizations and other data are classified within the iCSO database, though whether 
through error in data input (the frequency of odd classifications implies the latter is not 
the case), or capriciousness or arbitrariness on the part of the UN’s NGO committee or 
others designating categories for organizations.  The most glaring examples of odd 
(miss)classification of organizations were evidenced via analysis of the scope/scale of 
CSOs.  Surprisingly, only 34.8% of all organizational entries were classified as 
international CSOs/NGOs in scope of operations, with 33.1% classified as national, 
19.1% as local, and 13% as national in scope.  Odd inconsistencies were visible in terms 
of which types of organizations were deemed to have which scope/scale of operations.  
For example, only 53% of organizations with the typological classification of “local 
government” were also classified as having a local scope of operations, with many 
instead categorized as having international or national scope when that is apparently not 
the case.  Such incongruities cause concern as to the reliability of the data and its 
classification within the iCSO system.   
 In addition to drawing attention to possible misclassification of organizations, 
analysis of the scope/scale data revealed an interesting contrast in that substantially larger 
percentages of organizations in LDC/developing regions were classified as being local, 
national or regional in scope rather than international.  For example, only 6% of 
organizations in MDCs were classified as local in scope, but 13.1% in LDCs.  Only 5.9% 
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of organizations in MDCs were classified as national in scope, but 27.2% in LDCs.  If the 
latter data can be believed it may indicate (1) greater inclinations on the part of 
CSOs/NGOs in developing regions to look externally/internationally (to the UN or other 
IGOs) for potential sources of support, and/or (2) that civil society in developing regions 
is more bottom-up rather than hierarchical in its orientation as has been suggested in the 
literature.   
 Proportionality is a component of plurality of critical importance to this study in 
that understanding the degree to which regions are proportionally represented is a 
reflection of the degree of spatial parity and equitable pluralism in appraising the 
relationship between the UN and transnational CSOs.  Analysis of data specific to entries 
for organizations with consultative status revealed a disproportionate dominance of 
MDC-based organizations.  In most categories, there are more CS organizations 
headquartered in LDC/developing regions than MDC/developed regions, but LDCs are 
proportionally underrepresented relative to the portion of global population that they 
comprise.  The predominantly MDC regions of Europe, Anglo America and Oceania 
collectively comprise only 15.3% of the global 2016 population, but are headquarters to 
61.2% of organizations that presently hold consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.  
Among MDC regions, Anglo America was the most disproportionately overrepresented 
as it constitutes only 4.9% of the global population but is headquarters to 26.5% of CSOs 
holding consultative status.   
 LDC/developing regions comprise 84.7% of the world’s population yet are 
headquarters to only 38.7% of the civil society organizations listed as holding 
 228 
 
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.  By far, the largest proportional 
underrepresentation among LDC regions is for Asia which constitutes 59.7% of the 
global population yet was identified as headquarters to only 18.0% of organizations in the 
CS program.  Interestingly, LDC/developing regions are also severely underrepresented 
proportionally among organizations holding General Status, the highest accreditation 
level within the CS program, and the level which provides the greatest degree of access 
and least restrictions within the UN framework.  Of the 6 world regions delimited within 
the iCSO database, the 3 with the smallest percentage of General Status CSOs were all 
LDC/developing regions: only 1.2% of African-based CS organizations hold General 
Status, only 2.8% of Asia-based CS organizations, and 2.5% among those based in Latin 
America and the Caribbean. 
 A case study of the world’s 20 most populous countries was also undertaken as a 
gauge of proportional plurality/representation.  The findings not only reinforced the 
conclusion that CSOs based in LDC regions/countries were proportionally 
underrepresented but also allowed for a new type of comparative analysis related to 
proportionality, the representation of democratic versus nondemocratic countries within 
the CS program.  Of the 20 most populous countries, 10 were deemed by most recent 
FreedomHouse analysis to be democratic and 10 quasi/non-democratic.  Of the 10 
countries with the lowest percentages of all CS organizations, 6 were non/quasi-
democratic and 4 of the 5 countries that were the most underrepresented proportionally 
were non/quasi-democratic.  Only 1 of the 10 most populous non/quasi-democratic 
countries (DR Congo) was deemed to be represented in the CS program proportionally to 
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its population.  The underlying implication of the findings is that regime type and level of 
freedom may be important factors in determining degree of civil society representation 
within international forums. 
 An additional case study sought to determine degrees of variation (in 
representation of CSOs/NGOs in the CS program) among countries and sub-regions of 
the same geographical region.  Europe was selected as this regional case study because 
(1) it is home to approximately one-quarter of the world’s countries---providing a large 
pool of countries to analyze, and (2) CSOs/NGOs headquartered on the continent 
appeared to be well-represented within the consultative status program.  As expected, the 
degree of representation within the CS program varied widely among countries and also 
among sub-regions.  Proportional to population, the least represented countries by wide 
margins were those of Eastern Europe, likely reflecting a combination of both financial 
limitations (reflecting the East’s status as the least wealthy region of Europe) and also the 
political reality that scarcely one generation has passed since the end of authoritarian rule 
and the gradual and ongoing emergence of civil society.  The case study also revealed 
that CSOs from EU member states, or states which were EU candidates were 
proportionally far better represented within the CS program than those headquartered in 
non-EU/non-candidate countries, indicating the supportive role that the EU plays for 
European CSOs/NGOs (Thiel 2017). 
 Proportionality is also a potentially important consideration with regard to 
policy/issue areas in that it is desirable for some degree of equity to exist in the 
representation of different issues and policy areas.  The first guiding hypothesis 
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specifically addressed issues of proportionality and imbalanced representation both in 
regard to country/regional involvement and the policy/issues areas with which the 
CSOs/NGOs are concerned.  Widely varied and uneven degrees of representation of 
policy issue areas were found to exist within the UN-civil society framework.  Among 
classifications according to organizational typologies within the iCSO database, the 
organizational types specific to the CS program with the largest number of entries were 
Foundations (10.4%), Ageing (8.5%), Associations (7.7%), Labor (6.8%), and Disability 
(6.7%).  The organizational types specific to the CS program with the least representation 
were Institutions (1.3%), Private Sector (1.3%), IGOs (1.1%), Media 0.6%), and Local 
Governments (0.0%).   
 Database classifications according to fields of expertise also varied widely by 
degree of representation across policy issue areas.  Representation of CS organizations 
varied substantially across the 11 categories organized by fields of expertise with entries 
related to Economic and Social issues having the largest percentage at 20.2%, followed 
by Gender Issues/Women at 16.4%, Sustainable Development at 13.1%, and Social 
Development at 13%.  Outside the latter fields, total numbers of entries were more 
modest, with the smallest degrees of representation associated with 3 fields specific to 
Africa, each of which remained in single digits.  Outside the CS program, iCSO database 
listings related to both organizational typology and field of expertise showed even greater 
degrees of imbalance.  These findings support the contention of the first guiding 
hypothesis that imbalances exist regarding the representation of policy/issue areas within 
the CS program. 
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 A final element of the iCSO database analysis sought to determine the degree to 
which the ECOSOC-CS program was the primary outlet for civil society participation at 
the UN in comparison to several other UN accreditation/affiliation programs for 
CSOs/NGOs.  Five such programs were evaluated including those of the Commission on 
Sustainable Development, Department of Public Information, Financing for Development 
Office, Small Island Developing States, and the World Summit on Sustainable 
Development.  Analysis of the numbers for the other five UN affiliation programs for 
CSOs/NGOs revealed them to have only small fractions of the involvement of the 
ECOSOC consultative status program.   The DPI accreditation program had the largest 
number of accredited organizations with 868 (compared to nearly 5,000 organizations in 
the ECOSOC-CS program) and it appears to present organizations with opportunities for 
engagement throughout the year, whereas the other 4 programs---even if two (CSD and 
FDO) are theoretically ongoing---seem to be focused around periodic summits or other 
special events, thus providing a more limited dynamic for participation with the UN.      
 
Summary Overview of Survey Findings 
 The survey questionnaire was designed to operationalize the second and third 
guiding hypotheses.  As discussed in some detail at the beginning of Chapter 4, there is 
evidence to suggest that to at least some degree participant self-(de)selection occurred 
contributing to possible bias in the survey results.  Those organizations which are more 
active were perhaps in turn more likely to complete/submit the survey and those more 
inactive less inclined to do so.  In short, a disproportionately high survey response rate 
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among organizations which hold General status---likely the most engaged organizations 
within the CS program, a disproportionately low response rate for organizations which 
hold Roster status---the most restrictive accreditation status and likely the least engaged 
organizations within the CS program, combined with survey results that in some respects 
indicated somewhat higher levels of engagement than anticipated are the basis of the 
latter perception.  In the event such bias does exist, it does not invalidate the survey 
results as no known impact would have occurred regarding the operationalization of the 
second guiding hypothesis and with regard to the third guiding hypothesis, the findings 
revealed CSO/NGO participation levels that could at best be described as tepid, a level of 
involvement that would likely only be reduced further if any such bias could have been 
controlled.  The latter issues aside, the survey likely contributes to better understanding 
of the UN-civil society dynamic and yielded a range of interesting results---some of 
which were unexpected, an overview of which is provided in the following section. 
 One of the more important components of the survey and the first of three open-
ended questions asked participants why their organization sought consultative status and 
whether those goals had been realized.  Slightly less than one-third of responses (31.6%) 
were reasons specific to the policy/issues areas of the CSO, such as a labor organization 
seeking to bring international attention to workers’ issues.  The majority (68.4%) of 
responses were a diverse range of more general considerations, many of which were 
extrinsic in nature.  Interestingly, those respondents indicating more general or extrinsic 
goals such as “contributing to the UN” or “networking with other NGOs” were more 
likely to indicate having at least partly achieved those goals and also report higher levels 
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of satisfaction with the CS program.  Among respondents addressing whether the goals 
had been achieved, 46.4% indicated “yes”, with an additional 24.3% providing a partial 
or qualified “yes” in response, for a combined (at least partial) success rate of 60.7%.  A 
substantial minority of 23.2% indicated that their initial organizational goals for the CS 
program had not been achieved and another 16.1% of respondents indicated that they 
could not determine whether goals had been realized or not, with the most common 
accompanying reason being they had not been in the CS program long enough to have 
seen any impact---though nearly all such comments were from organizations which had 
been in the program for at least several years, a sufficient time to have participated in 
some way.   
 Many obstacles to achieving organizational goals and participating in the CS 
program were reported via the survey, among the most commonly cited of which were 
lack of financial resources, not understanding how to effectively participate or derive 
benefit from the program, segregation from the UN and member governments, and 
feeling ignored/powerless with little opportunity.  Accreditation level was not cited as an 
impediment by any organizations holding General consultative status (the highest 
accreditation level with the least restrictions) and only by a minority holding Special 
status.  However, a notable minority of 17.9% of all respondents did indicate that their 
accreditation level posed an impediment to participating, including the majority of the 
small number of Roster status (the most restrictive status) organizations responding.  
 To better understand the UN-civil society dynamic, participants were asked to 
indicate on number lines how they would rate the importance of each of 5 specific 
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considerations concerning their organization’s desire to obtain UN consultative status.  
The highest mean response (7.7) response was for prestige/visibility, followed by 
networking with other organizations (7.6), contributing written or verbal statements (7.4), 
and contributing/exchanging research (7.2), with credibility in fundraising (6.0) the least 
important consideration.  To gauge how outcomes compared to initial expectations, 
participants were also asked to use number line scores to rate the beneficial impact of 
each of 6 areas specified in the questionnaire.  Indicating successful alignment with many 
initial objectives, mean responses were highest for prestige/legitimacy (7.1), making 
meaningful contributions to the UN (6.4), and establishing connections with other 
NGOs/organizations (6.1).  The areas reported as yielding the least benefits were media 
publicity (4.8), making connections with NGOs/organizations in the US (4.7), and---
consistent with the low mean scores in the responses to initial goals for the CS program--
-aid in fundraising (3.9) for the organization.    
 In exploring the contention of the second guiding hypothesis that a diverse range 
of factors impeded participation in the CS program, participants were asked a series of 
questions related to barriers, the first of which used a series of number lines to assess the 
importance of each of 9 potential obstacles.  Of the latter, 4 of 9 items yielded mean 
scores higher than midpoint, indicating most respondents viewed them as moderate-to-
substantial barriers.  The highest among these with a mean score of 6.8 (on a scale of 0-
10) was financial commitment, with the somewhat interrelated issues of geographical 
proximity/distance (5.9) and time/personnel commitment (5.6) following closely behind, 
and understanding UN processes (5.4) rounding out the 4 highest scoring items.  Only a 
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minority of respondents indicated lack of board/donor support as a barrier but 
interestingly, in examining the returned questionnaires it appears that a disproportionate 
number of organizations indicating board/donor support as barriers to participation in the 
CS program also indicated no-minimal activity in many respects.  Most such 
organizations appear to have designated fewer UN representatives, have participated in 
fewer UN forums, and are less likely to have presented verbal or written statements at a 
UN function than organizations indicating no barriers posed by board members or 
donors.  Several possibilities exist in terms of the minority of organizations that lack 
board or donor support for participation in the CS program and the correlation with the 
latter findings.  For example, upon initially seeking CS affiliation the time/cost of active 
participation in the program may not have been apparent to many boards/donors and 
upon entering the CS program---as such commitments became more obvious, support 
could have eroded with a commensurate perception that funding and staff time could be 
better directed elsewhere.  Political considerations such as opposition to globalization or 
the UN in general may also serve to taint the perspective of some donors and board 
members, preventing or diminishing their support.     
 Other barrier-related questions also yielded insight.  One of the more telling 
questions contained in the survey asked participants to denote the degree to which they 
felt that the cost/effort of obtaining consultative status is justified by the benefits their 
organization has derived from the affiliation.  The majority of responses were at least 
marginally favorable but a substantial minority (29.1%) scored the number line item at 
mid-point or less, indicating they perceive the intrinsic worth of their participation to be 
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in question.  In an open-ended question, participants were also asked how the UN might 
improve the experience for organizations within the CS program.   Respondents’ diverse 
and often insightful comments and suggestions were analyzed and correlated to ten 
distinct issue areas---among which some overlap exists: access, bureaucracy, 
communication, elitism/fairness, expertise, funding, general guides/training, meetings, 
networking and capacity building, or issues specific to the CSOs policy/focus area.  
Among the latter, issues related to meetings and other UN forums (28.6%), funding 
(24.5%) were the most commonly cited, followed by the need for general guides/training, 
improvement in communication, and increased access were mentioned most frequently 
with the majority of respondents commenting on some combination of the latter 5 issues.  
Smaller numbers of respondents touched upon other issues such as fairness/elitism.  
 Principally, to test the third guiding hypothesis that most organizations do not 
participate in the CS program, but also to potentially shed light on the range of obstacles 
to participation as addressed in the second guiding hypothesis, survey respondents were 
asked to provide details concerning their designated UN representatives.  Most (78.2%) 
indicated that their organization had designated representatives at UN headquarters in 
New York, which also had the highest mean number (5.0) of representatives obtaining 
grounds passes.  Only slightly more than half (50.9%) of respondents indicated 
representatives had been designated in Geneva, and a small minority (20.0%) reported 
representatives accredited to Vienna.  Almost no organizations reported designating 
representatives at UN regional offices.  While most respondents did not indicate the 
process of designating and credentialing their UN representatives as problematic at least 
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to some degree, the process did appear to be an issue for some.  A large minority (35.1%) 
indicated difficulty experienced during the process, a large enough number that the issue 
should be regarded as a potentially important barrier to participation.  Respondents were 
also asked to characterize the nature/background of their UN representatives with the 
most common being full-time employees and board members of the CSOs/NGOs 
followed in frequency by donors and part-time employees. 
 In seeking to get at the core premise of the third guiding hypothesis, participants 
were asked a range of questions related to participation including networking and 
communication.  The vast majority (75.8%) of respondents indicated having attended at 
least 1 UN function since 2005.  If a small number of abnormal outliers among responses 
are excluded, the mean total number of events respondents reported attending during the 
period is 13.6 or slightly more than 1 per year.  Most organizations (75.4%) also 
indicated that they had communicated with the UN at least once since obtaining 
consultative status, ordinarily via email or phone---with most reporting somewhat tepid 
satisfaction levels with the speed and substance of the communication experience with 
the UN.  Less than half (40.3%) indicated that their organization had ever hosted or 
organized a meeting/event at the UN and only slightly more than half (51.6%) reported 
ever having participated in an NGO coalition/network.   
 Most (61.2%) reported having presented a written statement at least once but only 
38.7% reported ever having been asked to do so.  Less than half reported having 
presented a written statement with only 29.0% indicated they had ever been asked to do 
so.   Critical interpretations of the latter could include a variety of possible conclusions 
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including: (1) exponential growth of the CS program and the number of CSOs/NGOs 
participating means that there are more organizations within the dynamic than can be 
effectively used/consulted; (2) wide variations could exist in terms of the real/perceived 
credibility and competence of CS organizations with many CSOs/NGOs not deemed by 
the UN to be as worthy of being solicited for input; (3) many of the CSOs/NGOs awarded 
CS have such a narrow or obscure focus that there is little they can effectively contribute 
to the often broader issues with which the UN is concerned---which in turn raises the 
question of why such organizations were admitted to the CS program; (4) perhaps 
ECOSOC and other UN organs understand that many organizations in the CS program---
especially smaller organizations---either cannot (e.g., financially) or will not participate 
and thus does not solicit their participation.  Only a minority of respondents report ever 
having been contacted by other organizations in the CS program, foreign governments, or 
the UN and those that did indicated it was usually related to general information 
sharing/introductions or collaboration opportunities.  Asked to what degree they feel the 
United Nations values the participation of their organization, a tepid mean response of 
5.9 was yielded for a number line range of 1-10, conveying that a substantial number of 
organizations in the CS program feel alienated or underappreciated regarding the UN.  
 
Suggestions for Future Research 
 
 Although several rounds of editing and trimming ultimately reduced the length of 
the survey questionnaire to a considerable degree, the final version was 10 pages in 
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length and contained approximately 48 items depending upon how one may count some 
multi-part questions.  Given the in-depth nature of the questionnaire, I was largely 
pleased to have obtained a completion/return rate approaching 15% and invested 
significant effort (e.g., via follow-up emails/reminders) in order to attain that rate of 
return.  Accordingly, adding additional items to the survey questionnaire would likely not 
have been prudent and would have almost certainly reduced the response rate 
substantially.  If the latter reality did not serve as an impediment and survey length were 
no option, as can be evidenced in the following 7 examples---there are a number of 
additional survey questions that with benefit of hindsight may have yielded useful 
insights into the research and should potentially be considered for incorporation in any 
future follow-up study. 
In retrospect, exploration of certain issues would have been useful additions to the survey 
(were it not for the limiting factor of the economy of space)---e.g.:   
 Ideally, one or more survey items could attempt to assess the learning curve 
concerning how and over what period of time an organization ultimately learned 
to participate/contribute after obtaining consultative status.  
 Although the survey did not directly address the issue of agenda setting either in 
terms of gauging its frequency/prevalence or levels of (dis)satisfaction among 
CSOs/NGOs with regard to the latter, the issue surfaced in the comments of 
multiple respondents and is potentially a substantial issue related to engagement 
in the CS program.  The average organization in the CS program appears to have 
little-no input as to selecting the times or locations of civil society 
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meetings/functions or perhaps even more importantly in the planning of the 
agendas of such events.   
 Degree of access also appears to be an issue of concern based upon the feedback 
provided by multiple respondents, but the survey did not attempt to directly 
explore the latter.  It is apparent that many organizations in the CS program feel 
limited access exists to UN organs, national delegations/representatives, and even 
other CSOs/NGOs and NGO coalitions such as original major groups, a situation 
which may foster alienation and limited participation. 
 
 Minor questionnaire tweaks/additions aside, there are numerous examples of 
research that should be explored in any future study of a similar nature.  It is perhaps not 
unusual that research can generate new questions as it simultaneously provides answers 
to others and this study was no exception, as additional research is needed to fully 
understand many of the study findings both related to analysis of the iCSO database and 
the survey.  Having served on the boards of directors of multiple nonprofit organizations, 
I am particularly interested in the role of directors in supporting or opposing an 
organizations association with the UN and although the study sought to at least in part 
address the issue, many questions remain.  For example, why in 25% of cases is there 
such inadequate support on the part of a CS organization’s board and/or donors that 
respondents reported this as a substantial barrier to participation in the program?  Does 
lack of board/donor support reflect financial concerns---travel/participation costs funds 
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that could be better spent elsewhere?  Is it a reflection of political animosity on the part of 
donors or board members toward the UN and globalization in general? 
 The research has raised numerous other questions as well.  For example, many 
survey respondents reported contributing verbal or written statements to the UN or in 
some way contributing/exchanging research with the UN and/or other CSOs/NGOs since 
matriculation into the ECOSOC CS program.  However, it remains unclear how often and 
to what degree this activity has manifested into effectual policy change or formulation at 
the UN or otherwise at the international level.  Finding some means of objectively 
assessing the latter would permit a more meaningful appraisal of the tangible benefit 
derived from the primary collaboration between the UN and international civil society 
and could do much in addressing whether the CS program is as yet a viable catalyst for 
effective partnership or mere window dressing.  
 The survey findings indicated that only a minority of respondents had ever been 
asked by the United Nations to present a written (38.7%) or verbal statement (29.0%) at a 
UN venue, likely a reflection of the large and ever increasing numbers of CSOs/NGOs in 
the CS program.  It would be interesting to obtain more data related to such requests and 
the organizations that received them in an effort to glean patterns related to participation 
and UN interests related to consultations with civil society.  For example, are there 
specific policy/issue areas such as human rights or development that are far more (or less) 
likely to receive input requests from the UN?  Do such requests favor CSOs/NGOs from 
certain world regions or of certain sizes (i.e. capacities) or organizational typologies?  
Have patterns related to the latter questions varied over time or remained largely 
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consistent---e.g., are trends visible in policy/issues areas in which the UN is willing to 
consult civil society? 
 This research suggests that a sharp dichotomy exists between CS organizations 
accredited at the General level versus the Roster level.  While a definitive or 
generalizable conclusion cannot be made due mainly to the disproportionately low rate of 
surveys returned from Roster status CSOs/NGOs, the questionnaire data that was 
submitted indicates far higher levels of both participation and satisfaction on the part of 
General status organizations within the CS program, whereas organizations with Roster 
status were both least likely to be active participants and most likely to indicate 
substantial barriers to participation (with Special status CSOs/NGOs positioned between 
the two extremes).  The question of how to better engage Roster status organizations 
within the CS program so they feel less marginalized and might be better empowered to 
contribute in meaningful ways would appear to be a potentially important area for future 
research to explore.  The implication also exists that reforms are potentially needed in the 
process by which CSOs/NGOs are accredited and classified within the CS program in 
order to better screen organizations less likely to participate. 
 Not all suggestions for future research stem directly from the findings of this 
research.  The UN iCSO database is updated frequently and often expanded to include 
new or expanded datasets.  At the time this research was being undertaken a new dataset 
addressing meeting participation of UN-affiliated CSOs was in the initial stages of being 
added to the database.  At the time of writing no data as yet populated the system, but it 
was organized by meeting type (policy/topic) and session/year according to 8 categories: 
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Financing for Development; Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues; Public 
Administration; Social Development; Status of Women; Sustainable Development; UN 
Forum on Forests; and the Conference on States Parties to the Convention on the Rights 
of Persons with Disabilities.  Depending upon the category, when available data options 
will ultimately span up to 20 years or more, going as far back as 1992.  As this research 
progressed throughout 2016, I continually checked this dataset to determine if it had 
become functional in the hope of incorporating it into the study, but at the time the study 
concluded it had still not been populated with data.  As no data was available to examine, 
it is unclear whether statistics provided will be specific to organizations within the CS 
program or (more likely) reflective of all UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs---the latter is 
standard for most datasets within the system.  In either case such data would prove 
invaluable in formulating a detailed understanding of the nature and degree of 
participation within the UN-civil society dynamic.  Accordingly, one of the strongest 
recommendations for any future research related to the scope of this study and seeking to 
expand upon its findings is to comprehensively analyze statistics related to meeting 
participation on the part of UN-affiliated CSOs at such time in the future that the latter 
dataset is functionally available.  Such an analysis would allow more detailed picture and 
objective determination as to the degree of participation of organizations within the UN-
civil society dynamic.  
 The UN dynamic with civil society is perpetually changing both in terms of 
policy/issue areas and also with regard to the degree of pluralism UN involvement with 
civil society.  Had this study been undertaken several decades ago it would have found 
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much more modest levels of interaction across all policy/issue areas and of course due to 
a combination of factors including changing societal norms and evolving technology 
some areas in which there is collaborative effort between the UN and civil society today 
had yet to attain a status of universal acceptance/importance or even be conceived as 
focal areas or opportunities for collaboration---e.g. human (LBGT) rights, sustainable 
development, cyber-crime.  Also, although this study confirmed that perfect pluralism 
such as proportional representation of all world regions in general or developing areas in 
particular as yet does not exist within the UN-civil society relationship, far lower degrees 
of proportionality and pluralism would have existed in the past.  Accordingly, a longevity 
or otherwise future study mirroring the goals and parameters of this research will be 
necessary in coming years if the nature and degree of the continually evolving dynamic 
between the UN and international civil society is to be adequately understood in the 
future.   
 Opportunities also exist to expand upon research into proportional plurality.  This 
research undertook case studies of Europe (approximately 25% of the world’s countries) 
and also the 20 most populous countries on earth to determine the degree to which 
patterns of participation within the UN-CSO dynamic varied across sub-regional lines 
and from country to country.  Regional and sub-regional comparative analyses of other 
areas of the world would be useful in cultivating a more complete understanding of 
spatial variations in parity/pluralism within the dynamic.  For example, at the time the 
research was being conceptualized and planned, the degree to which Asian CSOs/NGOs 
were underrepresented within the framework was not fully understood.  Also, depending 
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somewhat on what one accepts as the boundaries of the continent, Asia is home to 
approximately the same percentage of the world’s states as Europe.  The latter reality 
combined with the aforementioned lack of proportional plurality within the UN-civil 
society dynamic would seem to necessitate that any future geographical case studies of 
this phenomenon include Asia and its sub-regions. 
 It may be especially useful to understand detailed patterns in terms of the types 
and numbers of CSOs/NGOs which have lost their consultative status.  This remains 
something of a mystery as the UN does not draw attention to or release data related to the 
phenomenon, but based upon personal observations and anecdotal evidence it appears 
that fairly substantial numbers of organizations that matriculate into the CS program lose 
the status by the time their first or second quadrennial report is due.  The latter implies 
programs are subject to attrition via inactivity, as the primary purpose of the quadrennial 
report is to ascertain the type and frequency of CSO/NGO participation in the CS 
program.  If appreciable percentages of organizations given CS accreditation are washing 
out after a few years due to non-participation, the legitimacy of the ECOSOC-CS 
program as a forum for global civil society would lose credibility, and it is likely for that 
very reason that the UN---likely the only realistic source of obtaining or tracking such 
data---will not be readily forthcoming with such statistics, making such a study difficult 
at best.    
 The processes wherein applicant organizations are either selected or rejected for 
admission to the CS program as well as the manner in which successful applicants are 
designated with an accreditation level of General, Special or Roster appear to be 
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potentially interesting areas for future research.  The degree to which both of the latter 
may be politically charged and may reflect possible biases on the part of the NGO 
committee and its decision-making processes was well beyond the scope of this research 
but would be interesting areas to explore in a future study.  For example, to what degree 
has the cultural pendulum swung away from organizations that are pro-Israel/Judaism, 
Christian or socially conservative in theme or mission?  To what degree do international 
political rivalries surface in the process---e.g. are CSOs/NGOs in Ukraine, or the Baltic 
States blocked or scrutinized as applicants to a greater degree due to the influence of 
Russia within the UN?  Rather than a political agenda, can inconsistencies be shown to 
exist in the CS screening/accreditation process stemming more simply from arbitrariness, 
capriciousness or poor judgement?  
 In a potentially related matter, further effort should be made to explore 
correlations between regime type (democratic vs. not) and levels of 
representation/participation of CSOs/NGOs within the UN framework.  By way of a case 
study comparing 10 countries that were democratic to 10 that were not, this research 
demonstrated a substantial gap in civil society involvement at the UN between the 
typologies.  A broader analysis exploring levels of participation among all non/quasi-
democratic states and the reasons and mechanics which account for their proportional 
underrepresentation could shed light not just on the inner dynamic of the ECOSOC-CS 
program, but more broadly on transnational democracy and civil society.  How 
commonly do national governments, the primary focal point and source of influence 
within the UN, use their influence to block the UN ascension of CSOs/NGOs from their 
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own countries that may have a contrasting agenda with the regime?  Is the latter scenario 
the primary factor in the underrepresentation of CSOs/NGOs from nondemocratic 
countries or is much of the phenomenon merely a reflection of civil society not being as 
vibrant or commonplace in such countries as opposed to democratic regimes?    
 More broadly, a comparative analysis of many of the particular circumstances of 
CSOs/NGOs in different countries and regime types could be useful in gleaning patterns 
and understanding imbalances in levels of civil society participation with the UN 
internationally.  For example, it would be interesting to assess levels of and variations in 
government funding and support for CSOs/NGOs as correlated to representation and 
participation of those organizations at the UN---e.g. are countries in which QUANGOs or 
otherwise state-affiliated/founded CSOs represented to a greater or to a lesser degree 
within UN-ECOSOC.  Such research would be a monumental undertaking, but would 
perhaps be attainable via a case study approach of select countries as illustrative of 
typologies. 
 The issue of access and more broadly, the degree to which UN-affiliated 
CSOs/NGOs have utilized that forum to actually impact policy formulation or research 
agendas of member states would be fertile ground for future studies.  Any such research 
would likely need to explore case studies of geographical areas (sub-regions) and or issue 
areas such as development or human rights in order to be manageable in scope, but would 
likely prove useful in further elucidating the degree to which the UN-civil society 
partnerships have potentially born fruitful outcomes rather than merely existing as an 
illusory or idealistic nod to global civil society on the part of the world’s preeminent 
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IGO.  If such research indicates that UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs do contribute to policy 
formulation among member states via the UN forum, then the UN-civil society dynamic 
would be vindicated to a great degree, but it remains unclear that the latter is the case and 
such an exploration was beyond the scope of this study. 
 It may prove useful to better understand patterns of civil society involvement and 
participation at each UN headquarters and regional office and cultivate a more detailed 
picture of how/why variations exist.  For example, it would be relatively easy to construct 
a survey instrument to determine the specific types of programs/conferences 
organizations participate in at each UN location along with the frequency of participation.  
In turn, correlations could potentially be made between types of CSOs/NGOs 
(accreditation level, MDC/LDC background, policy/issue areas, etc.) and which UN 
locations they are most and least likely to have involvement with as a part of civil society 
outreach programs---e.g. are organizations headquartered in (certain) predominantly 
LDC/developing regions more likely to participate in UN forums in Geneva, Vienna or at 
UN regional sites and if so, due to what factors (e.g. easier to obtain travel visas)?  
 Information yielded from research into the latter areas might potentially shed light 
as to how greater participation and greater degrees of plurality/proportionality might be 
achieved within the UN-civil society dynamic.  Such findings could help to address 
which other UN environments (UN programs based in Geneva, Vienna or regional 
offices) might be conducive to formal associations with civil society similar to the CS 
program within ECOSOC, a potentially valuable area to explore in future studies 
assessing ways to expand participation.  For example, if regions such as Asia are 
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proportionally underrepresented at forums in New York, the seat and focal point of 
ECOSOC and the CS program, perhaps it is justified via the desire for pluralism within 
the UN-civil society framework for additional linkages either via expansion of ECOSOC 
programs or creating new non-ECOSOC civil society partnerships at other UN locations 
including regional offices.  Research into the justification and feasibility of such 
strategies may prove beneficial as a catalyst for reforming and improving pluralism and 
proportionality within the system.  
 
Concluding Observations 
 To the researcher’s knowledge this is the first comprehensive academic study of 
macro-level patterns of regional and topical (policy focus area) participation on the part 
of all CSOs/NGOs holding consultative status with UN-ECOSOC.  It may also be among 
the first such studies which seeks to identify and explain specific reasons for engagement 
or the lack thereof on the part of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status.  Most empirical 
studies of civil society at the UN have focused upon a limited number of organizations 
within a single issue area (Clark et al, 1998).  A strength of this study is that its breadth of 
scope in seeking to analyze patterns of participation of all CSOs/NGOs holding 
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC did reveal macro-scale patterns within the 
institutional dynamic including uneven regional and policy/issue representation and 
relatively modest levels of participation on the part of most UN-affiliated CSOs/NGOs 
attributable to a diverse range of factors.  The study proposed that the expansion of the 
number of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status with the UN (ECOSOC) has not 
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necessarily equated to meaningful collaboration between the United Nations and 
transnational civil society, and accordingly the ideals of democratic pluralism are not 
being fully realized via this dynamic and the study findings to a great degree support the 
latter perspective. 
 As Foucault famously stated in exploring the concept of why power and influence 
should ideally be widely diffused throughout many political constellations, “I don’t want 
to say that the state isn’t important; what I want to say is that relations of power, and 
hence the analysis that must be made of them, necessarily extend beyond the limits of the 
state (Foucault 1980, 122).”  A central theme underlying this study was the balance of 
power and influence (and whether or not the latter exists in reality) between the UN and 
transnational civil society as manifested in the ECOSOC consultative status program.   If 
for example CSOs/NGOs in consultative status contribute power to the UN, it is likely in 
the form of legitimacy in that the relationship at least cultivates an impression of 
engagement with civil society and effort being made to implement pluralist democratic 
norms.  Likewise, the CSOs/NGOs in formal association with the UN appear to derive a 
real or perceived legitimacy and increase in status from the relationship.  In exploring the 
status and influence of CSOs/NGOs in consultative status, this research found little 
indication of power diffusion or that the traditional authority and influence of non-state is 
in danger of being eroded by transnational civil society within the UN dynamic.   
 International civil society can make positive contributions and serve useful 
purposes for transnational institutions as a vehicle for achieving myriad goals including 
monitoring human rights and international law, facilitating research in the field, 
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disseminating aid and services to those in need, providing council and expertise in 
specialized fields.  Potentially one of the most critical contributions international civil 
society can make is to serve as a catalyst for democratic norms in that establishing 
stronger bonds between democratic governance (at all levels including transnational 
governance) and institutions of civil society can in turn help to strengthen and engrain 
democratic traditions.  In many respects a strong civil society is beneficial for democratic 
traditions in that, for example, if integrated within democratic institutions whether at the 
sub-state, state or transnational level, civil society may potentially foster and reinforce 
democratic ideals and practices via the aggregation and representation of stakeholder 
interests and also via the mitigation of government authority (Uhlin 2009).  Likewise, by 
gaining knowledge of procedures and language used at the UN and other IGOs, elements 
of civil society may learn how to effectively use international instruments associated with 
democratic traditions such as compliance reporting to advance domestic or transnational 
agendas in various policy areas including human or environmental rights (Riddell-Dixon 
2008).  
 It would be difficult to study the phenomenon of transnational civil society 
without concepts related to pluralism being central considerations and an appraisal of 
pluralism within the UN-civil society dynamic hinges upon how the concept is perceived 
and defined.  In the broadest of senses, pluralism refers to inclusiveness in the 
incorporation of diverse voices within any process of deliberation or decision/policy-
making.  Dahl (1956) perhaps most famously encapsulated this broad concept of 
pluralism as being associated with a school of thought within classical liberalism that 
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focused upon multiple sources of political influence and that regarded democracy as the 
internal regulation of society through competition among many varied types of groups 
over power and social privileges.  Karppinen (2013) stressed that efforts to characterize 
pluralism usually share the core view that what is desirable and egalitarian about 
democratic systems is that their functioning cannot be reduced to any single hierarchy or 
idea, which for the purposes of the UN or other IGOs may mean that state-centric 
representation could potentially be broadened to in some capacity include civil society, 
business, sub-state actors/governments and other diverse interests.   
 In the latter broad sense, the UN has made commendable progress in achieving 
levels of pluralism unprecedented in its history.  The UN advocates diversity in 
representation, and the increasingly heterogeneous (geographical, policy issue areas 
represented, etc.) mixture of NGOs within ECOSOC reflects a strong institutional 
commitment to pursuing pluralism.  The UN has assumed a direct role in attempting to 
facilitate such pluralism within the consultative status framework via encouraging 
organizations representing the historically marginalized (e.g., the global south, 
human/indigenous rights-related organizations) and providing at least some funding and 
other support to empower more CSOs/NGOs from developing nations to participate in 
UN forums.  More civil society organizations are currently listed as being in formal 
consultative status with UN-ECOSOC than at any point in history.  There is better 
representation of total numbers of organizations from LDC/developing regions than at 
any point as is also likely the case in terms of the range and diversity of policy/issue areas 
represented by civil society organizations in association with the UN.    
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 However, significant question exists as to whether such efforts favoring plurality 
have yielded genuine improvements in the diversity of representation/ participation or 
whether they are largely symbolic (Kymlicka 2007, 3-25).  CSO/NGO representation at 
the UN may be more symbolic than substantive in terms of degree of active engagement 
of civil society within the UN dynamic, as the number and diversity of CSOs/NGOs in 
theoretical affiliation with the UN is not meaningful without active engagement.  Also, as 
discussed at some length in the research, proportional plurality---representation 
commensurate to the proportion comprised of a population---as yet does not truly exist 
with CSOs/NGOs headquartered in predominantly MDC/developed regions 
overrepresented proportionally at the UN and those based in principally LDC/developing 
regions proportionally underrepresented, grossly so in the case of Asia.   
 The concept of pluralism as espoused in Kantian classical liberalism and liberal 
institutionalism contends that ideally democratic systems have decentralized power 
structures and substantial influence and participation from diverse sources, rather than a 
limited segment of a polity.  The latter has been described as the most compelling 
argument on behalf of UN involvement with civil society organizations in that it 
facilitates a multi-actor framework and contributes additional voices, perspectives and 
expertise to international forums/regimes which have traditionally been the almost 
exclusive domain of state actors (Mingst and Muldoon 2015; Whaites 1996; Willetts 
2006).  However, virtually all substantive influence within the UN remains with member 
states and states have used their preeminence to successfully limit the expansion of 
CSO/NGO influence into key areas such as the General Assembly and Security Council 
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and to in effect segregate representatives of civil society via the practice of “parallel” 
venues.   
 The concept of pluralism within the framework of international politics can be 
narrowly defined.  Pluralist perspectives within constructivism potentially give the most 
consideration to the role of NGOs and civil society within the international system (Thiel 
2010, 7117).  Constructivist ideals in general denote pluralism in that constructivism 
takes into account a diverse, pluralistic range of considerations in examining how a 
complex dynamic of societal and other factors can impact transnational politics.  The 
transnational dynamic and the factors which influence it are social constructs that 
routinely change and evolve and accordingly, CSOs/NGOs as increasingly common 
manifestations of the complex societal dynamic should have some significance within the 
international system (Wendt 1992, 422-424).  Pluralists within the constructivist tradition 
see the manifestation and expansion of transnational civil society organizations as the 
growth of significant elements of bottom-up transformative influence upon international 
politics.   
 Succinctly, if vibrant civil society participation helps to foster democratic 
processes, increased roles of civil society within the UN and other IGOs will help 
facilitate democratic processes within such organizations.  Within the pluralist tradition 
of constructivism, CSOs/NGOs are regarded as the principle organizing element and the 
voice of transnational civil society, and as representing the interests of people and 
grassroots movements, separate from and diffusing the power of states (DeMars and 
Dijkzeul 2015, 11).  Pluralism also contends that the actions of IOs/IGOs and states may 
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become increasingly subject to the oversight of transnational civil society organizations 
and that such an outcome reflects democratic institutional trends (Keohane 1998).  This 
research revealed no evidence that organizations within the consultative status program 
were diffusing the authority of member states or exercising any form of oversight over 
state or institutional authority within the UN.   
 Furthermore, while many participants in the ECOSOC consultative status 
program may well be grassroots, non-hierarchical organizations in nature, many others 
are funded or otherwise heavily influenced by state actors.   In at least some instances 
state-financed or otherwise heavily state-influenced CSOs/NGOs have established a 
visible presence (if perhaps not a substantial impact) within the UN via the ECOSOC 
consultative status program.   However, whatever presence/voice these and other CS-
affiliated CSOs possess is primarily the result of the willingness of UN member states to 
permit their acceptance into the consultative status program.  The latter reality appears 
reflective of both neorealist and neoliberal theories related to the transnational dynamic in 
that non-state actors are being allowed only as much influence or attention on the global 
stage as state actors are willing to cede to them, rather than cultivating power or influence 
in their own right. 
 Transnational CSOs/NGOs are diverse in terms of their origins and functionality 
in that some appear to fit the global model of constructivism wherein power and 
influence flows downward to civil society from state or supra-state sources (e.g. 
QUANGOs) and other CSOs/NGOs better exemplify the plural(ist) constructivist model 
wherein they may originate at the local/grassroots level and ultimately influence policy at 
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the state-level and beyond.  Liberal institutionalism, an additional theoretical framework, 
views debates as to whether influence is hierarchical (top-down) or bottom-up in nature 
as largely irrelevant in that the latter theory posits that CSOs/NGOs are for the most part 
merely symptomatic of spreading international institutions, but do not constitute an 
important element of them or influence international politics/policy to any substantial 
degree.  IGOs including the UN thus may endeavor to pay at least superficial attention to 
civil society because of the perception that some role afforded to civil society is 
becoming a transnational norm and political/democratic expectation.  
 This study found a small minority of CSOs/NGOs to be regularly and actively 
engaged within the UN-civil society dynamic via the ECOSOC consultative status 
program.  However, in general those organizations that participate do so to minimal 
degrees or only sporadically and a large minority of CS-accredited CSOs/NGOs do not 
appear to participate in any appreciable way.  By implication, if the interaction between 
the United Nations and potentially most of the civil society institutions with which it 
presumably has the closest linkages is at best weak or sporadic, it is difficult to imagine 
that via such programs the UN through trickle-down approaches has substantial impact 
locally (i.e., global constructivist theory) or alternatively that local or state-based civil 
society is reaching upward and outward to impact international policy to any substantive 
degree.   
 The findings of this research revealed little indication of the existence of either 
such dynamic, but may indicate that the reasons for minimal or non-participation within 
the ECOSOC-CS program are even more varied and complex than initially realized. 
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Rather than global or plural constructivism, the findings of this study may imply support 
for liberal institutionalist theories in that decades-long expansion of IGOs as a trend, has 
facilitated a corollary expectation of expanding international civil society and an 
associated expectation of linkages between transnational governance and democratic 
institutions on the one hand and transnational civil society on the other as a standardized 
norm.  Liberal institutionalists merely perceive CSO/NGO growth largely as a bi-product 
of the increased influence of international institutions and globalization rather than a 
significant source of influence upon the international dynamic (DeMars and Dijkzeul 
2015).  In the broadest of senses, the latter ideas also at least partly mirror some 
constructivist concepts concerning the expansion of norms/expectations.   
 One can also see the possible applicability of rational-choice institutionalism in 
that a formalized linkage between the United Nations and international civil society was 
created in the form of the ECOSOC consultative status program behind the goal of 
addressing real or perceived shortcomings---e.g. the need for more pluralistic and 
democratic representation and potentially enhanced bureaucratic/program functionality 
(or at least cultivating the appearance of achieving one or both of the latter) within the 
UN dynamic.  More IGOs are granting CSOs/NGOs access to their institutional processes 
out of the perception that this is a newly standardized norm and via the expectation 
within the framework of transnational politics that such actions bolster democratic 
legitimacy.  Within the field of international relations, such a dynamic is supported by 
sociological institutionalism and constructivism both of which focus upon processes of 
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norm diffusion and institutional replication as catalysts for construction and spread of 
international norms.   
 The expanding numbers of CSOs/NGOs within ECOSOC’s consultative status 
program and growing diversity in terms of geographical and policy/issue areas 
represented within the CS program may be more theoretical than functional as a trend 
within the UN dynamic.  The study revealed little indication of CS-affiliated CSOs as 
agents of democratization, serving as effective vehicles of representation of international 
stakeholders, or of CSOs within the CS program holding any tangible form of oversight 
with regard to the UN or its member states.  In that the vast majority of NGOs within the 
CS program appear to make negligible if any contribution within the UN framework, 
realist, Marxist and English School theorists appear to have been proven at least partly 
correct via their state-centric views of how the UN and transnational political systems 
function.  Reflective of structuralist visions of how a transnational political dynamic 
operates, within the United Nations, member states have maintained their near total 
monopoly on power and influence and seem poised to continue doing so for the 
foreseeable future.  In the process of safeguarding their hegemony state actors have in 
effect diminished the potential influence of transnational civil society within the UN’s 
institutional fabric.      
 The dualistic pluralist concept of realized/actual versus potential power is an 
interesting area to explore within the context of the UN ECOSOC dynamic.  This study 
found no evidence of CSO/NGO erosion of the power, influence or sovereignty of UN 
member states, nor was there any evidence of any real capacity for 
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oversight/accountability of the UN or its members.  The only plausible case to be made 
for realized power on the part of CS-affiliated CSOs would be as purveyors of useful 
information.  However, given the degree to which CSOs/NGOs are segregated from 
member states and many important UN organs (e.g., the General Assembly and Security 
Council) and denied access to both of the latter, it is difficult to see how the vast majority 
of organizations within the consultative status program could claim to have achieved 
influence even via information politics as a medium.   
 The issue of potential power is perhaps less clear.  No indication exists that CSO 
access, input, or oversight capacity within the UN framework is poised to expand to any 
appreciable degree in the immediate future.  Such expansions could only happen via the 
willingness and complicity of most member states, most of which---reflective of 
structuralist perspectives---have throughout the more than 70 years of the UN’s existence 
shown little-to-no willingness to forfeit their monopoly on political influence within the 
organization.  However, some potential at least theoretically exists for limited expansion 
of the influence of organizations within the CS program such as improved access to UN 
organs of secondary importance or expanded roles with regard to information sharing, 
consultation, or implementation of UN initiatives in the field by CS-affiliated 
CSOs/NGOs.     
 As intergovernmental organizations have become more prevalent and have grown 
in power and influence, many including the UN have potentially become more sensitive 
to perception and criticism related to the need for democratic norms (e.g. the inclusion of 
diverse sources of input) to become more fully institutionalized.  In the case of the UN 
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ECOSOC consultative status program, extensive and continually expanding formal 
linkages between the UN and transnational civil society have been established.  However, 
an actual capacity for vibrant, verdant exchange or an environment in which either a 
globalist or pluralist vision of a constructivist dynamic within transnational governance is 
being fully realized, has perhaps not as yet been achieved. 
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NGOs in Consultative Status with UN-ECOSOC 
 
General Background 
1. Why did your organization seek Consultative Status with the UN?  
 
 
 
 
 
2. Have these goals been achieved during your experience with the UN?  Why or why not?  
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. What is your classification as an NGO in Consultative Status with the UN? 
General Status  (    ) _____ 
Special Status (    ) _____ 
Roster Status (    ) _____    Do you feel your present classification is appropriate? Y ___ N ___  
 
4. To what degree does this classification assist or impede your ability to participate in UN 
programs? 
(10 denotes a very high degree of difficulty, 0 denotes no difficulty) 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
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5. Following obtaining your accreditation, has your NGO ever communicated with the UN (not 
counting submission of quadrennial reports)? 
 Yes _____ 
 No _____ 
 
6. On a scale of 0 (not important) to 10 (utmost importance) how would you rate the importance 
of each of the following considerations concerning your organization’s desire to have UN 
Consultative Status?  
 General prestige/visibility for organization 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Credibility in fundraising 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Networking with other NGOs/organizations 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Contributing/exchanging research with the UN and other organizations 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Contributing written or verbal position statement on issues 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Other (please specify)________________________________________________ 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
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7. Within your organization, who was most responsible for seeking UN Consultative Status? 
 CEO _____ 
 Executive Director _____ 
 Board Member(s) _____ 
 Other (please specify title _______________________________) _____ 
 
8. How would you rate the beneficial impact upon your NGO of obtaining UN Consultative 
Status in each of the following respects? (10 denotes highly beneficial, 0 denotes no benefit 
directly derived) 
 Making meaningful connections with other NGOs in the US 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Making meaningful connections with other NGOs internationally 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Making meaningful contributions to the UN 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Prestige/legitimacy derived for your organization 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Media publicity for your organization 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 
 
 278 
 
 Aid in fundraising for your organization 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Other (please specify: ______________________________) 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 Other (please specify: ______________________________) 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
Accreditation/Representation 
1. Please indicate if a designated representative of your organization has successfully obtained a 
UN Grounds Pass/ID for each of the following UN headquarters/offices …  
New York Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______  
Geneva     Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______ 
Vienna      Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______ 
  Regional Offices 
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining pass/ID: ______ 
Bangkok, Thailand Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______ 
Beirut, Lebanon Y ___ N___ If Yes, # of representatives obtaining grounds pass/ID: ______ 
Santiago, Chile Y ___ N___ If Yes, number of representatives obtaining pass/ID: ______ 
 
2. In a typical year what total number of representatives of your organization will have completed 
accreditation and obtained a UN Grounds Pass: ________  
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3. At which of the following UN headquarters/offices has your organization participated in 
meetings/conferences or some other function?  
 New York  ______  
 Geneva     ______ 
 Vienna      ______ 
  Regional Offices 
 Addis Ababa, Ethiopia ______ 
 Bangkok, Thailand ______ 
 Beirut, Lebanon ______ 
 Santiago, Chile ______ 
 
How would you assess the overall ease/difficulty of designating and accrediting your 
organization’s representatives to the UN?  
 (10 denotes a very high degree of difficulty, 0 denotes no difficulty) 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
4. Which of the following best characterizes the nature of your designated UN representatives? 
 Full-time employee(s) of your NGO _______ (# in this category _____) 
 Part-time employee(s) of your NGO_______ (# in this category _____) 
 Board member(s) of your NGO _______ (# in this category _____) 
 Donor(s) to your NGO _______ (# in this category _____) 
 Other unpaid supporter(s) of your NGO _______ (# in this category _____) 
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Participation 
1. Approximately how many UN conferences/meetings/workshops has your organization attended 
in the following periods:  
 2005-present: _____ 
 1995-2005: _____ 
 Pre-1995: _____ 
 
2. Aside from attending conferences has your organization…  
 Presented a written statement at the UN? Yes____ No____ 
 Presented a verbal statement at the UN? Yes____ No____ 
 Been asked by UN to present a written statement? Yes_____ No_____ 
 Been asked by UN to present a verbal statement? Yes_____ No_____ 
 
3. To what degree do you feel that the UN values the participation of your NGO? (10 denotes 
extremely high valuation, 0 denotes total lack of valuation)  
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
4. Has your organization ever organized/hosted an event (e.g., meeting among NGOs) at the UN?  
 Yes_____ No_____ 
 
 
Networking/Communication 
1. To what degree has your organization networked with other NGOs in Consultative Status with 
the UN?  (10 denotes a very high degree of interaction, 0 denotes no interaction at all)  
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
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2. Since you obtained Consultative Status have any of the following directly contacted you?  
 UN-affiliated NGOs     Y_____(estimated # of times: ______ )    No_____ 
 Foreign governments Y_____(estimated # of times: ______ )    No _____ 
 UN agency/office Y _____(estimated # of times: ______ )   No _____ 
 
 If yes, for what purpose did the other NGO(s) contact you (check all that apply): 
  General information sharing/introductions _____ 
  Collaboration/sharing of research _____ 
  Specific question about UN process _____ 
  Specific question about your NGOs mission _____ 
  Other (please specify__________________________________________) _____  
 
3. To what degree has your organization communicated with the UN with a question/request via 
the following mediums? (below each please rate level of satisfaction with the speed/substance 
of reply from UN: 10 denotes complete satisfaction, 0 denotes complete lack of satisfaction)  
 
Have you emailed the UN? Yes _____ No _____ If yes, how many times: ___________ 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
  
Have you called the UN? Yes _____ No _____  If yes, how many times: ___________ 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
  
Have you faxed the UN? Yes _____ No _____  If yes, how many times: ___________ 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
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Have you written the UN? Yes _____ No _____  If yes, how many times: ___________ 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
4. Has your organization ever participated in any NGO network(s)/coalition(s) active within the 
UN framework?  Y_____ N_____ Name(s) of network(s)/coalition(s): 
Barriers 
1. How would you rate each of the following as barriers to NGO participation with UN 
programs? (10 denotes significant barrier, 0 denotes no barrier at all)  
 Understanding UN Processes (Clarity of Opportunities to Participate)  
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 Conference Registration 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 Designation/Credentialing of UN Reps 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 Financial Commitment/Expenses 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 Time/Personnel Commitment 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 Quadrennial Report 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 Geographical proximity/distance of UN functions 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 Support of your NGO’s board and/or donors 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 UN restrictions concerning presentation of written/verbal position statements 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
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 Other (please specify ____________________________________________) 
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
2. How could the UN improve the overall experience for NGOs with Consultative Status? 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3. To what degree is the cost and effort of obtaining and maintaining UN Consultative Status 
justified by the benefits derived by your organization?  (10 denotes highly justified, 0 denotes not 
justified at all)  
10----------9----------8----------7----------6----------5----------4----------3----------2----------1---------0 
 
 
Name of survey respondent: _____________________ NGO: ___________________________ 
 
Anonymity in this study is guaranteed.  Respondents’ identities and the identities of participating 
NGOs will be known only to the researcher and neither will ever be revealed to any third party, 
nor will the identity of respondents/NGOs ever be published in any research derived from this 
study.  
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United Nations  
Resolution 1996/31 
Economic and Social Council 
49th plenary meeting 
25 July 1996 
1996/31. Consultative relationship between the United Nations and non-governmental 
organizations  
 
The Economic and Social Council,  
 
Recalling Article 71 of the Charter of the United Nations,  
Recalling also its resolution 1993/80 of 30 July 1993, in which it requested a general 
review of arrangements for consultation with non-governmental organizations, with a 
view to updating, if necessary, Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) of 23 May 1968, as well 
as introducing coherence in the rules governing the participation of non-governmental 
organizations in international conferences convened by the United Nations, and also an 
examination of ways and means of improving practical arrangements for the work of the 
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations and the Non-Governmental 
Organizations Section of the Secretariat,  
Recalling further its decision 1995/304 of 26 July 1995,  
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Confirming the need to take into account the full diversity of the non-governmental 
organizations at the national, regional and international levels,  
Acknowledging the breadth of non-governmental organizations' expertise and the 
capacity of non-governmental organizations to support the work of the United Nations,  
Taking into account the changes in the non-governmental sector, including the emergence 
of a large number of national and regional organizations,  
Calling upon the governing bodies of the relevant organizations, bodies and specialized 
agencies of the United Nations system to examine the principles and practices relating to 
their consultations with non-governmental organizations and to take action, as 
appropriate, to promote coherence in the light of the provisions of the present resolution,  
Approves the following update of the arrangements set out in its resolution 1296 (XLIV) 
of 23 May 1968:  
ARRANGEMENTS FOR CONSULTATION WITH NON-GOVERNMENTAL 
ORGANIZATIONS  
Part I  
PRINCIPLES TO BE APPLIED IN THE ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE 
RELATIONS  
 
The following principles shall be applied in establishing consultative relations with non-
governmental organizations:  
 287 
 
1. The organization shall be concerned with matters falling within the competence of the 
Economic and Social Council and its subsidiary bodies.  
2. The aims and purposes of the organization shall be in conformity with the spirit, 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations.  
3. The organization shall undertake to support the work of the United Nations and to 
promote knowledge of its principles and activities, in accordance with its own aims and 
purposes and the nature and scope of its competence and activities.  
4. Except where expressly stated otherwise, the term "organization" shall refer to non-
governmental organizations at the national, subregional, regional or international levels.  
5. Consultative relationships may be established with international, regional, subregional 
and national organizations, in conformity with the Charter of the United Nations and the 
principles and criteria established under the present resolution. The Committee, in 
considering applications for consultative status, should ensure, to the extent possible, 
participation of non-governmental organizations from all regions, and particularly from 
developing countries, in order to help achieve a just, balanced, effective and genuine 
involvement of non-governmental organizations from all regions and areas of the world. 
The Committee shall also pay particular attention to non-governmental organizations that 
have special expertise or experience upon which the Council may wish to draw.  
6. Greater participation of non-governmental organizations from developing countries in 
international conferences convened by the United Nations should be encouraged.  
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7. Greater involvement of non-governmental organizations from countries with 
economies in transition should be encouraged.  
8. Regional, subregional and national organizations, including those affiliated to an 
international organization already in status, may be admitted provided that they can 
demonstrate that their programme of work is of direct relevance to the aims and purposes 
of the United Nations and, in the case of national organizations, after consultation with 
the Member State concerned. The views expressed by the Member State, if any, shall be 
communicated to the non-governmental organization concerned, which shall have the 
opportunity to respond to those views through the Committee on Non-Governmental 
Organizations.  
9. The organization shall be of recognized standing within the particular field of its 
competence or of a representative character. Where there exist a number of organizations 
with similar objectives, interests and basic views in a given field, they may, for the 
purposes of consultation with the Council, form a joint committee or other body 
authorized to carry on such consultation for the group as a whole.  
10. The organization shall have an established headquarters, with an executive officer. It 
shall have a democratically adopted constitution, a copy of which shall be deposited with 
the Secretary-General of the United Nations, and which shall provide for the 
determination of policy by a conference, congress or other representative body, and for 
an executive organ responsible to the policy-making body.  
11. The organization shall have authority to speak for its members through its authorized 
representatives. Evidence of this authority shall be presented, if requested.  
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12. The organization shall have a representative structure and possess appropriate 
mechanisms of accountability to its members, who shall exercise effective control over 
its policies and actions through the exercise of voting rights or other appropriate 
democratic and transparent decision-making processes. Any such organization that is not 
established by a governmental entity or intergovernmental agreement shall be considered 
a non-governmental organization for the purpose of these arrangements, including 
organizations that accept members designated by governmental authorities, provided that 
such membership does not interfere with the free expression of views of the organization.  
13. The basic resources of the organization shall be derived in the main part from 
contributions of the national affiliates or other components or from individual members. 
Where voluntary contributions have been received, their amounts and donors shall be 
faithfully revealed to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations. 
Where, however, the above criterion is not fulfilled and an organization is financed from 
other sources, it must explain to the satisfaction of the Committee its reasons for not 
meeting the requirements laid down in this paragraph. Any financial contribution or other 
support, direct or indirect, from a Government to the organization shall be openly 
declared to the Committee through the Secretary-General and fully recorded in the 
financial and other records of the organization and shall be devoted to purposes in 
accordance with the aims of the United Nations.  
14. In considering the establishment of consultative relations with a non-governmental 
organization, the Council will take into account whether the field of activity of the 
organization is wholly or mainly within the field of a specialized agency, and whether or 
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not it could be admitted when it has, or may have, a consultative arrangement with a 
specialized agency.  
15. The granting, suspension and withdrawal of consultative status, as well as the 
interpretation of norms and decisions relating to this matter, are the prerogative of 
Member States exercised through the Economic and Social Council and its Committee on 
Non-Governmental Organizations. A non-governmental organization applying for 
general or special consultative status or a listing on the Roster shall have the opportunity 
to respond to any objections being raised in the Committee before the Committee takes 
its decision.  
16. The provisions of the present resolution shall apply to the United Nations regional 
commissions and their subsidiary bodies mutatis mutandis.  
17. In recognizing the evolving relationship between the United Nations and non-
governmental organizations, the Economic and Social Council, in consultation with the 
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, will consider reviewing the 
consultative arrangements as and when necessary to facilitate, in the most effective 
manner possible, the contributions of non-governmental organizations to the work of the 
United Nations.  
Part II  
PRINCIPLES GOVERNING THE NATURE OF THE CONSULTATIVE 
ARRANGEMENTS  
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18. A clear distinction is drawn in the Charter of the United Nations between 
participation without vote in the deliberations of the Council and the arrangements for 
consultation. Under Articles 69 and 70, participation is provided for only in the case of 
States not members of the Council, and of specialized agencies. Article 71, applying to 
non-governmental organizations, provides for suitable arrangements for consultation. 
This distinction, deliberately made in the Charter, is fundamental and the arrangements 
for consultation should not be such as to accord to non-governmental organizations the 
same rights of participation as are accorded to States not members of the Council and to 
the specialized agencies brought into relationship with the United Nations.  
19. The arrangements should not be such as to overburden the Council or transform it 
from a body for coordination of policy and action, as contemplated in the Charter, into a 
general forum for discussion.  
20. Decisions on arrangements for consultation should be guided by the principle that 
consultative arrangements are to be made, on the one hand, for the purpose of enabling 
the Council or one of its bodies to secure expert information or advice from organizations 
having special competence in the subjects for which consultative arrangements are made, 
and, on the other hand, to enable international, regional, subregional and national 
organizations that represent important elements of public opinion to express their views. 
Therefore, the arrangements for consultation made with each organization should relate 
to the subjects for which that organization has a special competence or in which it has a 
special interest. The organizations given consultative status should be limited to those 
whose activities in fields set out in paragraph 1 above qualify them to make a significant 
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contribution to the work of the Council and should, in sum, as far as possible reflect in a 
balanced way the major viewpoints or interests in these fields in all areas and regions of 
the world.  
Part III  
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSULTATIVE RELATIONSHIPS  
21. In establishing consultative relationships with each organization, regard shall be had 
to the nature and scope of its activities and to the assistance it may be expected to give to 
the Council or its subsidiary bodies in carrying out the functions set out in Chapters IX 
and X of the Charter of the United Nations.  
22. Organizations that are concerned with most of the activities of the Council and its 
subsidiary bodies and can demonstrate to the satisfaction of the Council that they have 
substantive and sustained contributions to make to the achievement of the objectives of 
the United Nations in fields set out in paragraph 1 above, and are closely involved with 
the economic and social life of the peoples of the areas they represent and whose 
membership, which should be considerable, is broadly representative of major segments 
of society in a large number of countries in different regions of the world shall be known 
as organizations in general consultative status.  
23. Organizations that have a special competence in, and are concerned specifically with, 
only a few of the fields of activity covered by the Council and its subsidiary bodies, and 
that are known within the fields for which they have or seek consultative status shall be 
known as organizations in special consultative status.  
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24. Other organizations that do not have general or special consultative status but that the 
Council, or the Secretary-General of the United Nations in consultation with the Council 
or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, considers can make occasional 
and useful contributions to the work of the Council or its subsidiary bodies or other 
United Nations bodies within their competence shall be included in a list (to be known as 
the Roster). This list may also include organizations in consultative status or a similar 
relationship with a specialized agency or a United Nations body. These organizations 
shall be available for consultation at the request of the Council or its subsidiary bodies. 
The fact that an organization is on the Roster shall not in itself be regarded as a 
qualification for general or special consultative status should an organization seek such 
status.  
25. Organizations to be accorded special consultative status because of their interest in 
the field of human rights should pursue the goals of promotion and protection of human 
rights in accordance with the spirit of the Charter of the United Nations, the Universal 
Declaration of Human Rights and the Vienna Declaration and Programme of Action.  
26. Major organizations one of whose primary purposes is to promote the aims, 
objectives and purposes of the United Nations and a furtherance of the understanding of 
its work may be accorded consultative status.  
Part IV  
CONSULTATION WITH THE COUNCIL  
Provisional agenda  
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27. The provisional agenda of the Council shall be communicated to organizations in 
general consultative status and special consultative status and to those on the Roster.  
28. Organizations in general consultative status may propose to the Council Committee 
on Non-Governmental Organizations that the Committee request the Secretary-General to 
place items of special interest to the organizations in the provisional agenda of the 
Council.  
Attendance at meetings  
29. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may 
designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the Council 
and its subsidiary bodies. Those on the Roster may have representatives present at such 
meetings concerned with matters within their field of competence. These attendance 
arrangements may be supplemented to include other modalities of participation.  
Written statements  
30. Written statements relevant to the work of the Council may be submitted by 
organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on subjects in 
which these organizations have a special competence. Such statements shall be circulated 
by the Secretary-General of the United Nations to the members of the Council, except 
those statements that have become obsolete, for example, those dealing with matters 
already disposed of and those that had already been circulated in some other form.  
31. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation 
of such statements:  
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(a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;  
(b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place 
between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;  
(c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the Secretary-
General may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in 
final form;  
(d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will 
be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of 
2,000 words, the organizations shall submit a summary which will be circulated or shall 
supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A 
statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of the Council 
or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;  
(e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status or on 
the Roster will be circulated in full if it does not exceed 500 words. Where a statement is 
in excess of 500 words, the organization shall submit a summary which will be 
circulated; such statements will be circulated in full, however, upon a specific request of 
the Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations;  
(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the President of the Council, or the 
Council or its Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations, may invite organizations 
on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions of subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) 
and (e) above shall apply to such statements;  
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(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be circulated by the 
Secretary-General in the working languages, and, upon the request of a member of the 
Council, in any of the official languages.  
Oral presentations during meetings  
32. (a) The Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall make 
recommendations to the Council as to which organizations in general consultative status 
should make an oral presentation to the Council and on which items they should be heard. 
Such organizations shall be entitled to make one statement to the Council, subject to the 
approval of the Council. In the absence of a subsidiary body of the Council with 
jurisdiction in a major field of interest to the Council and to organizations in special 
consultative status, the Committee may recommend that organizations in special 
consultative status be heard by the Council on the subject in its field of interest;  
(b) Whenever the Council discusses the substance of an item proposed by a non-
governmental organization in general consultative status and included in the agenda of 
the Council, such an organization shall be entitled to present orally to the Council, as 
appropriate, an introductory statement of an expository nature. Such an organization may 
be invited by the President of the Council, with the consent of the relevant body, to make, 
in the course of the discussion of the item before the Council, an additional statement for 
purposes of clarification.  
Part V  
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CONSULTATION WITH COMMISSIONS AND OTHER SUBSIDIARY ORGANS OF 
THE COUNCIL  
Provisional agenda  
33. The provisional agenda of sessions of commissions and other subsidiary organs of the 
Council shall be communicated to organizations in general consultative status and special 
consultative status and those on the Roster.  
34. Organizations in general consultative status may propose items for the provisional 
agenda of commissions, subject to the following conditions:  
(a) An organization that intends to propose such an item shall inform the Secretary-
General of the United Nations at least 63 days before the commencement of the session 
and before formally proposing an item shall give due consideration to any comments the 
Secretary- General may make;  
(b) The proposal shall be formally submitted with the relevant basic documentation not 
later than 49 days before the commencement of the session. The item shall be included in 
the agenda of the commission if it is adopted by a two-thirds majority of those present 
and voting.  
Attendance at meetings  
35. Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status may 
designate authorized representatives to sit as observers at public meetings of the 
commissions and other subsidiary organs of the Council. Organizations on the Roster 
may have representatives present at such meetings that are concerned with matters within 
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their field of competence. These attendance arrangements may be supplemented to 
include other modalities of participation.  
Written statements  
36. Written statements relevant to the work of the commissions or other subsidiary organs 
may be submitted by organizations in general consultative status and special consultative 
status on subjects for which these organizations have a special competence. Such 
statements shall be circulated by the Secretary-General to members of the commission or 
other subsidiary organs, except those statements that have become obsolete, for example, 
those dealing with matters already disposed of and those that have already been 
circulated in some other form to members of the commission or other subsidiary organs.  
37. The following conditions shall be observed regarding the submission and circulation 
of such written statements:  
(a) The written statement shall be submitted in one of the official languages;  
(b) It shall be submitted in sufficient time for appropriate consultation to take place 
between the Secretary-General and the organization before circulation;  
(c) The organization shall give due consideration to any comments that the Secretary-
General may make in the course of such consultation before transmitting the statement in 
final form;  
(d) A written statement submitted by an organization in general consultative status will 
be circulated in full if it does not exceed 2,000 words. Where a statement is in excess of 
2,000 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall 
 299 
 
supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A 
statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon the specific request of the 
commission or other subsidiary organs;  
(e) A written statement submitted by an organization in special consultative status will be 
circulated in full if it does not exceed 1,500 words. Where a statement is in excess of 
1,500 words, the organization shall submit a summary, which will be circulated, or shall 
supply sufficient copies of the full text in the working languages for distribution. A 
statement will also be circulated in full, however, upon the specific request of the 
commission or other subsidiary organs;  
(f) The Secretary-General, in consultation with the chairman of the relevant commission 
or other subsidiary organ, or the commission or other subsidiary organ itself, may invite 
organizations on the Roster to submit written statements. The provisions in 
subparagraphs (a), (b), (c) and (e) above shall apply to such statements;  
(g) A written statement or summary, as the case may be, will be circulated by the 
Secretary-General in the working languages and, upon the request of a member of the 
commission or other subsidiary organ, in any of the official languages.  
Oral presentations during meetings  
38. (a) The commission or other subsidiary organs may consult with organizations in 
general consultative status and special consultative status either directly or through a 
committee or committees established for the purpose. In all cases, such consultations may 
be arranged upon the request of the organization;  
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(b) On the recommendation of the Secretary-General and at the request of the 
commission or other subsidiary organs, organizations on the Roster may also be heard by 
the commission or other subsidiary organs.  
Special studies  
39. Subject to the relevant rules of procedure on financial implications, a commission or 
other subsidiary organ may recommend that an organization that has special competence 
in a particular field should undertake specific studies or investigations or prepare specific 
papers for the commission. The limitations of paragraphs 37 (d) and (e) above shall not 
apply in this case.  
Part VI  
CONSULTATIONS WITH AD HOC COMMITTEES OF THE COUNCIL  
40. The arrangements for consultation between ad hoc committees of the Council 
authorized to meet between sessions of the Council and organizations in general 
consultative status and special consultative status and on the Roster shall follow those 
approved for commissions of the Council, unless the Council or the committee decides 
otherwise.  
Part VII  
PARTICIPATION OF NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS IN 
INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCES CONVENED BY THE UNITED NATIONS 
AND THEIR PREPARATORY PROCESS  
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41. Where non-governmental organizations have been invited to participate in an 
international conference convened by the United Nations, their accreditation is the 
prerogative of Member States, exercised through the respective preparatory committee. 
Such accreditation should be preceded by an appropriate process to determine their 
eligibility.  
42. Non-governmental organizations in general consultative status, special consultative 
status and on the Roster, that express their wish to attend the relevant international 
conferences convened by the United Nations and the meetings of the preparatory bodies 
of the said conferences shall as a rule be accredited for participation. Other non-
governmental organizations wishing to be accredited may apply to the secretariat of the 
conference for this purpose in accordance with the following requirements.  
43. The secretariat of the conference shall be responsible for the receipt and preliminary 
evaluation of requests from non-governmental organizations for accreditation to the 
conference and its preparatory process. In the discharge of its functions, the secretariat of 
the conference shall work in close cooperation and coordination with the Non-
Governmental Organizations Section of the Secretariat, and shall be guided by the 
relevant provisions of Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as updated.  
44. All such applications must be accompanied by information on the competence of the 
organization and the relevance of its activities to the work of the conference and its 
preparatory committee, with an indication of the particular areas of the conference 
agenda and preparations to which such competence and relevance pertain, and should 
include, inter alia, the following information:  
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(a) The purpose of the organization;  
(b) Information as to the programmes and activities of the organization in areas relevant 
to the conference and its preparatory process and the country or countries in which they 
are carried out. Non-governmental organizations seeking accreditation shall be asked to 
confirm their interest in the goals and objectives of the conference;  
(c) Confirmation of the activities of the organization at the national, regional or 
international level;  
(d) Copies of the annual or other reports of the organization with financial statements, 
and a list of financial sources and contributions, including governmental contributions;  
(e) A list of members of the governing body of the organization and their countries of 
nationality;  
(f) A description of the membership of the organization, indicating the total number of 
members, the names of organizations that are members and their geographical 
distribution;  
(g) A copy of the constitution and/or by-laws of the organization.  
45. In the evaluation of the relevance of applications of non-governmental organizations 
for accreditation to the conference and its preparatory process, it is agreed that a 
determination shall be made based on their background and involvement in the subject 
areas of the conference.  
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46. The secretariat shall publish and disseminate to Member States on a periodic basis the 
updated list of applications received. Member States may submit comments on any of the 
applications on the list 14 days from receipt of the above-mentioned list by Member 
States. The comments of Member States shall be communicated to the non-governmental 
organization concerned, which shall have the opportunity to respond.  
47. In cases where the secretariat believes, on the basis of the information provided in 
accordance with the present resolution, that the organization has established its 
competence and the relevance of its activities to the work of the preparatory committee, it 
shall recommend to the preparatory committee that the organization be accredited. In 
cases where the secretariat does not recommend the granting of accreditation, it shall 
make available to the preparatory committee its reasons for not doing so. The secretariat 
should ensure that its recommendations are available to members of the preparatory 
committee at least one week prior to the start of each session. The secretariat must notify 
such applicants of the reasons for non-recommendation and provide an opportunity to 
respond to objections and furnish additional information as may be required.  
48. The preparatory committee shall decide on all recommendations for accreditation 
within 24 hours after the recommendations of the secretariat have been taken up by the 
preparatory committee in plenary meeting. In the event of a decision not being taken 
within this period, interim accreditation shall be accorded until such time as a decision is 
taken.  
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49. A non-governmental organization that has been granted accreditation to attend a 
session of the preparatory committee, including related preparatory meetings of regional 
commissions, may attend all its future sessions, as well as the conference itself.  
50. In recognition of the intergovernmental nature of the conference and its preparatory 
process, active participation of non-governmental organizations therein, while welcome, 
does not entail a negotiating role.  
51. The non-governmental organizations accredited to the international conference may 
be given, in accordance with established United Nations practice and at the discretion of 
the chairperson and the consent of the body concerned, an opportunity to briefly address 
the preparatory committee and the conference in plenary meetings and their subsidiary 
bodies.  
52. Non-governmental organizations accredited to the conference may make written 
presentations during the preparatory process in the official languages of the United 
Nations as they deem appropriate. Those written presentations shall not be issued as 
official documents except in accordance with United Nations rules of procedure.  
53. Non-governmental organizations without consultative status that participate in 
international conferences and wish to obtain consultative status later on should apply 
through the normal procedures established under Council resolution 1296 (XLIV) as 
updated. Recognizing the importance of the participation of non-governmental 
organizations that attend a conference in the follow-up process, the Committee on Non-
Governmental Organizations, in considering their application, shall draw upon the 
documents already submitted by that organization for accreditation to the conference and 
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any additional information submitted by the non-governmental organization supporting 
its interest, relevance and capacity to contribute to the implementation phase. The 
Committee shall review such applications as expeditiously as possible so as to allow 
participation of the respective organization in the implementation phase of the 
conference. In the interim, the Economic and Social Council shall decide on the 
participation of non-governmental organizations accredited to an international conference 
in the work of the relevant functional commission on the follow-up to and 
implementation of that conference.  
54. The suspension and withdrawal of the accreditation of non-governmental 
organizations to United Nations international conferences at all stages shall be guided by 
the relevant provisions of the present resolution.  
Part VIII  
SUSPENSION AND WITHDRAWAL OF CONSULTATIVE STATUS  
55. Organizations granted consultative status by the Council and those on the Roster shall 
conform at all times to the principles governing the establishment and nature of their 
consultative relations with the Council. In periodically reviewing the activities of non-
governmental organizations on the basis of the reports submitted under paragraph 61 (c) 
below and other relevant information, the Council Committee on Non-Governmental 
Organizations shall determine the extent to which the organizations have complied with 
the principles governing consultative status and have contributed to the work of the 
Council, and may recommend to the Council suspension of or exclusion from 
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consultative status of organizations that have not met the requirements for consultative 
status as set forth in the present resolution.  
56. In cases where the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations has decided to 
recommend that the general or special consultative status of a non-governmental 
organization or its listing on the Roster be suspended or withdrawn, the non-
governmental organization concerned shall be given written reasons for that decision and 
shall have an opportunity to present its response for appropriate consideration by the 
Committee as expeditiously as possible.  
57. The consultative status of non-governmental organizations with the Economic and 
Social Council and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended up to three years 
or withdrawn in the following cases:  
(a) If an organization, either directly or through its affiliates or representatives acting on 
its behalf, clearly abuses its status by engaging in a pattern of acts contrary to the 
purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations including unsubstantiated or 
politically motivated acts against Member States of the United Nations incompatible with 
those purposes and principles;  
(b) If there exists substantiated evidence of influence from proceeds resulting from 
internationally recognized criminal activities such as the illicit drugs trade, money-
laundering or the illegal arms trade;  
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(c) If, within the preceding three years, an organization did not make any positive or 
effective contribution to the work of the United Nations and, in particular, of the Council 
or its commissions or other subsidiary organs.  
58. The consultative status of organizations in general consultative status and special 
consultative status and the listing of those on the Roster shall be suspended or withdrawn 
by the decision of the Economic and Social Council on the recommendation of its 
Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations.  
59. An organization whose consultative status or whose listing on the Roster is 
withdrawn may be entitled to reapply for consultative status or for inclusion on the Roster 
not sooner than three years after the effective date of such withdrawal.  
Part IX  
COUNCIL COMMITTEE ON NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATIONS  
60. The members of the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations shall be elected 
by the Council on the basis of equitable geographical representation, in accordance with 
the relevant Council resolutions and decision 1/ and rules of procedure of the Council. 2/ 
The Committee shall elect its Chairman and other officers as necessary.  
61. The functions of the Committee shall include the following:  
(a) The Committee shall be responsible for regular monitoring of the evolving 
relationship between non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. With a 
view to fulfilling this responsibility, the Committee shall hold, before each of its sessions, 
and at other times as necessary, consultations with organizations in consultative status to 
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discuss questions of interest to the Committee or to the organizations relating to the 
relationship between the non-governmental organizations and the United Nations. A 
report on such consultations shall be transmitted to the Council for appropriate action;  
(b) The Committee shall hold its regular session before the substantive session of the 
Council each year and preferably before the sessions of functional commissions of the 
Council to consider applications for general consultative status and special consultative 
status and for listing on the Roster made by non-governmental organizations and requests 
for changes in status, and to make recommendations thereon to the Council. Upon 
approval by the Council, the Committee may hold other meetings as required to fulfil its 
mandated responsibilities. Organizations shall give due consideration to any comments 
on technical matters that the Secretary-General of the United Nations may make in 
receiving such applications for the Committee. The Committee shall consider at each 
such session applications received by the Secretary-General not later than 1 June of the 
preceding year, on which sufficient data have been distributed to the members of the 
Committee not later than six weeks before the applications are to be considered. 
Transitional arrangements, if possible, may be made during the current year only. 
Reapplication by an organization for status, or a request for a change in status, shall be 
considered by the Committee at the earliest at its first session in the second year 
following the session at which the substance of the previous application or request was 
considered, unless at the time of such consideration it was decided otherwise;  
(c) Organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status shall 
submit to the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations through the 
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Secretary-General every fourth year a brief report of their activities, specifically as 
regards the support they have given to the work of the United Nations. Based on findings 
of the Committee's examination of the report and other relevant information, the 
Committee may recommend to the Council any reclassification in status of the 
organization concerned as it deems appropriate. However, under exceptional 
circumstances, the Committee may ask for such a report from an individual organization 
in general consultative status or special consultative status or on the Roster, between the 
regular reporting dates;  
(d) The Committee may consult, in connection with sessions of the Council or at such 
other times as it may decide, with organizations in general consultative status and special 
consultative status on matters within their competence, other than items in the agenda of 
the Council, on which the Council or the Committee or the organization requests 
consultation. The Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;  
(e) The Committee may consult, in connection with any particular session of the Council, 
with organizations in general consultative status and special consultative status on 
matters within the competence of the organizations concerning specific items already in 
the provisional agenda of the Council on which the Council or the Committee or the 
organization requests consultation, and shall make recommendations as to which 
organizations, subject to the provisions of paragraph 32 (a) above, should be heard by the 
Council or the appropriate committee and regarding which subjects should be heard. The 
Committee shall report to the Council on such consultations;  
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(f) The Committee shall consider matters concerning non-governmental organizations 
that may be referred to it by the Council or by commissions;  
(g) The Committee shall consult with the Secretary-General, as appropriate, on matters 
affecting the consultative arrangements under Article 71 of the Charter, and arising 
therefrom;  
(h) An organization that applies for consultative status should attest that it has been in 
existence for at least two years as at the date of receipt of the application by the 
Secretariat. Evidence of such existence shall be furnished to the Secretariat.  
62. The Committee, in considering a request from a non-governmental organization in 
general consultative status that an item be placed in the agenda of the Council, shall take 
into account, among other things:  
(a) The adequacy of the documentation submitted by the organization;  
(b) The extent to which it is considered that the item lends itself to early and constructive 
action by the Council;  
(c) The possibility that the item might be more appropriately dealt with elsewhere than in 
the Council.  
63. Any decision by the Council Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations not to 
grant a request submitted by a non-governmental organization in general consultative 
status that an item be placed in the provisional agenda of the Council shall be considered 
final unless the Council decides otherwise.  
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Part X  
CONSULTATION WITH THE SECRETARIAT  
64. The Secretariat should be so organized as to enable it to carry out the duties assigned 
to it concerning the consultative arrangements and the accreditation of non-governmental 
organizations to United Nations international conferences as set forth in the present 
resolution.  
65. All organizations in consultative relationship shall be able to consult with officers of 
the appropriate sections of the Secretariat on matters in which there is a mutual interest or 
a mutual concern. Such consultation shall be upon the request of the non-governmental 
organization or upon the request of the Secretary-General of the United Nations.  
66. The Secretary-General may request organizations in general consultative status and 
special consultative status and those on the Roster to carry out specific studies or prepare 
specific papers, subject to the relevant financial regulations.  
67. The Secretary-General shall be authorized, within the means at his disposal, to offer 
to non-governmental organizations in consultative relationship facilities that include:  
(a) Prompt and efficient distribution of such documents of the Council and its subsidiary 
bodies as shall in the judgement of the Secretary-General be appropriate;  
(b) Access to the press documentation services provided by the United Nations;  
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(c) Arrangement of informal discussions on matters of special interest to groups or 
organizations;  
(d) Use of the libraries of the United Nations;  
(e) Provision of accommodation for conferences or smaller meetings of consultative 
organizations on the work of the Economic and Social Council;  
(f) Appropriate seating arrangements and facilities for obtaining documents during public 
meetings of the General Assembly dealing with matters in the economic, social and 
related fields.  
Part XI  
SECRETARIAT SUPPORT  
68. Adequate Secretariat support shall be required for fulfilment of the mandate defined 
for the Committee on Non-Governmental Organizations with respect to carrying out the 
wider range of activities in which the enhanced involvement of non-governmental 
organizations is envisaged. The Secretary-General is requested to provide the necessary 
resources for this purpose and to take steps for improving the coordination within the 
Secretariat of units dealing with non-governmental organizations.  
69. The Secretary-General is requested to make every effort to enhance and streamline as 
appropriate Secretariat support arrangements, and to improve practical arrangements on 
such matters as greater use of modern information and communication technology, 
establishment of an integrated database of non-governmental organizations, wide and 
timely dissemination of information on meetings, distribution of documentation, 
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provision of access and transparent, simple and streamlined procedures for the attendance 
of non-governmental organizations in United Nations meetings, and to facilitate their 
broad-based participation.  
70. The Secretary-General is requested to make the present resolution widely known, 
through proper channels, to facilitate the involvement of non-governmental organizations 
from all regions and areas of the world.  
Notes  
1/ Council resolutions 1099 (XL) and 1981/50 and Council decision 1995/304.  
2/ Rule 80 of the rules of procedure of the Council. 
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